

FAMILY AND CIVILISATION IN THE EAST AND THE WEST

(With particular reference to India and the U.S.A.)

BY

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
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INTRODUCTION

Countries like India which moved from colonialism to nationhood are seeking to modernise themselves and to improve their economy as rapidly as possible. These changes will have profound influences upon the family systems.

Changes in the family system are necessary to facilitate and promote the modernisation of the economy of a nation. Among such changes is the need to control population growth, or "family planning." But this is only a part of the results which may be expected. In order to clarify the significance of family change to general social change, and vice versa, the comparative method is used. In this study of family systems in the East and West the Indian family system is compared with those in other areas and with Western experience.

It should be noted that great reformers, such as Mahatma Gandhi and Mao Tse-tung emphasised in their programmes that the social changes they propose and initiate necessitate family reforms beginning with a change in the social status of women. Women shape the minds of the young, whom they bear.

Chapter II on *The History of Family Sociology* consists really of three parts. In the early periods before it was called family sociology, the family systems were used for the purposes of regularising and helping the larger social systems work. The Epics and heroic documents used family tales and legends to inculcate common moral, social and political values in the people. The religious books of both the East and West also served the same purposes. From the family tales individuals gained a common code of behaviour which fitted them into the larger society. This was the standardisation of customary or common law. Later as family sociology arose and received an official name a great many schools of thought sought to formulate some idea of the nature of the family unit. Finally in the most recent periods the family doctrines became entwined with ideas of the relation of the institution to social change. Also the family began to adapt to social changes, on the one hand, and to force society to adapt itself to family needs.

Chapter III discusses the works of Frederic Le Play, who in France between 1806-82 developed studies of the relations of the family types with various societies and conditions of civilisation. The purpose of this chapter is to point out that the relation of the family to grand social change, has a history which, considering the interest of Indian and other sociologists in the family, should be made more easily available and better known to them.

Chapter IV presents a general survey of world family systems. This classifies all the major family types of the world into five groups of which

the Western has traits most fitted to the modern age and the other four are less so. From this analysis it is possible to gain a picture of possible movements of each type. Needless to say no family system is ideal or perfect and this applies to the Western as well as the others.

The family is the *basic social unit*. It is an institution which not only serves primate man but also is responsible for the religious and moral aspects of society as well as being integrated with the legal and political structures and governmental institutions. In other words, the family is a triple organisation. Hence the emergence of an independent legal state, in contrast with colonial organisation, not only requires family modification but eventually forces certain kinds of changes.

This thesis is developed further in Chapter V which shows that the nuclear family with its distinct biological base is *fundamentally* and *basically* the same the world over. In other words, the order found in nature also extends to human family relations. That is if men were not creators of culture the human family would be essentially alike everywhere. Hence, great family system change is largely a response to culture change and vice versa. Moving from colonial to self-government and from feudal to modern conditions is a massive cultural change. Hence the uniqueness of any family system, including the Indian, is one of its adjustment to the type of society which is present at any time and not to any fundamental differences between Indians and other people. It maintains that the family is fundamentally the same in the East and the West.

Chapter V outlines the general tracts of all the five major world family systems. In each is found the same basic primate system of values. Men and women as spouses live rather exclusively, notably in respect of intimate relations. They form mating pairs of sexual animals and bear children. These children are raised by them to adulthood and inculcated with the necessary knowledge required of adults for the culture into which they are to fit.

The uniqueness of any family system lies within the cultures to which it is adapted or into which it must fit. Thus, family systems consist not only of universalisms of the species but also localisms about these which adapt them to the cultures in which they are found. This is where *Family and Society* comes into the picture. If the society changes, as they all do in course of time, the family has to adjust. The question is: does the family type promote the new developments or is it a delaying factor or hindrance? Or does the family itself change at times and in some cultures until all at once the people find themselves with a divergence between needs for a family and their present family system? Since change is in the realm of a natural event—that is everything changes in time—this situation also tends to occur. A new type of civilisation can emerge different from the old family system as in contemporary India a family system can move out of relation to the culture in which it is found as is suggested for the contemporary West.

With these general observations we turn in Chapter VI to a discussion

of the Indian family. To clarify its nature we use the comparative method because measurement is purely relative. We compare the Indian family system with the Western one, and in particular with the one in America, which is the most extreme Western. This is not an invidious comparison because any system is not ideally fitted to its culture particularly in a rapidly changing world. But it does give us a chance to point out some basic needs of modernisation in the Indian system. It also brings the Indian system out of its "supposed uniqueness" into the general realm of primate and cultural family arrangements.

This permits us to use the term "Indian Family System" in Chapter VI when we talk about India and to state explicitly that we are not discussing the Hindu Family System. The Hindu family is only a part of the Indian system which also includes Moslems, Christians, Jains, Buddhists, and tribals. These also reside in India. (In this sub-continent there exists a "caste system" but, as in the case of the family, it is also an Indian, and not necessarily a Hindu institution.)

Chapter VI commences the analysis of the Indian "Joint" family which is claimed to be a unique "type", theoretically different from any Western one. The data supporting this claim in the works of Dr. Irawati Karve were first analysed. The study led to the conclusion suggested throughout this monograph that there were no significant differences between the Indian family system as presented in her material and the historic Western family. It was suggested that the little-known work of Frederic Le Play about the traditional European family system found all the characteristics of those claimed as uniquely Indian to be common in 19th century Europe. This is seen specifically in the typological organisation which Le Play called the *famille souche*.

To a considerable extent nearly all Indian family writing other than census reports and some descriptive details about anomalies (conspicuous expenditures for dowries for females and for wedding ceremonies and the lower status given to female children) is directly concerned with the joint family. Some claim this form is increasing, others that it is decreasing, and still others that it has been almost constant for more than a century. Some hold that it is a significant factor in Indian life. However, the census reports on household size made during this century and of the composition of households in the more recent censuses indicate that the joint family is more a prominent feature since the last century or so. Most persons in India live in what are called "nuclear types" of households which consist of husband and wife (if both are living), their children and a few appendaged relations or close friends. Ten per cent of Indian households lacked male heads in 1961 and it is presupposed that widows and some of their children or relations may comprise the family in these cases.

We summarise the main documents about this type of family and try to find what it is and what its existence indicates about the Indian system. One of our first conclusions is that the term "JOINT" is a misnomer. Rather

than being a joint family in the Western sense of being both agnate and cognate, or of claiming ancestry and *right or status* from both mother and father's lines, it really is nearly always an undivided agnatic unit. Its uniqueness is the keeping of some sons or agnatic brothers, and their wives and children in the ancestral household under the domination of the oldest male. He holds the undistributed property of the family. The oldest woman, generally the wife of the oldest male, runs the females in the household, leading to drastic servility in the younger women. The male children and the brothers of the head of the household, where these are part of the joint household, are also in semi-servile status. A part of the same problem is the extreme emphasis upon "arranged" marriages and docile roles for females.

However the obsession of Indian sociologists with the small minority of the joint (undivided) families is very great. The writers often define jointness so loosely that families living in separate households, but with common economic interests, even if these households are in different communities, are classified as "joint." No particular analysis is made of the reasons for undivided households. Most of the analysis is of details, some predicting the passage of this type of family, some denying any reduction, and others bemoaning the loss.

Obviously the existence of such a phenomenon has one or more probably, a number of explanations. However, little attention has been given to this form of analysis. Joint families are found in the cities as well as in the rest of the country. The important contribution we seek to make to this controversy here is to point out that what is called "jointness" in India is found to a considerable extent among families in the Western world and everywhere else although probably in not so distinct a manner. The family everywhere is a cooperative institution most likely to be used for mutual aid. It is also an institution which has the trait of coloration. What one member does, either good or bad, brightens or dulls the image of the other members. Thus, essentially the family is different from all other social groups, particularly those based upon economic calculations. This fact is the same in the West as in India and works whether the branches of the family live in the same or in different households. The family is different also from locality, territorial, social, or government groups. However, it is an integral part of nearly all other groups.

Later chapters in the analysis seek to extend the horizons of family sociology by specific details about the Western family system which show that it is also changing. It seemingly has also gotten out of gear with the demands of modern culture at least to the extent that it is also now revising itself. It shows how this is taking place by a summary of specific large-scale studies in America in which kindred are returning more to presence and to "power" in family affairs, at least informally. Since kindred are massively powerful about Indian family system, to the extent that it may hinder the
 m on of the country t s that a gradual movement toward

some convergence of the Eastern and Western family systems is coming about.

FAMILY AND CIVILISATION

While there are a number of types of family sociology ranging from treaties on marriage, divorce, child rearing and the like, this study concerns itself with one type—the family system in relation to the social system. One form of this relation exists in periods when strong central governments never developed, at least during known historical periods. This same type of relation is found in other periods in which what is known as “high civilisation” decayed. A relation of a different type comes about with the creation of stronger central governments, such as those which require and emphasise court actions and civil litigation. In these legal relations the government *per se* becomes a third party to settlement of issues and disputes between persons and others which may arise.

At this point the use of the term “civilisation” instead of society should be explained. We are not going into meticulous definitions of the concept “civilisation.” A society can be almost any form of grouping from a tribe to a national state. However a “civilisation” is generally larger than a society, has a longer life history, can and has assumed a number of forms in human history and in its own history and covers a multitude of smaller societies of one type or another. We can speak of Eastern and Western civilisations while recognising that there are vast differences within each. Hence the idea of *Family and Civilisation* in India is used to signify that this is a study of the current family system in this ancient Sanskrit language area in relation to the present problems of national independence and self-government.

We are not considering the word “civilisation” as being a monopoly of the Western industrialised societies. However one may look at India, whether optimistically or pessimistically, it certainly is the site of a vast complex culture. It surely is one of the world’s larger and more unique social systems. It might also be pointed out that sociologists and historians of civilisations always include India in that category. We could name a dozen writers who include India as such whereas none is known to us who has excluded the people who live in this subcontinent from that category. Among the more important recent figures might be mentioned W.E. Flinders-Petrie, Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee and Pitirim Sorokin.

FOUR MAJOR FAMILY CONCEPTS

In order to clarify the study it is necessary to discuss four major family terms each of which is used to characterise what is called an “ideal type.” One of these may be called the *nuclear* family and the other three *trustee*, *domestic* and *atomistic* family typologies. The nuclear family is a unit generally composed of a man and a woman who take on social roles called

"husband" and "wife". They nearly always have children, which gives the husband and wife a second role each, as mother and father, or "parent." This "ideal type" of nuclear family is the nucleus or core found in every family system. In the trustee type of family the nuclear unit gets practically all its connection with the larger social system and the world of strangers through its kindred and relatives. In the domestic type of family the nuclear kernel has still considerable relation to its kindred but also adds some direct relations with the outside world through governmental agencies, such as courts and local officials and also employers.

In the atomistic "ideal type of family" the individual comes more and more to the forefront. Kindred and relatives, other than aged parents and sometimes a young couple when first married, do not reside in the household with the nuclear unit. The individual has an automatic age of maturation in which he passes from formal relation to his nuclear family of origin to a condition called *sui juris* or "independent." After that his relation to the nuclear family of origin becomes mostly voluntary. This legal period of maturation tends to consist in a "process" of gradual abandonment of former rights and responsibilities (and subjection to family control) which may differ by sex and may cover a period of several years. In female children in the United States, for instance, there is an "age of consent" which generally is at about 16 years of age. Before that age sex relations with a female minor is called in legal terminology "criminal conversation". A girl under 16 cannot ordinarily marry or consent voluntarily to sexual relations. A boy under 18 is not ordinarily allowed to marry without parental consent. "Children" under 16 years of age are supposed to be in schools if capable of learning. Even if they are placed in institutions for delinquents they are supposed to have school classes to attend. Full maturity comes ordinarily at 21 years of age when the "citizen" has the right to vote and is subject to all public law. Recently the voting age in America has been reduced to 18 to match with the requirement of liability for compulsory military service at 18. This seems due in part to earlier physiological maturity of youth now in the countries of improved diet and health conditions. It is being enlarged to make the person 18 or over completely a legal adult.

Around this atomistic family there are still kindred, but they have receded in part both as to rights and responsibilities. These have been yielded to the individual. The atomistic type has received exaggerated emphasis during the past century of migratory movements over national lines or to other areas and to urban centres. With the decrease in the types of mobility resulting as the new lands fill up and restrict migration and the cities offer greater psychological resistance to long distance movements of masses of persons, the kindred seemingly are returning to a more prominent role (at least informally) in the atomistic families of the industrial nations.

It is necessary to remark here that there is a significant difference between the nuclear and the atomistic family conceptions. The nuclear family is what may be called ubiquitous or ever t The atomistic

family is a specialised institution of highly mobile periods times and places. Hence the existentialist cliché that the "nuclear family is functionally consistent with modern urban industrial economy" is misleading. Modern urban industrial society produces, and possibly requires, considerable atomization of social relations from the family unit to the individual but that is different from the "nuclear family."

THE TRUSTEE FAMILY

In Western Society a definite relation has been established between the family and the type of civilisation which goes with it. This is due to the basic fact that the family is part of the social structure—the most universal part. Every living person, unless an orphan or born out of wedlock, is a product of a nuclear family. When the total civilisation is weak at the top, as for instance has no strong orderly government, then the trustee family has always taken over most of the functions otherwise performed by the overhead social system. This type of family which rules in the absence of strong extra-family governmental forces has been called the *trustee* type. In such a situation organisations of kindred rule over many phases of the household family and these are known as trustees of the rights and powers of the society in regard to the family and the family in regard to the society. In this case the clan disciplines the individual for the society as a whole, or for its own purposes or at the request of the above organisation. In the individualised type of family, known as the *atomistic* type it is the custom for the adult individual to be responsible for himself. If he commits a crime the agents of the higher society, be they sheriffs, police or soldiers, apprehend the individual and, if he is a *sui juris* person, he comes into direct contact with the courts and other bodies which administer justice or try to repel wrong doing for the larger society.

This individual responsibility is not very characteristic of the trustee type of family. In those cases where there is trouble between the individual and strangers the agents of the larger society do not have recourse to the individual. Instead they go to the head or ruling group of the trustee family and make their complaints. Sometimes they ask the trustee family to discipline the individual. At other times they ask that this trustee organisation bring the individual before the courts or trial organisations where the sentence is normally one against the whole family and in which the family must take measures against the individual. They have to discipline him or revoke his membership which process is called *Abandon Noxal*. Then he is a familyless person with no protection.

This type of a family system is composed of groups of households, or what are sometimes called "nuclear families" and they are bound together by blood, intermarriage, or customary legal obligations called clientship. In some cases a large family lives in one housing unit with separate firepots. The joint family in India is a type of borderline trustee unit with certain unique characteristics.

ACTIVE AND PASSIVE SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

The ties between the members of these large trustee groups consist of some which are called "active" and others "passive." Under the passive ties, the individuals are bound to protect each other against the outsiders. Under the active form the individuals are bound to come to the aid of a member and help him to seek redress or take revenge for wrongs inflicted upon the member.

The passive form of social solidarity was so strong in the Medieval Age of Western society that the first modern courts were unwilling to pay much attention to "witnesses of acts." A witness would normally either be a member of the kindred group of the injured person or the guilty one and, by nature of his relation, had to take one side or the other without regard to fact. At that time the custom of "*serment*" was held to be more fully capable of getting at the real truth than the testimony of witnesses. If a man placed his hands upon a Holy Bible and swore to a thing it was believed to be true more often than when affirmed to by the testimony of witness simply because, in many cases, there were no unbiassed witnesses because of kindred or clientship. In modern times when the societies have become more secularised and, after repeated printings, the Bible, in many cases, has lost its aura of sacredness and just become like any other book, then the testimony of "unbiassed witnesses" is sought and respected. Still however a semblance of the old custom hangs on in that the witness is sworn to "tell the truth, and the whole truth," with his hands upon a copy of the Bible or sacred book.

The active form of social solidarity is one which, unregulated, tends to break down into the family feud or what is called "blood vengeance." This disrupts the countryside and there have been a number of more notorious feuds which have almost depopulated certain areas. We cannot give the details here but in many rural districts, even today, persons walk charily between various familistic groups which are at odds with others. The original reasons have sometimes even been forgotten. In the middle age in France during the reign of Charlemagne, who tried to revive the ancient Roman Empire, a system of *transaction*, *composition* and *amend* was set up. The local officials were charged to have every family feud brought before them in a proceedings similar to an arbitration court, known as a *transaction*. After the hearing the officials decided who was right or wrong and ordered a *composition*, or fine to be paid by the family deemed guilty. After this a *truce* was enforced accompanied by a formality known as the *amend*. A part of the "composition" was considered a public fine and was kept by the local official. This part was known as the *fredum* payment.

Ages of the West between the decay of the Roman Empire and the rise of the modern world active and passive solidarity was demonstrated remarkably by what is called *wergeld* or ransom money (War Gold). If a member of one kind group was captured by another during a local war, each member of the captured persons' group had to contribute to the *wergeld* according to his nearness to the captured person. On the other hand if one group captured another and a ransom sum were paid the member of the "trustee family" received a part of the ransom in regard to his obligation to pay were the situation reversed.

Most common practice in all family groups now-a-days is the protection of its members and the securing of redress if a member is injured. This is one reason that the existentialist cliché that the *nuclear* family is functionally coterminous with industrial civilisation creates so much misunderstanding. Although now modern civilisation has moved very far away from the instantaneous breaking of labour and employment contracts, it is patent that industry and business has to operate on its own rules to succeed. Hence the industrial worker is constantly subject to unemployment, strikes, sickness and other disabling difficulties which make him incapable of surviving alone. In these cases relatives, an employed wife or a child, step in and help out the family. Public welfare does something but it is niggardly, degrading, and in most cases, unable to do the job as it should be done.

THE NUCLEAR AND ATOMISTIC FAMILIES

If we discuss the nuclear family next this will enable us to differentiate clearly between that conception and the atomistic type. Ordinarily the nuclear family is pictured as the standard household group but in reality it is only a common nucleus of the universal "legitimate" or socially defined breeding and infant care unit. The nuclear family is the active structure of the human biosocial process in relation to time. Its relation to the social structure is similar to that of the molecule to an element in chemistry. A molecule is the smallest portion of an element or compound that retains chemical identity with substance in mass and is the smallest portion which moves about as a whole. The individual, oftentimes proclaimed to be the most elementary social unit is not that. A hundred individuals do not make a society but an elementary unit of husband and wife, who can and do have children is the smallest society. All identifiable forms of social relations are found in the family unit.

This complex social unit is basic to society because the human species is generic-disjunctive. It takes two to breed and those same two, are generally deemed essential to rear the children properly. The relation between this family and society this type of family and civilisation is called "necessitous conjunctive symbiosis" ¹

The concept *nuclear family* cannot be put into the same classification as the group of trustee, domestic and atomistic units. The nuclear family is a part of each classification of the three above whereas trustee, domestic and atomistic units are conceptually exclusive. These three are classifications of the forms of relations of the family system to the larger society. In those societies in which the power structure of the total society is relatively simple and weak the trustee family takes on and forms a strong supporting unit about the individual families. On the other hand when the society is very developed and complex, as in the modern state, the atomistic family type develops because the general society forbids interference at the local level.

This may be illustrated by the struggle of the developing states with the former power of the "clans." The clans are essentially formed out of related trustee families. The struggle is over the rule in affairs by the agents of the clans or of the central government. It goes into all affairs. In the trustee family days of Rome up until the commencement of the Empire (about B.C.-A.D.) it was customary for almost any member of one of the trustee families to be designated or to designate himself as the agent to punish an intruder in the case of what is known as *flagrant delit*, or sexual intrusion. In the Augustinian legislation this was reduced to the right only of a father or a husband. They alone could kill the intruder and claim family violation as a defence against the charge of murder.

In the movement from sovereignty of family groups over to the fairly complete subjection of the family system to public law, the trustee family stands at one extreme and the atomistic at the other. Hence the atomistic family is more volatile than the trustee and domestic, and at the same time more fragile. The trustee family is self-regulating in a rather static and unchanging pattern. The atomistic family is also self-regulating but within the mores. It is open to fads and fashions. This makes it fit into societies which are characterised by new adaptations. It is also characterised by short time cycles of two or three generations. (On these three family types, see Chapters 27-29 in Zimmerman, *Family and Civilization*, op. cit.)

In between these two types of extreme family systems is what is called the "domestic" type. In the middle periods of social development it is the model type. It is often called "Victorian" because Queen Victoria ruled England (1837-1901) during the period in which this type reached its widest acceptance. In such a period as this the clans have lost their power and the modern atomized individual has not reached ascendancy. However it had been on a gradual rise in Europe since the 13th century. The family reforms of the Protestant Reformation which promoted the control of family by the sovereign states and made the need for the rise of statute law in regard

Desmond Morris, *The Naked Ape*, New York, 1967; James V. Neel, "Lessons from a primitive people" *Science* Nov. 20, 1970 pp. 815 ff.; Donald S. Sade, *Science*, 168, 1971, pp. 701-2; John E. Pfeiffer, *The Emergence of Man*, New York, 1969; Zimmerman "The Future of the Nuclear Family" in *Int Journal of Sociology of the Family* September 1972

to the family were incidents of its development. Marriage, divorce and parent-child relations came under legal regulation. The present atomic family did not really emerge into dominance in the modern West until the 20th century.

FAMILY SYSTEM TYPE CHANGES AND MODERNISATION

This monograph attempts to show that the family is a living growing institution because of its relation to the culture of its period. It grows or moves within the life cycle of the individual, with the cyclical movements of great cultures, and with the enlargement of civilisations. All of this means that what is fitting for it at one time or under one set of cultural circumstances may (and does) not do for another.

Social Science is ultimately an approach toward causal understanding. Even descriptions of social events seek to locate sequences and uniformities and promote meaningful or interrelated understanding. We do not know what cause is but feel that it is something having to do with relations between events, their connected appearance, their co-relations in movement or change and their sympathy or antipathy for each other. Ordinarily we assign a causal significance to that event which is designated as primary in time but this is not always true. Sometimes events of causal significance to each other are thought to appear simultaneously.

In sociology, however, our primary attention in cause is directed at events which follow each other within measurable and understandable lengths of time. We attribute to the first appearing a primary causal significance in the repeated appearance or disappearance of a second event depending upon sympathy or antipathy between the first and second. Thus sociology is basically a study of change or of time sequences.

The vehicle or host within which the change comes about is the human personality. Events of an earlier time influence the personality and seek to remould it. If this is done on a sufficient scale, the general outward manifestation of the personality, the culture, changes. Then the culture, which controls the family as one of its agents influences the nature of that organisation, and further personality changes are to be expected. Thus we have the repetitive cause-result, series which makes up much of the framework or skeleton of the chain of human events.

Thus the problem of family sociology is not the universality of the nuclear family but rather its engagement in a system or systems fitted to the civilisation of which it is a part. We must see the machine as a whole. Man is not man but a different human according to the civilisation in which he is enmeshed. This impinges upon us from two points of view. One is *fact* and the other is *cause*. The fact that different phases of a civilization have changed family-social system relations cannot be denied. All important original documents in cultural history from the earliest documents to the present attest to this. However for our purposes here the fact is a back

ground. What we seek is an understanding of cause.

Basic finite of "decisional" cause, as a principle, differs from the Aristotelian analysis and is more Liebigian. In his study of plant growth, Liebig showed that the most scanty element, among those needed and in relation thereto, was like the shortest stave in a barrel. A barrel can never hold a liquid permanently at any higher level than the shortest stave, as a pond or lake never gets permanently higher than the overflow canal. In the cultural system such as the one in which lives modern man, the main basic limits to persistence and flowering rest with the family system. It is the key stave as well as a stave. It holds both liquid and the hoops. The family system must change in countries like India to permit modernisation.

THE HISTORY OF FAMILY SOCIOLOGY

Any attempt to deal philosophically with the significance of the family in a given civilisation needs a background of the various ideas about the role of the domestic institution in different historical periods. This may be called the history of family sociology. At each period either in the East or the West there have been certain fundamental thoughts upon the role of the family in the civilisation. Without exception the *Sacred Books of the East*, the 50-volume series of translations edited by F. Max Muller, presented versions of a strong relation of Man to Family and Family to Man. The same applies to the Heroic Documents either of the East or the West. While our main concern here is India it is valuable to point out that it was the main writings of Confucius which first really systematised the ideals of the Northwestern Asiatics. These played a role similar to that of the Vedic Hymns, the Laws of Manu, and the Epics of Ramayana and Mahabharata among the peoples of the Sanskrit area in India.

A Heroic Document is a Community (Clan, Tribal, Trustee) family legend which is elevated to the status of an Epic poem and is believed to give the early history of the founders of a group of people. An Epic poem is a narrative which is recited and generally, in an Heroic Document, deals with the experiences of one of the founding heroes and his group. Illustrations of the Epic Poems or Heroic Documents is the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* for the Greeks, *Beowulf* for the Anglo Saxons, *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* for the Hindus, and others. (All this is discussed in Zimmerman, *Family and Civilisation*, 1947, Ch. 10). The early conception of right, wrong, and social organisation are founded on and in these poems. In a fundamental sense the Hebrew *Old Testament*, which was substituted in the 5th and 6th centuries A.D. for the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* as the main historical legend of Western Society, is a heroic document. The *New Testament* of the Christian Bible merely adapted and revised the *Old Testament* collection to the Jews.

FAMILY SOCIOLOGY CAME FIRST

Thus Family Sociology is the oldest organised sociological discipline for several reasons. Any primitive form of society depends in a large degree upon the extended family system—the clan, gens or genos for its local and civil rule and as the responsible collective unit for support of more extensive, or overhead, forms of government. Consequently, all beginning folk or social literature of importance—such as the Heroic Documents or the beginning of codified law—is fundamentally a theory of family control

This aims to systematise the "common law" and to enroll the people directly into the legal codes of the expanding society. The growth of sovereignty, and of domestic civil peace and order, hinges upon the subordination of the clan and the transfer of the control of the nuclear family directly to public law and regulation. In India and the Sanskrit regions the castes adopted these elementary socialising principles of family organisation connected with religious views of right and wrong early in their crystallisation. Each caste also had its Gods, or version of the Hindu Gods at an early time. Hence no civilised period of our society has been without its family sociology. It is true that only in the last century and a half have these ideas been labelled sociology as such. However, under other labels similar ideas as found in modern family sociology have existed and must be considered family theory. Systematic family theory preceded organised conceptions of the Gods and religion.

Durkheim (1858-1917) in his *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* published in 1912 understood this principle. He showed that primitive group life is the generating force or "sufficient cause" of religion. Hence religious ideals and practices are founded fundamentally in the upholding of the social group. Since the family is the group instrument, par excellence, the concept of sacred is intimately bound with family life, and if there is or was a social evolution, the family system preceded the organised religious doctrine. Other ideas of right and wrong were inculcated into family training of the young.

The early societies had to subordinate the nuclear family to a larger kin group. At that time there were no nations or large inter-related territorial groups of people. Directly above the kin groups were only small tribal governments which tried to rule over clans or interrelations of kin which dominated the nuclear families. Nations began to develop only in the last 10 or 12 thousand years. The last ice sheet, which covered the northern hemisphere, known as the Wisconsin-Wurm glaciation, began about 60,000 years ago and did not start to melt away until about 15,000 years ago. After that, slowly and hesitatingly modern civilisation with its permanent villages, iron age and small nations commenced. The modern societies reduce the kin group to a volunteer relation over the family and bring the new territorial unit—the nation-state into power. Family law is an integral part of the social structure as the spokes are part of the wheel.

This is not imagination or fantasy. In 1950 it was discovered at the University of Chicago that an element called Carbon 14, a standard component of all living things, decayed from the time of the death of the thing at a half rate of about 5500 years. Thus decay of these Carbon 14 molecules may be measured, after complicated refinement to eliminate extraneous materials, by geiger counters. If the Carbon 14 is half gone, the things studied are about 5500 years of age and if three quarters has decayed, about 11,000 years. This form of refinement is very accurate up to about 40 000 years or back to about the middle of the time of the last ice sheet. Since then

many more forms of measurement have been developed but most interesting to us is that which comes from the identification of pollen from plants. Now when human remains are found, or indications of an early habitation, a search is made to find the fecal material deposited there by humans. By examination of these under microscopes it is possible to identify the kinds of plants the people ate from the pollen still therein. Hence we know about where, how and when men lived since the commencement of this present after-glacial age.

VERY EARLY SYSTEMATISATION OF INDIAN FAMILY PRACTICE

Since India proper is somewhat protected on the northwest, north and northeast by very high and ancient mountain ranges it is fairly certain that this area was not only habitable but inhabited as early, if not earlier, than any part of the northern hemisphere. The mountains tended to hold back the ice sheet. Hence there is a high degree of probability, if not certainty, that modern civilisation commenced here early in the advanced history of man. Hence we may expect that the small family generally called the "nuclear", which had to be detached from its very strong ties to the close kin groups with the emergence of modern civilisation, began that transition here in India as early at least as it did further west around the Mediterranean.

Mountains and ridges much lower in height in North America held back and redirected the Ice Sheet of the same glaciation period. There is no reason to think that the great Himalaya range did not do the same very effectively in northern India. Hence settlements in the Indian subcontinent could have been developed earlier and were probably much less disturbed than in regions more open to movements of glacial ice from the north. Evidently anthropologists understand this and have been able to pick a line east and west just north of the mountain ranges to look for caves which show the remains of early habitation and to explore them by excavation. The book by the anthropologist Carleton Coon about *Seven Caves* tells this story. He actually found one by this process and had it excavated.¹

EMPHASIS ON NUCLEAR FAMILY IN MARKET ECONOMY

All of this advanced movement of subordinating the nuclear family directly to the larger society first took place early in Western history before the sixth century B C. It fell away however in the anarchy of the Dark Age which dominated most of Europe between the sixth and tenth centuries

A.D. Then the same civilising movement concerning the family was repeated in an almost identical manner. By the end of the twelfth century the foundation elements of the modern nuclear family of the West were in existence.² These two periods of the nuclear family system in the West were the ones in which urban living and market economy developed and penetrated the general life of the countries. This does not contend that the rural districts and peasant families all became of the nuclear type but, from what we know about the situation generally, the rural districts followed the same trends as in the cities.

Generally always in the West differences have prevailed between the organisation of peasant families and those in the cities. Not much is known about this matter because what is called *history* is essentially concerned with the cities and the upper classes. However from about A.D. 250 onward, the peasant families of Europe reverted increasingly to control under the feudal system. The feudal manors, or large farms, tended to be located nearly always in the more fertile lands of the country. On these manors the organisation of the family was determined almost entirely by the dictates of the feudal lords or their managers, (if the lord or feudal chief were not a resident). In the poorer agricultural lands, or those which reverted to forest cover after the disruptions of the Roman Empire and its legal system, the people reverted to the tribal state in which dominant families of the clans held power over the others. Little is known about social organisation of a private nature during these periods. All were held to the local tribal leaders either by ties of kindred or of allegiance (clienthood) for mutual protection.

The people on the good agricultural lands of the manorial system were bound to the soil (*adscriptus glebae*) which means they were not slaves but serfs. They were free personally but had to work for the lords as well as themselves. They could not be evicted but, upon their deaths, a selected one, often the eldest son, could succeed to the parental holding with right to cultivate it by payment of certain tribute. The others had to leave or take subordinate positions. However the death rates were very high and surplus population was not much of a problem.

² This is not the same as saying that the nuclear family (alone) is compatible with industrial civilisation. Industrial civilisation is one variety of the modern type. Roman civilisation was not industrial at its height, but it had the nuclear family. The nuclear family is characterised mostly by two forms of unique social relations—that between husband and wife and those between parents and their children. The nuclear family is the nucleus of all family types. We call the modern family *nuclear* because generally husband and wife, parents and children, are the majority and important members of the household. Industrial families have a very unstable economic base due to unemployment, strikes early retirement, limited ownership of real property by the masses and other hazards. Hence recent trends of dominance of industries in the cities are counteracted by the unofficial groupings of close kin in the neighbourhoods so as to be of mutual aid. Thus "nuclear family" is used in two senses—the nucleus of the family cell and the small family largely comprised of that nucleus living in the industrial household.

What happened to the family in India during the period from its primitive days until the 19th century will depend upon what Indian historians eventually tell. Radhakamal Mukerjee in his *Creative India* suggests that the different codes of the law of Manu show temporal fluctuations between different forms of the family based upon the ratio of collective versus individual right similar to cyclical movements like those which have taken place in the West. It is entirely possible that the same historical forces were at work in the Indian family system as in the West but the adjustments of the family to external control have been less evident due to the intercessions of Caste between Family and Society. This could have been due to several circumstances.

RISE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH TO FAMILY CONTROL

Commencing in the 11th century the West began to recover from the Dark Age which had set in the 6th century after the decay of what is called *classical society* or Roman dominated culture. The "Universal Christian Church" (of the West only) had risen to power in the 6th century and it increasingly ruled the Western family culture similar to caste rule in India. However there was but one Church with its unified doctrine from Rome. The Church control and peak of its doctrine probably reached its height of elaboration and acceptance by the 13th century. Thomas Aquinas, who was born in 1225, wrote a doctrine of family organisation which was generally accepted as the most comprehensive statement. (See Questions XII to XVI in Part III, supplement to *Summa Theologica*).

Shortly after that the family began to separate itself from entire rule by the Christian Church (then the Roman Catholic one in the far West) gradually after the Reformation, it came under control of the rising secular states. Part of the difficulty seemed to arise because the Church was not willing to adapt its conceptions of the form of the family needed to meet new emerging social conditions. It was changed so far that Desiderus Erasmus, a prominent priest who refused to accept a cardinalship, not only criticised the major positions on marriage and other matters held by the Church, in four works between 1518 and 1526, but in another, *Praise of Folly*, seemingly sneered at all need for control of the family by the Church bureaucracy. Later John Milton (1608-1674) wrote four tracts on the Church and the family in which he accused the institution of having misinterpreted the Holy Writ or biblical sayings about marriage and the family. (*Divorce: Judgement of Martin Bucer Tetrachordon Colasterion*) The change took place only in the Protestant branches but these gradually set the trends toward the

centuries. The Church wished to keep the family as a religious unity and under canon law control whereas the States wished to dominate it under public law and control. By the commencement of the nineteenth century the States had the family legally, but the Church, both Protestant and Catholic branches, had it informally, religiously and ceremonially. Both forms of rule, the religious and the secular, are now important in the family.

In between the West and the East the Moslem countries which came into power by the 8th century, held the family under religious control with a rural backing of clan domination. However these Moslems in the Sanskrit area generally did not diverge widely from the basic patterns of Hindu social organisation either in matters of family or caste.

WESTERN MODERN FAMILY SOCIOLOGY: ITS THREE PERIODS

This leads up to the nineteenth century and the rise of modern family sociology. Fundamentally, modern theory falls into three great periods of thought. The first period may be called the Nineteenth century doctrine, which covers the period from the French Revolution to the onset of World War I in 1914. The French Revolution seriously disturbed the family ideology of Europe both by experiments in France itself and by the spread of many new family ideas all over Europe through the Napoleonic law codes. People began to wonder what social significance could be found in the family system.

The second period of modern sociology is equated with extreme family reforms following World War I. These reforms differed in their extremity and perpetuation by country but fundamentally they were alike in essentials—whether under Communism, Fascism or movements toward democratic totalitarianism. This will be shown further.

The third period began at about the end of World War II and is still in existence. In essence it seems an attempt at recovery or a reaction to the social disorganisation brought to a peak by the extreme family changes in the second period. It is also marked by advanced polarisation between the pro- and anti-family forces.

Theoretically an analysis such as this is supposed to be limited to the trends in family sociology, and its various branches, in law, in politics, in social work and in religious doctrine. However, a doctrine in any branch of family sociology is always related rather closely to the changes in the family itself. Consequently the ensuing analysis summarises changes in the family along with the variations in the themes and doctrines of the various branches of family sociology.

Family sociology is not by any means the sole proprietorship of the professional text writer in the field. From the logical and cultural points of view, the political, the juristic, the religious and the special family sociologies have been separated as disciplines during the past generation and each has paid little attention to the others. Nevertheless in spite of this

segmentation and separation of philosophy, there has been considerable agreement among the various fields concerned with the family. They all study a common unity—the family—and its changes have made the separate doctrines a unity.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY SCHOOL: NOMINALISM

Nineteenth Century sociology in the West made "the family" a time-section in the theory of a constantly changing "domestic unit." According to all the popularly accepted theories the nuclear family unit was an historical development and would pass away with the newer organisation of society which would follow.

In all of the major evolutionary theories of society of this period, the family was included and, increasingly, each step hypothecated the domestic unit as becoming more and more a "nominalistic", man-mate, temporary, ever-changing-in-one-direction, time-limited unit. This means that fundamentally, family sociology from its Pre-Comtean origin to World War I considered *the society of similar individuals* as the only perpetual realism and the nuclear domestic family a dated creation of it. The family was considered to have a historical beginning and eventually a similar temporal decay and the replacement by some other domestic arrangement more adapted to the modern mass world then beginning to emerge.

Nominalism is a philosophic conception which holds that a social group like the family is artificial and organised for a purpose (*ad hoc*) and exists only as long as it is wanted for that purpose. Realistic family sociology holds that the family is a *natural group* and may only be nullified by express action and in individual cases and then with difficulty. Marriage, divorce, childbirth and other such aspects of the family have long-run social consequences which are enforced by society, according to the realistic family sociology. If your father and mother were American, according to this conception, and they die immediately, the father just after your conception and the mother just after your birth, you are still an American and at a certain age must pay taxes, register for the draft, etc. Also you are entitled to inherit through your father and mother and to the protection afforded any American citizen. If your father were in the war and were killed, and a later Veterans bill gives inheritable rights for free education for veterans, you are entitled to free college education. None of these long-time after-effects of family making can be explained by the nominalist position.

This philosophical position of Nineteenth Century sociology did not arise unexpectedly. It was an end position, within the theory of limits, taking off from the complete naturalism of society, and all its major manifestations as codified in the *Summa Theologica* of Thomas Aquinas. This work expressed the most advanced social thought of the West toward the end of the thirteenth century. The steps toward the complete nominalist conception of the family were gradual but ever onward. By 1500 do t

philosophers concerning the nature of society yielded to nominalism all its parts except the state and the family. The family began to be considered very much nominalistic only after 1750. The pure nominalist conception of the family became a cardinal tenet of Marxist philosophy after 1850.

FACTUAL VS ETHICAL FAMILISM

The great practical attempts at "factual" or nominalist organisation of large segments of the Western family system came in the decades between World War I and II spearheaded by legal measures in Russia and Germany but followed sympathetically in a psychological fashion certain other Western countries, including the USA. While "factual" familism is still rampant in Western countries a reaction may have set in, at least in an undercover sense. After all the human family is essentially a primate mating and reproduction system, even though now tied up with the needs, purposes and pressures of advanced civilisations. The primate background could be expected sooner or later to reject extremes of family disorganisation brought on by widespread anti-familism. At least that is what happened very rapidly in France and Russia after the waves of demoralisation brought about by the revolutions of 1789 and 1917. A somewhat similar recovery came about in Germany after World War II. The families there, in one way or another, were badly broken and vastly disturbed. They had gone through anti-familism in the Hitlerian philosophy of the thirties, the destruction by bombing and defeat during the early forties, the imprisonment of millions in Russia, the losses by dead and wounded, and the upsets of values brought about by the armies of occupation. Now it seems to have made a very strong recovery. The family system in Russia went through a similar destruction and recovery during and after World War II.

In a sense what is known as modern family sociology began with the studies by Frederic Le Play (1806-1832) of France. He may be called the founder of family studies in that he did not theorise about the family as an adjunct to other sociological theories but by his other theories upon the results he gained by empirical study of all types of European families. However his ideas need to be discussed at length in a later chapter.

THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY SCHOOL

The main difference between the earlier Nominalist position regarding the family in most 19th Century sociology and the extreme views of the early 20th Century lay in the widespread later theory that the state had the "right," and in some respect the "duty" to extinguish the family as a "natural" social institution. The reason given for this need to break up the family as a legal group was to make the individual directly responsible to the political agency not as beforehand through the family. Various phases of this philosophy appeared in many fields. In the United States it was widely held that the

primary responsibility for the individual would change over to a new community form replacing the family. Social workers began to multiply in numbers and power and to deal more directly with the individual. This trend regarding the individual may have reached its high point after the onset of the depression of the Thirties. After that time it may have begun to recede on account of the tremendous growth in the numbers needing help and supervision.³

In the field of law during this period, the greatest influence or change was not in the field of family law but arose in jurisprudence incidental to other legal changes. However, it became conventional for courses formerly called "family law" to be described as simply "domestic relations."

In the religious field during this period the older dogma of family virtue came up against desertion, divorce, birth control and other denunciations of the "demoralised" age of the Twenties. The religious people were confused by the changes in the mores and considerable divergence of views began to develop.

THE VARIOUS ATTEMPTS TO EXTINGUISH FAMILY REALISM

In political views on the family, Russia first after 1917, later Germany and Italy (for a short while) began steady movements toward the new "freedom"—the attempt to extinguish the ethical family by abrogation of all older family law—except with retention of a slight deference to incest. This is what is called in legal terminology the rise of the "factual family" as opposed to the older "ethical family" consideration.⁴ The "factual" family is one that considers living together "marriage" and the family was not supposed to have legal consequences—or at least very few. The Communists did it to get rid of the state, (so they claimed) and the Fascists did it to make the state, totalitarian (so they claimed). But both did it in a similar fashion. In Christian countries divorce, if allowed, is a matter mostly of civil litigation in which there is an attempt to establish a spouse "injured" by the marriage contract and who is to be freed by law.

In the United States during this period the conception of family responsibilities began to shrink. The change was achieved mostly by legal fictions, such as the widespread acceptance of separate jurisdictions for divorce alone—the rise of migratory divorce. The one and two child families began to be emphasised as most desirable. A philosophy of "eat, drink, and

³ For this development see Carle C. Zimmerman *Family & Civilization* (New York Harper, 1947), chaps 19-22; Otto von Gierke, *Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500-1800* (Tr. by Ernest Barker) (Cambridge, England: The University Press 1934) *Recent Trends in the United States* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933), chaps XIII, XV and XXIII, XXIV; Frederick Lewis Allen, *The Big Change—America Transforms Itself 1900-1950* (New York: Harper, 1952) chaps 5-10.

⁴ See the Association of American Law Schools, *Selected Essays on Family Law* (Brooklyn The Foundation Press, 1950) all of Section 3 Part IV especially 907-917

be merry" took over. "Puritanism" began to be called "a system of repressions" as if the idea of individual restraint was thwarting human life. F. Scott Fitzgerald epitomised much of this and its consequences in his *The Beautiful and the Damned* and Sinclair Lewis' *Main Street* expresses a good deal of the same feeling. This theory cropped up later, in the "mammalian right" theory of the sexological school. More recently the theory has arisen that sex need not be a familistic monopoly at all. This is an extreme "atomistic" conception of the family. The formula of this is that "any sex relations between freely-consenting adults is only a private matter." But the family relation—husband, wife, mother, father, child, son, daughter etc means most adults cannot "freely consent" unless the family bond is nullified.

THE APPROACH TO CLIMAX OF NOMINALIST FAMILY SOCIOLOGY

In the middle of the 20th Century American fiction and drama began to desert the older theme of divorce as a tragedy and to present it as a necessary and even an ennobling experience.⁵

In the field of family sociology the older evolutionary teachings began to give way, in part, and to change otherwise. The changes were manifested by the rise of the first books of a new kind of family sociology which is now still popular, though changed considerably, the "functional" approach. Probably the first of this new type of work was the book *Marriage* by Ernest R. Groves (1933) which appeared just five years after the last of the important of the older evolutionary texts *Problems of the Family* by Willistine Goodsell, (1928):

The chief characteristic of this kind of work is the inherent implication that the family is not a natural process of life but should be made existentialist. That is, if one chooses a family, through marriage, the text becomes a sort of "fashionable guide to family happiness." At no place in these works is the alternative—passing out of the social system by not becoming an integral part of "the chain of being"—presented clearly, even though it is admitted that the important people marry and reproduce within family units. In other words, the functional works tend to present an unreal view of the living social life to persons just on the verge of becoming irreversibly committed to that life.

A second phase of the change in family sociology during this period was the rise of the "functionless, affection only, school" of family sociology. Although preceded by a number of other studies, the work by William F. Ogburn in *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, 1933, op. cit. gave it its great, and still continued popularity in American sociology. In this development the Marxian version of the older 19th century school of social

change is used as a plausible intellectual foil to misinterpret some meaningless statistics. According to this version, all functions of the family except affection, and possibly reproduction, have been taken over by other agencies.

The weakness, invalidity and logical phantasy of these claims have been analysed elsewhere.⁶ Suffice to say they gave one branch of the existentialist school of family sociology a plausible grounding in sociological theory and allowed the general philosophy of existentialism to take over

CHANGES WITHIN THE FAMILY SYSTEM ITSELF

However during the early twentieth century, commencing before 1920 and culminating in vaster developments after 1950, the family system of Europe and America began some changes of its own without regard to the directives, or their lack, furnished by the major family disciplines. These changes may be described first as independent movements of the family systems, or key portions thereof, at self-discipline and a gradual turn toward "natural unitism and realism." Secondly, since the change included only a portion of the families, and not all, some followed the older course and some the new, so that a *polarisation* of good and bad, or old and new, family types began and have widened.

At first this polarisation or separation of the older and newer family types was only minor and unnoticeable; later about 1950 it became violent. Thus, it happened that after 1950 the Western world has witnessed the most violent contrast of two family types, one semi-factual and one semi-ethical, it had seen for some centuries. For instance, since 1950 in the United States we have seen the following contrasts.

The Anti-Social Polarisation: From the factual aspects of the family system the West now has the highest level of real divorces (excluding immediate post-war fluctuations from hasty marriages) ever seen in that culture since rates of such have been recorded. This rapid rise began in the U.S.A. among the civilian population sometime in 1942, thus violating and reversing the older alleged principle that wars and their resultant increases in social solidarity were associated with reduced divorce rates. After the war there were high peaks of divorces due to the returned soldiers, and then the situation settled down in its regular form with higher rates than before World War II.

From the factual family system we have also the highest rates for desertions and quasi-desertions of families that we have ever had. A quasi-desertion is an avoidance of the paying of alimony and support moneys legally due to a divorced woman and the children. This is accomplished in the United States by rapid change of legal jurisdictions by the former husbands or deserting wage earners so that the state and federal funds for

Aid to Dependent Women and Children (A.D.C.) must provide the funds for support. The courts cannot keep up with the quasi-deserters. (In England and Wales alone these matters cost the public directly thirty million pounds in 1955). Now they have ruined relief agencies in some of the American States.

Also from the factual family system (assisted by war breakages) we have reaped a harvest of juvenile delinquency which is outstanding and probably only equalled by conditions resulting from the Revolutions in France (and its family demoralisation) and that in Russia after 1917.

The Pro-Social Polarisation: Contrasted with this, and on the good side, the family has made certain gains in the increasing power in the opposite group, the ethical family system. This is measured by the following important facts.

For the first time in the history of a free, urban and rationalised family system, a vast and long-continued decline in the real birth rate was arrested between 1940 and 1960 and a steadily increasing number of our families moved from the one and two-child types into the three-or-more-child, or socially-reproductive, types. This alone made erroneous all previous predictions as to the growth and size of the population of the United States of America. Also now that the population is getting much larger the tendency to automatic control is seen in the lessening birthrate. After about 1960 it slowed down considerably.

This change, of course, in important phases of the American family system was a subtle elusive thing, as yet little understood. It had something to do with the environment of persons born between 1915 and 1920. It should be said at the beginning that the mores of a culture move slowly, like a giant pendulum, and also very ponderously. For some generations up to 1910-1915, the Americans born each year moved slowly but surely toward a lower birth-rate. By the period 1910-1915 each "cohort" of 1000 typical American women reached its all-time low of reproduction. Then gradually after 1915, each 1000 female children born began to have at a given

⁷ Demographic figures are complicated and cannot be introduced here. Proofs of the statements in the above two paragraphs are given in W.S. & E.S. Wotinsky, *World Population and Production* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1953) 44ff.; United Nations, *Proceedings of the World Population Conference, 1954* (New York: UNESCO, 1956) Volume I, Meeting 6; P. K. Whelpton, *Cohort Fertility Native White Women in the United States* (Princeton University Press 1954).

The latest claim of the weekly press is that American women are now having children at close to the "Zero Population Growth" rate. "Zero population growth" is a rate which equalises the numbers of births and deaths. However when a country approaches this rate (which is an average of about 2.1 per woman during her reproductive life) the population continues to grow for 25 or 30 more years because the former high rates bring larger and larger classes or cohorts of new mothers into the bearing ages each year until the earlier large birth humps are exhausted. The zero population growth advocates think America will have sufficient population at about a quarter of a billion if we wish to keep up our high standard of living and

comparable age more children than their immediate preceding years cohort at the same age

As a result of this change in reproduction, all previous estimates of the size of the American population for the latter half of the twentieth century had to be revised radically upward. Between 1920 and 1940 the American population began to dip in the slant of its growth curve as if it were reaching a peak and would shortly stabilize or turn downward. The direction was reversed after 1940 as if it were moving toward a newer and higher peak. Then it changed courses again about 1960.⁷

Between 1950 and 1960 the American population grew by excess of births over deaths of 29 millions, the greatest increase in one decade in its history. By 1960 the annual rate of growth was 3 millions a year, sufficient to double the population in 40 years. Estimates by the census based upon assumption that the growth rates would remain the same until 1980 at 1956-7 rates places American population in 1980 at 260 millions. However, since then they show some slowing down. Since "nonage" in the USA is about 16 years for all families (end of compulsory school age) at any one time the active adult population is supporting 16 baby crops or about 50 millions of juveniles, which is quite a task. Much of the slowing down was claimed to be due to the use of the "pill" by many women to prevent extra births. However that is seemingly a false claim because the "pill" is declining in use and the population rate also is still declining.

A second aspect of this trend toward family revival as indicated earlier was marked by its conspicuous regrouping in the cities so that environment control helped direct the motivation of the teen-agers toward creativity.⁸ In essence, "Good families" now surround themselves with similar families and the world of the child seems "good." This self-isolation of "good" families seems to increase with the demoralisation of other families.

However this is not the whole story. Conspicuous changes of a rational nature took place in such important European countries as Italy, France, Germany, and Russia not to mention others. In Italy the totalitarian movement toward "factual familism" inherent in Fascism, had to be given up early because of the great influence of the Catholic Church. However that country is rapidly reducing its birth-rate to meet the challenge of over-population facing its culture and the movement is not directed by either a political power or a religion—that is in the "private" mores.

France, its neighbour, but one with a very low birth-rate for nearly a century, has reversed the trend during this same period. Germany, a country dominated by the factual family ideology of Nazism has shown a remarkable recovery toward ethical concepts. Other countries, including Russia, have changed.

⁸ Proofs of this are in *Successful American Families* Zimmerman
New York 1960.

In Germany, in spite of the turmoil of Fascist engagements against the family, the destructive war, the dismemberment of the country, the occupation (with its sexual let-down) we find the solidarity of the family reasserting itself.

A case study of this has been made for West Germany by Helmuth Schelsky, based upon about fifteen studies made by him or under the guidance of the late Leopold Von Wiese and others. The German family first had totalitarian rule, then the war, and finally the after-war conditions. After the war, 9,100,000 East German exiles were forced upon them by the Soviets; 2,500,000 family heads were degraded by denazification and demilitarisation; 2,500,000 spouses were lost in the war; 2,000,000 prisoners were kept in Russia in slave labour camps a long time before returning them, 1,500,000 mutilated persons had lost arms, legs or major senses; and, finally, 4,50,000 had ordinary wounds from war or bombing. In total this affected 22,000,000 persons, but since some categories overlapped, the war destruction alone affected severely between a third and a half of the families.

According to these scientists the difficulties, which would be expected to weaken the family system, rather strengthened it considerably. "At the time when the state and the economic organisations were destroyed, and when almost every citizen was exposed to immediate dangers and terrible losses, marriage and the family offered protection and natural support and the domestic institutions were recognised as the last form of social security... When the outer world failed, and the individual was isolated (*Ohne Uns*) the family strengthened its effort (*Mit Uns*)... and this was even accompanied by a decline in eroticism (*Abbau der Erotic*)". (This above passage is freely translated from Schelsky's report in *Colloques Internationaux* for which see the full title in footnote.⁹)

This buffeting has taken place also in the United States. In the twenties it was reflected in the revolt against Puritanism. In the thirties the great depression struck at the wage earners, salaried persons, business men and investors alike. Then in the forties came the warring period of World War II, with its absentee husbands and fathers, its blackouts and food restrictions. After that has been the artificial shortages, or at least high prices for food, the Cold War, the Korean episode and higher and higher taxes for armament and help to other countries, then inflation, and the War in Southeastern Asia.

In such a situation as this it became a time, in many senses, of "every

⁹ *Colloques Internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique Sociologie Comparee de la Famille Contemporaine* (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1955). Includes the papers and discussions in the field of family sociology for France, Germany, England and Italy. The colloquium was organised by the National Research Centre in Paris because, in the opinion of this research organisation, family sociology had the least development in France and was most needed there) it consists of 10 papers, which are original contributions summarising family conditions in the four countries, a synthesis and concluding chapter, and four good bibliographies one for each language.

(family) for itself" The families were forced to draw closer together and to lead an inner life most privately their own.

These changes are not all, nor do they refer to all countries, but they do include five of the more prominent and most populous countries of the West and concerned families of more than a half billion persons in 1950. Nor were the changes all alike in the empirical sense. It showed a decrease in the birth-rate in Italy, and an increase in France and in the U.S.A. It showed similar changes in family attitudes in Russia with the same political regime continuing, and in Germany with the changes of regimes. The point is that the changes only become important from the family point of view if we view them collectively as a renaissance of family realism, or ethicalism, in relation to the cultures as opposed to the older trends toward factualism, nominalism and cultural irresponsibility.

One "cause" which seems to make the reactivation of family realism and solidarity more a certitude, is the increased demands of modern cultures upon the family to produce a new and more expensive type of human product. Time was, and not so long ago, when a child could withdraw from schooling in the early teens and help his family. Now with most of our children in high school, college or professional institutions, even up to twenty-five years of age, more strain is put upon the family requiring them to do things in a family way greater than before. This is reflected in the ever increasing body of law concerning the obligations and duties of parents to children.¹⁰ More recently the public law in the U.S.A. is making persons legally adult at 18 years of age. This may reduce family obligations somewhat

Family Change and Family Sociology

Social change of this type is slow and ponderous. It is achieved largely by use of plausibilities, rationalisations and fictions. When the "factual" family system of Soviet Russia became increasingly unfitted to the new militaristic state, the Russians did not say "Communist family ideology is wrong". Rather they hedged, rationalised, and gradually came round to the new position. First they "fumigated" the public mind by contending Lenin's views on the family and dubbed his personal behaviour as "puritanical". Then instead of saying that they rejected Communistic family ideology for the Victorian, they accepted the older view as "improved Communism". They forbade all semblance of factual marriage view under the slogan that such ideas were not "good for the community".

In family sociology we now seem to witness the same ponderous turning of the family system in the whole Western world. This is marked in sociological works by several intellectual changes. One is the disappearance of knowledge and use of the older books or of newly printed versions of the older doctrine, or even anything resembling it. Second, is the appearance

¹⁰ On this see White House Conference on the Family. *The American Family* (Washington, D. C. A special Bureau Publication, 1948) chapter VI

of a new doctrine, with plausible, but generally false, contentions of relations to the older one. This new type of doctrine claims that it is the "old", but factually the only connection between the two is merely plausible. Third, is the appearance of new kinds of books about the family, only a few of which even attempt to be creative. However all of them begin substituting for the older works so that the "new knowledge" of the family is gained from them. Fourth, then, are latent changes of opinion beginning. Many of the leading intellectuals, those who deserted the old views for the half-way new, begin to recognise the really new and to swing over towards it.

Conclusions

Family sociology is a very ancient intellectual subject. The great and growing public interest in it now seems due to the fact that we are entering a new "era" of social time. Any great change like the decay of Greece, the birth of the Roman Empire, the rise of the Christian movement at an end of that empire, the end of the Dark Age or beginning of the Renaissance and the Reformation has seen similar movements in family sociology because of disturbances between the external cultural world and the family.

The modern Western family has moved slowly toward conceptions of nominalist relations between the outer culture and the inner organisation. This movement reached a high level between World Wars I and II. Then the family may have begun a slow turning movement toward a realist relation with the new culture of the new Atomic Age.

In a general period of family upheaval and change of course, the major problems of family sociology rest in the relations between the major culture and the nuclear unit. It is a matter of ideals, duties, obligations, and privileges. Changes in these, or the willingness of the family to support the new culture and the willingness of the old culture to leave the family alone are what is important.

Changes in the family system are the surest indications of major social change. Also when social change arises from external causes sooner or later the family has to adjust.

FAMILY-CIVILISATION SOCIOLOGY OF FREDERIC LE PLAY

In the Western societies family sociology has been somewhat different from that in India. No matter how much we criticise the preoccupation with the joint-family idea in Indian (See Ch. VI) sociology, it is a basic theory of the relation between the family and its former pre-industrial and semifeudal civilisation. This idea of *family and civilisation* relations as a main field of study was also true among others in Europe in the 19th century. However much we may now think of the family sociology of that century as misinterpreting the role of the family in history it was, in its way, an approach to the theories of the relation of the family organization to the civilisation of that and previous times. In this period came the work of Frederic Le Play and the Le Play school in France. Le Play lived from 1806 to 1882. He may be said to have been the first real scholar of FAMILY CIVILISATION Sociology.

Le Play, the Unknown Sociologist

The reason that Le Play sociology is not, at least until recently, made much of in the West is an historical accident due to social changes. When Le Play studied and wrote about family conditions in the 19th century the only country in Europe which was undergoing a grand demoralization of its culture was France. This was following the Revolution of 1789 and upsets in the country due to the wars of conquest of Napoleon Bonaparte. Prior to this period France had been the Mistress of Europe and was a World power. It owned French Canada as a colony and had enabled the American colonies to break away from the British Empire. Le Play's father had been a customs officer in Honfleur, at the mouth of the Seine, during the Napoleonic regime and the blockade of the French ports by the English navy. He disappeared soon after 1806 and young Le Play was sent to an uncle's house in Paris to be educated by relations and family friends. Thus, he not only came from a broken home, but was immersed at an early age in the revolutionary turmoil stemming from the Napoleonic movement and the urbanisation and industrialisation of the 19th century.

He was educated as a mining engineer and became interested from then on in the social conditions of the emerging European industrial worker. For purposes of his studies of industrial peace and social stability he developed a method of choosing and studying "representative families" of industrial workers, part time farmers and peasants without using modern

terminology, he considered these as small "family-social systems". By intensive studies of their family income and expense budgets (on a very elaborate scale), he sought to find how the larger social systems, such as industries, classes, and states or nations impinged upon the individual. He was seeking to discover which conditions of FAMILY and SOCIETY worked best for both family and social welfare.

These studies, continued over 35 years and in all European countries (along with his conspicuous success as a mining engineer and industrial leader in France, Spain, Russia, and elsewhere), led to his advancement as a public figure. In about 1850, he gave up mining and spent the remainder of his life perfecting his family research methods and ideas and spreading them through his writings, his institutions and his personal contact. A Le Play institute is still active today in Paris—*La Societe de Economic et de Science Sociale*. (Philippe Perier, a retired French ambassador and also on the council of the *Institute International de Sociologic* with headquarters at the University of Rome, is its president).

Why Le Play Sociology is Relatively Unknown

However, Europe began to break up temporarily about the end of the 19th century, entering into two devastating "World Wars" which tore up peace and tranquility there. During this period what development in sociology there was in the Western World came mostly from America. At that time however, the U.S.A. was a new land freshly settled and, with its many ethnic groups, had more or less of a "nominalist" instead of a unified "folk" culture. Hence its family sociology became something different from the *Family and Civilization* theme and remained so until after the unification of the American culture in the 20th century. This unification of American culture toward realism took on largely when immigration was more or less stopped after World War I. The country was then united or knit together also by common suffering in succeeding events such as the depression of the thirties, and World War II. Only after that, largely due to the writings of Zimmerman (See *Family and Civilization*: New York: 1947) did the significance of family to civilisation condition get any large hearing at all in the West.

As told in the Chapter on the *History of Western Family Sociology*, up to the end of the second WORLD WAR, and even for some time after most of the family sociology, which was mainly American, was concerned largely with advice to the young about happy marriages and theories of the personality influences of various family types. While earlier some American theorists had written a little about Le Play, his ideas just did not fit the nominalist conception of social relations developed in America of that time and European sociology was not particularly creative. The earlier period in Europe had produced such figures as Herbert Spencer (1820 to 1903) and Karl Marx (1818 to 1883) but Spencer was largely accepted only in America.

Marx became an early European favourite because his views coincided and dealt mostly with the Industrial Revolution. However, after the ten-volume study by Charles Booth on "*Life and Labor in London*" published before 1900, no real sociological writing developed in the continent except by old timers such as Durkheim who, along with similar persons of about his period, took their intellectual roots in previous years. Even today there is no Durkheim in France and, as yet, no types such as Herbert Spencer nor Charles Booth in England.

Another historical "fact" of significance was the change in the Le Play "school" which came about on the Continent and spread elsewhere. As Le Play became old and inactive, leadership in the society passed to Edmond Demolins, who introduced some extraneous ideas of his own concerning geographic determinism into the previous themes which had concentrated upon family organisation and harmonious socio-industrial relations. Patrick Geddes, an English biologist, became entranced with Demolins' geographic ideas and started an English school of Le Play which emphasised mostly these geographic factors introduced by Demolins. (This English school is now no longer active.) But Sorokin, in his *Contemporary Sociological Theories* in 1925, by mainly attacking the ideas of Demolins, gave the false impression that Le Playism was primarily "geographic determinism". As a result of these emendations by Demolins, Le Playism was even listed for years in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* as primarily a geographic determinist until sometime in the 1940's when Zimmerman was asked to revise the listing. He agreed to do so only if it could be written according to the main themes of family and society typical of Le Play and that was done.

In a book by Zimmerman on *Family and Society*: New York, 1935, an attempt was made to remedy this situation by translating the summary volume of Le Play's *European Workers*. The book was dedicated to Sorokin in order to appease him. However, this type of sociology which emphasises the major role of family changes in social systems is just now commencing to catch on. For societies now modernising, Le Play is certainly the most important but least understood sociologist of the 19th century. His main ideas deal particularly with the problem of the relation of the family system, and its development, to their civilisations.

This neglect of the study of the significance of Le Play's main ideas was not so at the end of the 19th century. Alfred Marshall, the eminent economist, who was 24 when Le Play died, adapted the Le Play methodology for the construction of "ideal family types" to the concept "representative firm" in economics. Durkheim, who early criticised Le Play, studied the same major problems in his *Division of Labour and Suicide*. (He reached the same conclusions but did not attribute the "causes" directly as Le Play did). In spite of this background, conventional theorists now tend to claim that "scientific sociology" only really began with Durkheim and Max Weber or other favourites under whom these various European experienced

sociologists had studied

The Family Budget as a Tool of Study

Apparently Le Play studied society and sociology almost entirely through the use of an elaborate analysis of family budgets. These budgets concerned the incomes and expenses of typical selected families. But, in addition he went behind the actual recording of these budgets in monetary terms and analysed the *social backgrounds* involved in the securing of various items and types of income and of its utilisation. His family budgets were very elaborate case histories of the families. Consequently he selected his families very carefully to characterise the entire social milieu to which these families belonged.

Thus the truth of the matter is that Le Play used a combination of two methods in his studies. The first was what is called at times that of "participant observation". At other times it is called by the Germans the "vertehende" or introspective-understanding method. Once the major outlines of a problem or situation were clarified from studying people or "participating" with them in their routines, then cases could be picked for further analysis. These cases were those thought most characteristic of the traits suspected from participant observation. To give an illustration, if one considers the joint family a most important social form in a village, then it seems that the best pursuit would be to pick for study the most successful joint family for further study. Once this is done the relations of husband and wife, parent and children, grandfather and grand children, grand-mother and grandchildren, mother-in-law and daughter-in-law and every social personality could be typed in relation to every role or status. These could be studied for standardised expected relations. This might be checked for several joint families as Le Play and his helpers did for European family types. Out of this a composite summary of a type could be made up. This is what he called the typological method, best illustrated now by Alfred Marshall's concept of the "representative business firm".

Unfortunately for the reputation of Le Play the typological methods he developed and used were credited to Max Weber due to a series of historical circumstances. Max Weber (1864-1920) did not commence to write in the field of sociology until after Le Play died (1882). By that time France was down as a force in social thinking. (It is just now coming back as a prominent European power). On the other hand Germany was rising, and still is, even after two destructive World Wars and dismemberment. Germany had the prestige and its graduate degree—the Ph.D.—took over as a pre-condition of academic prestige. It became a badge of alleged

¹ A most recent good work in Le Play is by M. Z. Brooke, Le Play, *Engineer and Social Scientist*. London: Longman Group. 1970. pp xii 193 55 shillings. Zimmerman's *Family and Society* New York, 1935 contains a translation of Vo 1 of the 6 volume study *Les Ouvriers Europeens* and an explanation of Le Play's main ideas.

omniscience. So Weber, the German, gained the credit which should have belonged to Le Play. Even the late N. S. Timasheff, the most erudite and fair of writers about *Sociological Theory* claimed that the 6 volume study *The European Workers* was completed and published by 1855. This work did not really come out until in the eighties shortly before Le Play died. No one in the field of Sociological theory after 1900 really read Le Play and studied his ideas.

His first "budget" study was that of the "Miner of Hartz", an industrial family in the Hartz mountains of Germany. He went to this region on a field trip in 1830 when as an engineering student in Paris, he took a walking journey with some other students to see first hand aspects of the European mining industry. At that time the rural industrial workers of Europe combined wage work with subsistence farming and collection of fuel from the village forests. Thus each miner's family was engrossed in a complex social system which guaranteed it a living and, at the same time, required it to diversify its activities and perform numerous functions. Thus his study of the Miner of Hartz was really of an analysis of the social system of rural miners in that part of Europe.

In the 19th century, Europe was vigorously embarked upon the related processes of the industrial revolution and urbanisation. Le Play became interested in what was really happening to people under these vast new transformations. He felt that what was really happening would be reflected in these family budgets which described the life and daily processes of representative families. He was particularly interested in the problem of security for the family. To be sure that he noted the social conditions promoting security he included in each budget a special category, item 18, which dealt with the rights and guarantees of a livelihood. Such a budget study as this in a modern industrial society would now include rights to health insurance, old age pensions, unemployment insurance, free medical treatment, housing assistance, vacations, bonuses, job security and all the paraphernalia given the worker in addition to and above his take-home pay.

These subsidiary rights now amount to a considerable part of the actual real income of industrial workers. As a matter of fact it was the Le Play type of analysis which led in time to an understanding of the need for urban and industrial substitutes for the income in kind and from natural resources of the community which accrued to the first emerging industrial workers of Europe. At the time of Le Play the customary rights in the industries outside of the cities gave the same social "insurance" as these modern forms of guarantees try to do in the welfare states.

Without going into detail about the family budgets, which were very complicated, it is necessary to point out that Le Play used the inquests as a device for studying the details of the social system. Many persons did not understand this and he has since been called an economist, a specialist in labour morale and, due to the influences of Edmond Demolins a geographic determinist. But Le Play was from the very start a self-trained sociologist

using the typical families in each part of society as a tool for elaborating the system of social relations about that family. That is why he reported only on a few representative families in the various social systems and sub systems of Europe.

Basic Ideas About Society

For the period between 1830 and 1850 Le Play travelled about Europe as manager of various mining enterprises from the very extensive operations in Russia, to the north of Germany and down into the Iberian peninsula. He was the most famous mining engineer of his day. Everywhere he went he gathered data on the typical social systems of labourers, industrialists, miners, fishermen, cloth weavers and various other types of small social groups. He began to formulate some ideas upon social change. Having lived during the height of Napoleon's domination and seeing first hand the commencement of the great stirrings of the industrial revolution all over Europe, he became convinced that he should give all his time to the study of sociology by the family budget method. After 1855 he more or less devoted himself entirely to this study teaching his ideas through a society formed by him and his friends in Paris. Until his death he continued in this endeavour, interrupting it only to carry on certain public duties as a senator and more or less free-wheeling ambassador for the various French Governments.

Since he did not study sociology as an official sociologist he was free of deep engagement with most of the ordinary theories current at that time in Europe such as the followers of Comte, St. Simon, Marx, Herbert Spencer, Hegel and the like. His first divergence from what he might have thought if he had studied "official" sociology, was what he considered to be the *basic social unit*. To Le Play that was the *family*, rather than the *individual*. Thus Le Play belongs in the category of the *few* men in Western history who, since the time of Plato, have had sophisticated understanding of the nature of social change and the responsibility of social thinkers in relation to its guidance and control. In this respect Le Play stands on a par with relatively a few men notably probably Dante, Machiavelli, Milton, Vico, Sorokin and Arnold Toynbee.

The theory of social motivation pointed out by Le Play was that of the permanent and ever-abiding quest for happiness as measured by the desire for peace, stability of society, and good neighbourly relations between men and their fellows. In this respect he claimed no originality in indicating this form of motivation, but held that he was merely repeating a truism well known to social scientists. Le Play made this doctrine of motivation for change a theory of history. He claimed it only a partial theory of history, it is true, but he did note that the quest for stability of relations between men and men had accounted for many of the good and bad aspects of history. According to him many of the wars even those so-called religious

wars of the fourteenth through the eighteenth centuries in Europe, were misguided attempts to find stability. Freely translated into English, one of his main doctrines in this respect was that, 'Although men could only enjoy stability and happiness in times of peace, they continually resort to wars, one of the greatest sources of suffering, in the hope that they could find this happiness.'

Human Nature

Any attempt to interpret social change, or to make a case for a form of change which the social thinker feels is desirable, always involves a conception of the nature of man. All these theories of human nature and social change may be put for our purposes into two broad classes, which may be called *deistic* and *theolic* conceptions. A deistic conception of human nature holds that man was created in one unalterable mold and can only extend that idea. Such for instance were the basic conceptions of the social change theorists of Europe of the social contract school of Hobbes and Locke, who preceded the eighteenth century rationalists such as Voltaire, Rousseau, Paine and others. Out of a condition of "war" in which everyman was against everyman, came the Leviathan of Hobbes. Locke was similar in his basic ideas.

During the nineteenth, or Le Play's century these deistic conceptions of human nature continued in the works of Comte, Hegel, Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx and hundreds of lesser figures. Each had a different variety of words for the constant change they felt immanent in society, such as Comte's "positivism", Hegel's "freedom" and Marx's struggle of the masses against the classes, but all saw only *one* conception of human nature as forever guiding change. This inner force, whether it be "liberty", "freedom", "common sense", "positivism" or "class struggle" was given men at "creation" and had been in existence ever since.

Deism as a religion holds that when God created the earth, he left man with the forces to work out his own destiny and has not intervened again. On the other hand a theodic conception of human nature is one that puts both good and bad in man and gives him some ability to differentiate between the two and to reverse his course at any time he feels or is convinced that the bad actions have overwhelmed the good. In simple terms, the theodist conception of human nature believes there is a *free will* whereas the deist is always very much a "determinist" of one variety or another.

Le Play was outstandingly a theodist in his conceptions of human nature. He, of course, recognised that man was related to the other animals of creation and to the material order of the universe, Man was an animal, and also a gregarious animal. In some respects he held man was handicapped as a gregarious animal because the other social animals possessed within themselves nearly all the conditions of stable existence. This stability of the gregarious animals other than man could be dissolved ordinarily only

by outside forces. On the other hand, man, as a gregarious animal, shows little stability in his societies because there are always within each *good* and *bad* elements of their own kind. "Among men, the abuse of free will often engenders suffering brought about by instability and discord." This was Le Play's theodic point of view.

All of this means that Le Play, in the nineteenth century, showed considerable foreboding of the crisis of the twentieth. At least he felt that new forces for instability and unrest were about and that these would increase. Thus this Le Play "method", no matter for whatever else it may have been valuable, was also a fine instrument for predicting social change of a revolutionary nature.

Simple And Complex Societies

It is customary among the great thinkers on social change to differentiate between societies as to size, extensivity, and complexity and to confine generalisations about social change to the sub-species in which they are interested. Plato, for instance, conceived of primitive societies as moving differently from the great city states. Plato held that the primitive society, ordinarily grew from village to community toward a small city state and then tended to become corrupt or overwhelmed and die. Plato thought of this as "natural change", a sort of organic succession from life to a slightly more developed form and then to death. Social change, or that type attempted to be controlled by "guardian" men, belonged to the greater societies. His conception of the philosopher king was one of intelligent leadership for the greater societies.

This same differentiation of societies by modal types is seen in the recent voluminous works by Toynbee. He differentiates between the primitive societies and the "civilisations" (which he studies) by the terminology of "rabbits versus elephants." The primitive societies, or rabbits, are small, short lived, have been numerous, are not well known, and offer little experience aid for the student of social change in our type of *great civilisations*. Toynbee finds in *all* history, of which we have knowledge, only about thirty great civilisations or "elephants", and finally ends by studying only about twenty as of significance and four or five of them as being original and of greatest significance.

This same approach is explicit in the writings of Sorokin who categorises societies into these types and studies the greater or more extensive civilisations. Machiavelli does not have any explicit characterisation simply because he begins his study with the Roman Italian classical world and carries it down to Florence of 1492, without making any generalisations about other societies. Vico, however, makes the classification absolutely clear. He recognises a primitive type of society, of the type Le Play could call "simple", and shows it has two forms, which Le Play would call "simple and peaceful" and "simple but suffering". Vico's advanced society is given as only one in his *ons* but then he takes up the cyclical movements of advanced

nations" In the part of his work on "The Course of Nations" he shows how they can, and have, in Le Play's terminology, moved from "prosperity" through "complex suffering" and vice versa. (See also *The New Science* Bk. V. "The Recurrence of Human Things".)

Thus Le Play's classification of simple and complex societies and the differential course of each, is Platonic, on the one hand, and observational, on the other. Le Play had, of course, read Plato, whom he quotes often but was not, as indicated to the writer by some private correspondence made indirectly with his grand children, an avid reader of history or the classics

Immanent Change in Social Relations

This above classification of simple and complex societies, with their varied forms, simple prosperity and simple suffering and complex prosperity and complex suffering, leads Le Play to the theory of inward, or immanent, change. Immanent change, as opposed to changes from outside factors such as being over run by wars, devastations, and other "acts of God", is the tendency for prosperity to breed suffering and suffering, under conditions of a wise leadership (and circumstances allowing), to breed a return to prosperity.

Insofar as is known to the writer, Le Play never read Machiavelli's *History of Florence*, (written 1521-25) the foundation work of this Florentinian's great theories, but it is apropos of the above discussion of immanent change by Le Play to quote a portion of one paragraph from this work (Fifth Book, opening lines).

"Nations, as a rule, when making a change in their system of government, pass from order to disorder, and afterwards from disorder to order, because nature permits no stability in human affairs. When nations reach their final perfection and can mount no higher they commence to descend; and equally when they have descended and reached a depth where they can fall no lower, necessity compels them to rise again. Thus states will always be falling from prosperity to adversity, and from adversity they will ascend again to prosperity. Because valour brings peace, peace idleness, idleness disorder and disorder ruin; once more from ruin arise good order, from order valour, and from valour success and glory."

Much of this is similar to the observations of Le Play that: "The most familiar trait in the varied pictures of human history is the passage from peace to discord or, in other words, from prosperity to suffering. Prosperous groups form slowly . . . grow . . . and multiply in a condition of well being. . . Coming into contact with historical peoples, they become rich, learned and strong . . . and acquire renown, and sometimes brilliancy, but almost always in this period they begin to decay . . . From riches they secure vice; from learning, error; and finally, from force, error, vice, and all the abuses of novelty." (Last chapter of Vol. I, *Les Ouvriers Europeans*.)

Neither of these authors made this rule of Prosperity versus Suffering rhythm in social change an Machiavelli used the qualification "as a

rule." Le Play believed that there was no predestination, no necessity, and no regularity in social change but held that the "tendency" existed. What he called prosperity was "generally" followed by movements toward suffering and vice versa. He illustrated this by cycles in the history of the French people from 1600 B. C. to his day.

This immanency in social change is a main category in the social change theories of the other writers mentioned here, but in each case it has its own peculiar twists. In general, Toynbee's analysis of the rise of the internal proletariat, the severance of leadership communication between the "creative minority" and this proletariat, the failure to meet challenge by adequate response, and finally the union of the internal with an external proletariat, and the end of the civilisation, was his way of putting it. Sorokin has a system of immanent causation in his theories of social change, in which the "sensate culture" becomes over-ripe, and then, after passing through a gethsemanac, the culture slowly begins to oscillate over towards an idealistic or "mixed" type of socio-cultural configuration. This "immanent change" was also a main thought of Plato's and his use of the variation of the types of music in the society as an indicator of this, is very close to much that Sorokin later developed in his social and Cultural Dynamics.

Conclusions

Thus, Le Play started with two basic ideas. The first was that the unit or cell of society was the family. The second was that by studying the family and its various interrelations with the other aspects of society he could tell essentially what was happening or the trends in social change under way. From these two starting points he created an analysis of European society in the 19th century which enabled him to picture much of the difficulties which arose in Europe in the 20th century.

We do not have to defend Le Play but to point out that he understood the family system as basic to the civilisation. In other words, it was a family civilisation theme. This is different from the ordinary family sociology which looks upon the domestic institution primarily as another of the many groups with which man becomes involved in his course through life.

Its meaning for Indian sociology is that there should be found in the sub-continent relations between the family as it exists and the type of culture within which it is found. It is possible that the joint or undivided family is a symptom of something deeper in the society. If it is collusory with the caste system to keep order under the barest minimum standard of living, it is practical to suggest that the rigidities of the two joint families and caste systems—should be discarded together insofar as a society such as this can control its own destiny.

In other words Indian Sociologists generally could profit from making the works, or some of them, available for study in local printings—that is English translations. Change in the family system in the country seems inevitable. It is up to the sociologists to what kind of change

A GENERAL THEORY OF FAMILY SYSTEMS

One of the purposes of any science is to find order in the fields studied so that new facts may be fitted into the old in such a way that prediction of class behaviour is possible. Every single item or event does not have to be studied once a classification of similars is made. This applies to family systems as well as to the other phenomena of nature. In 1957 at the request of the International Institute of Sociology Zimmerman commenced a work of classification of current major systems of the human family. Each system was to be of homogenous family groups with similar behavioural patterns. The results of these investigations and classifications have led to a number of published papers.¹ These studies increasingly verified the theories and classification in the first publication and added a little more information about each group. For instance the paper in *Social Science* gave specific details concerning the mixed Western Precolumbian family systems in Northern Latin America, from fresh material gathered in Mexico, Peru and the Carribean lands. These were not available for the first two papers. Now after a first-hand study of the Indian family, it is appropriate that details of this system be re-examined carefully to see how it fits into the original general classification. One function of science is to test and reverify original hypotheses.

The Basic Types of the World's Family Systems

In order that the reader can understand what this is all about it is necessary to summarise first, the original classification of the world's major family systems. These were named the *Western*, the *Confucian*, the *Primitive* and the *Sanskritic-Arabic systems*. A fifth was then added called the mixed Western pre-Columbian for use in areas such as northern Latin America in which the upper classes have adopted Western Religious and/or civil marriage but the rural masses retain the older Aztec, Mayan, Chibchan, or Inca patterns. The reasons for this separate classification will be shown later. The Western family system is that arising in Europe and received its great codification in the new law added to the *Corpus Juris Civilis* under the Emperors Justinian and Theodora which was done in Constantinople around

¹ Three in particular might be mentioned. The first was a report published in the proceedings of the meeting of the Institute which was held in Nuremberg, Germany in 1959; the second was prepared for a festschrift to Pitirim Sorokin and was published in 1962 by the Free Press, New York City; the third is "The Reorganisation of the World's Family Systems during the Space Age" *Social Science* Vol. 35, No. 3 June 1960 pp 149-170

535 A.D. It was a development and systematisation of the principles which had arisen gradually in Roman Law since before the legalists under Augustus (B.C. 26 to A.D. 14) took the first steps to write down their family law, particularly applying at first to the citizens or Roman upper classes. In its peak the Roman Empire included much more than all of the then civilised Europe and parts of Western Asia. Western society and the Christian Church which was founded amidst the ashes of Roman grandeur, carried its civilising messages on amongst the barbarians which then gradually occupied Europe.

The Confucian was named after the Chinese philosopher by that name who lived between 551-479 B.C. and who is credited with the systematisation of Chinese family principles. The Primitive family system was a name applied to those which are prevalent among peoples who seldom have an integrated form of social organisation more widespread than the tribe of a number of related clans. These clans are generally exogamic (or must out-marry) but the tribes are mostly endogamic (must in-marry). Thus as a general rule a man must get his wife outside of his clan but not farther away than in his tribe of related classes. The Sanskritic-Arabic is found in societies which have been great or highly civilised at least once but which have since lost their leading positions and become somewhat subordinate cultures. Now these seem re-emerging to their former distinctive positions. The family systems in these types of societies have been moulded by high civilisation conditions but the declines of these civilisations has been accompanied by some, but not entire, regressions in family organisation. Their families remain about 50 percent on local levels of organisation and about 50 percent on higher or national planes. The Indian family system analysed here was put into this type. Further reference to it here will call it the *Indian* type. The all India area, including the nearby countries with similar Sanskrit-derived languages, form a considerable bloc of these current general types of cultures.

The Western Family System

The Western family system arose in the Graeco-Roman Christian countries. It was codified in the essentials in the fourth part of the remodelled Roman law (*novellae*) in the Eastern part of the Roman Empire by the jurists under Justinian and Theodora, between 527 and 555 A.D. Its outlines were taken over in Western Europe through the influence of the False Decretals (pseudo-Isidorean, c. 850 A.D.) and the systematic work of the Canon lawyers of the Western Christian Church.

Its main characteristic is a dual or joint regulation of the family (outside of its private field) by both civil and religious law and influence. The civil law moulds its outer form and the religious pressures (all family systems have an inner private core—the personal or “primate” part) push as far within its inner life as possible. This joint rule by both internal state and religious codes leads to an astonishing similarity of the family from one region or country of the Western lands to another *Nationalism* is made

easy because the people can inter marry without great difficulty, if they wish. The United States is composed of peoples most of whom are from all the representative countries of the Western family system. The others (Negroes, American Indians and Caribbeans) have or are conforming mainly to its forms. Intermarriage of ethnic groups is a most common phenomenon in the country. The building up of one people out of many ethnic fragments is hence facilitated. The American Negro elements (25 millions) form an exception to this ethnic fusion. So also does black skin colour impede the practice of intermarriage in other Westernised countries.

The independent rule of this family system by two or more agencies is a healthy influence in that if one doctrine or agency becomes exceedingly powerful and subverts the family system, the others form an opposition. Thus, the West witnesses an eternal conflict between church and state over family doctrine. This struggle has many facets as that at the time of Luther and Erasmus in the early 16th century; that in the Communist and Fascist countries of this century; or the birth-control, abortion and sex freedom issues in the United States during the present generation.

Moving gradually since the Reformation, the Western family system has reached an excess of legalistic control by the national states and by secular law in this 20th century. It might have started to recede from this legalistic position due to popular revulsion. The totalitarian doctrines of Europe of this century denied the right of overhead moral control for the family system. In the United States the "companionate" and "mammalian" doctrines also were an expression of this extreme position in regard to the family. The "companionate" idea in its extreme denied any public control of marriage formation or dissolution. The "mammalian" doctrine promoted the idea that fornication between humans was like defecation and urination a natural act not subject to the mores except as (possibly) to its time and place. For a few decades in the United States, the teaching of family law was subverted to a consideration of only "domestic relations", thus attempting to classify spousal and parental matters as but of the same type as the social and economic relations between buyer and seller, landlord and tenant, and employer and employee. During this period it was customary to proclaim that the marriage union was purely "contractual".

These excessive movements in the Western family system toward secular overhead control may have led to a reversal of this trend. Public law seemingly cannot rule the interior of the family except with great difficulty and in extreme cases. The history of family law shows that, with few exceptions, the public has never tried to rule the internal family. Incest has always been considered an infamous crime and, at times, cruelty of parents to children or man to woman were held illegal. However proofs of internal abuse is so difficult the correction is generally left to members of the families or near kin. In the U.S.A. many retributive or corrective punishments of such actions by kin have been excused by the plea of the "unlawful" law" in defence

Consequently, an excessive and monopolistic regulation of the family by secular law leaves and has left internal control of the family largely to private interests and to individual caprice. Desertion, divorce, quasi-desertion from support by divorced husbands, juvenile abandonments, and juvenile delinquency by orphans and quasi-orphans seem to grow apace. A quasi-orphan is a child being reared by its mother alone because the husband has deserted. These forms of social maladjustment weaken the state collectivity. At first these freedoms seemed necessary for urbanisation and industrialisation. But now it is possible that these spreading challenges have forced or may be forcing the modern Western states to reconsider their actions and, hence, the re-emergence of increased moral and "public opinion" control over the family. Most American states now claim they are being bankrupted by the rise in the numbers and the demands of millions of families on or seeking public relief payments. This is spent under a law with the euphemistic title of *Aid to Dependent Children*. In many cases it is a substitute for deserted parents.

As a result, the past two decades may have shown a commencement of a gradual reaffirmation of moral and religious controls over the Western family system. This new trend seems clear in Russia, Germany, and the United States. While not so clear in other countries such as France and Italy, it may be a general new trend now starting in the Western family system.

The most important sign of this reversal in the United States has been the recent changes in reproductive rates. Such has also happened now in the former almost negative birth-rate countries of Europe like France, Germany and England. While greater religious and moral control over the family system is not the only reason for the change from a near negative to a positive reproduction rate in the United States during the middle of this century it probably was a most important factor. The mores are included as a religious force. In known demographic history, this is the only instance of a reversal of reproductive rates in a free, urban, wealthy civilisation without such pressures as the Caducary laws of Rome (14 B.C. to 96 A.D.) or the Fascist propaganda in modern Europe prior to World War II. It started in the U.S.A. among the cohorts of female babies born between 1915 and 1920. These yearly classes of female children, when they matured, had more children than their mothers had had at the same ages. The birth rates of the U.S.A. increased. Now since 1958 the rate of change has slowed down indicating possibly a considerable ability of the family system to adapt to social conditions. In a sense the family system shows some capacity for "self regulation" as opposed to legal controls. At present many in the U.S.A. are thinking in terms of zero-population-growth birth-rates.

The Confucian Family System

This type is found principally in China and Japan particularly in those areas in which the Sacred Books are mainly the writings of Confucius and

Mencius, as interpreted during the Sung Dynasty. Where these peoples have spread in the Pacific or South Asia, their family system has gone with them. It is one in which the male household line and its living head dominates the family or almost a pure agnate type. The teachings of Confucius form the model. Most families have adopted the patterns of some of the older feudal houses, of which the Tokugawa and Meiji houses of Japan are examples. Hence, since the feudal ruling families were alike, the families of the commoners are similar.

Public law or a priestly class has had little influence upon this family as it has existed until now. Certain patterns of family behaviour are institutionalised by the Chinese gentry class and theoretically enforced by ancestor worship through large clans of persons bearing the same names—*tsu*. This class incorporate all *classes or strata* of people who have the legend of descent from the same ancestor. In practice, however, the peasantry rule their internal family behaviour by similar custom somewhat as they wish. Since marriage involves the adoption of the wife into her husband's line, and is arranged by the parents of the male, social mobility of persons and blood lines is not hampered by different domestic customs.

Such a family system can come easily under public law, which serves in the main merely to codify the practices of the Sacred Books and the ordinary common conceptions of the clans or *tsu*. However, generally, the system has provided for intermarriage of all classes or what the Romans called a common *jus connubi*. This does not mean that marriage was ever the least indiscriminate in China but certainly the country had no particular castes or sects which prohibited intermarriage. This general principle probably was of underlying importance in the ability of Japan to modernise, to Westernise, and to become an important power quite rapidly in the nineteenth century. So also we probably see the commencement of a very rapid modernisation in China now. The family system has come under public family law and the ideas of Mao Tse-tung and other leaders are being enforced by that and pressure of public opinion.²

The movement of the Confucian family system, particularly in China where modernisation seems now under way, will undoubtedly be toward its development more and more in the legal, national state, or public status field. Contrary to the Western, which seems moving toward greater moral control over excesses of private and legal domination, the Confucian type will have more responsibility to public family law in the future. However it does not seem to have far to go. Thus, from the family system point of view—disre-

² In 1950 Mao promulgated the Chinese marriage law which he had been advocating since 1931. The principles of this law were to "Abolish the feudal system of marriage characterised by the use of constraint, respect for men and contempt for women, and indifference to the interests of sons and daughters." He sought to put into practice a system of marriage characterised by freedom to marry for men and women, one wife to one husband, equal rights for men and women and the protection of the equal rights of wives, sons and daughters. See Stuart Mao Tse-tung, Pelican Book pp. 260 et passim.

garding other considerations—the rise of China to an important power in the space age is not surprising. Familywise, the further modernisation of its social system should not be difficult.

The Primitive Type of Family System

The primitive family system is one in which the clans dominate the external affairs of the family. There is little or no state law and little or no unifying world religion. The barrier to the state is the tribal boundary. Each tribe has a unique language of its own. The creation of a modern state among them with a unifying family law means the destruction of much of the clan or tribal power. This is and will be further the cause of considerable confusion and demoralisation among the people. If they give up the old customs (allowable polygyny, levirate, sororate, etc.), the people become lost until a newer system takes over.

Even now almost without exception the primitive family systems in Africa are said to be sadly demoralised. The men are migrating rapidly to cities, mines, and places of commercial labour, outside of the confines of the rules of their tribes or of their related groups. Their wives generally stay with the tribes. If the male decides to remain in his new location, nothing can prevent him from taking another woman and completely deserting his former. Ordinarily, such deserted women would be widows and would be attached polygynously to a relative's household. There is no place in Africa for the unattached woman and, until recently, no such women. But the question arises as to the remarital status of a deserted wife—and the increasing numbers of them now appearing.

If the industrial worker is not married upon leaving his tribe but returns in time for a wife, with his new economic affluence, he is capable of driving the bride price above the resources of the others who have stayed in the village. Ordinarily, this system uses marriage payments from the extended family of the groom to the extended family of the bride. In case of a breaking of the marriage, the payments are supposed to be returned. Further the matter of divorce is mainly a private nuclear family affair. If the husband has gone away and made money to help his family make a large marriage payment, and after marriage again goes away, and deserts (divorces) his wife, the reclaiming of this large marriage payment is difficult.

At present, a modernised family system for Africa or for self-governing nations in Africa seems far away and extremely difficult. The task will have to be accomplished. Now the general demoralisation of family values and lack of a working family system for large areas of Africa is pathetic. Anthropologists, governmental administrators, and missionaries alike are attesting to these facts without exception. The near anarchy in governments in many areas is a result.³

³ For of h of studies about the tribal families see Arthur Phillips (Ed) *Survey of African Marriage and Family Life* New York, Oxford

(Sanskritic Arabic)

The Indian Type of Family System

Family systems of this type exist in those areas of the world where, once great cultures have flourished and decayed and have as of now not yet been considerably reconstructed on a large nationalistic scale. Among these areas is the Arab world of northern Africa and the Middle East. Also included are India and Pakistan, Burma, Siam, the lower Indo-China, and the new Indonesia. These are people who have become electrified during this century by the idea that they are but "Dwarfs on the shoulders of giants" This medieval expression, much used in England and on the continent by John of Salisbury (12th century), served originally to inspire the Western Renaissance. It served to remind Europeans of that time that originally, in the days of Graeco-Roman supremacy, their ancestors had achieved a greatness in relation to which their then (12th century) condition was pathetic. In all these countries the vestiges of former greatness are apparent in the ruins and are now recognised historical facts among the people.

The mark of these older family systems is that, having been in great flowering cultures, they have remained in a more unified ethical state, although they now have no single unifying law or ruling religious system. They have retained their strong ethical family systems in a confused mixture of variant religions such as the sects of the Moslems, as well as of Zoroastrianism, Jainism, and Buddhism and the multitudinous castes in India. Smaller groups have sects of other religions among them—Druse, Jews, Christians, etc.

Those people now have strong family systems or a very ethical character but no overriding civil law with significant preference. Since the religious sects are many, but none of them markedly territorially inclusive, there is no strong church-state rule or semblance of it over the family systems. Even a small village in India can have half a hundred castes and versions of family rule. The tribes of India, which include many millions of people, each has its own overhead family control, separate from any variety of Hinduism. The same general territorial confusion of family rule pervades and plagues the whole Islamic and most of the Buddhist worlds.

The peoples of the old family systems are of extremely vital importance to the world in the space age. They must constitute close to a half of the world's population. They sit astride some of the basic avenues of communication such as the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, and the Malay Straits. Their territories include much of the world's known future petroleum supplies and probably of other necessary raw materials as yet untapped. The masses are poverty stricken and in their ignorance, along with their devoutness, are capable of extreme mob violence to one another and to others in their midst. Small recent illustrations are the uprisings in the Arab World, the violence

between Arab and Jew, the Cyprus problem and the millions massacred over the separation of Pakistan and India. In addition, most of these peoples have been until recently colonies of the Western world, in which modern sanitation measures markedly reduced their death rates. Therefore, a population explosion is now occurring in practically every segment. Finally, the passing of colonialism means that from now on whatever order, peace, and sanity exist in these countries will have to come from their own self-governments.

The family system characteristic of these peoples is one of primary devotion to the religious or moral field of family responsibility to the exclusion or very strict limitation of the individual and public law aspects of the unit. The young mix in the developing cities and universities but are thrown out from their castes and religions if they cross-marry. Demographers now maintain that the birth rate excess is so great that illiterates are increasing more rapidly than literates and the ratio of scientists and professionals to the masses is decreasing instead of increasing. An American scholar in the University of Ceylon had an "attitude census" made of the ideas the Buddhist monks had toward birth control. He found that they simply had no ideas on the subject because it had nothing to do with the concept of progress toward *Nirvana*.

The situation for developing self-governments is complicated by languages. India has not been able to overcome the opposition from some states to implementing the constitutional provision of making Hindi the national language.

The condition is not so grim among the eighty millions of Indonesians. There nearly all are Moslem and speak Malay, which has Latin letters. In addition, they have large unused lands in Borneo and elsewhere, where the population surplus can, and probably will go, before starvation. Neither is the situation so bad in Mediterranean Africa, the Middle East, or the Buddhist countries, but for different reasons.

The Mixed Western-pre-Columbian Type

Commencing about 1500 A.D., several European countries with their Western family systems became colonial powers with rules over the new world peoples in America and Australia. In the Americas were three ancient cultures which had reached the stage of high civilisations—namely the Aztec in Mexico, the Maya in Yucatan and Central America and the Inca in Northern and Western South America. Somewhat related to these three was the Chibcha culture also in the northern edge of South America. The remainder of the Americas was thinly settled by stone age tribal peoples. Similarly Australia was thus settled by Melanesian natives.

In the course of events, a story too long to tell here, the Westerners destroyed the three ancient great civilisations and also killed off, drove away or put the tribal peoples on reservations. The remnants of the three great

cultures not killed off by war or enslaved and worked to death, retreated to the mountains, forests and interior districts. There in the four succeeding centuries they have recuperated and now have repopulated their countries and are moving to the cities. Statistics about the matter are not to be had but it is generally claimed that now after 450 years, there are as many or more descendants of the older groups as were once ruled from Cuzco, Peru, by the inca royalty when the Spanish conquerors first invaded the territory.

As a result of this series of historical events a mixed family cultural system is found in these regions of Mexico, South and Central America. At the top is the Western Roman Catholic form of marriage which is licensed either by the Church or State, or both, and at the bottom is the older pre-Columbian type. With the modern urbanisation and industrialisation of these countries now under way, the two systems have begun to intermix. The peasants, married according to ancient customs, are leaving the villages and moving to urban and industrial cities and regions where, from the legal point of view, they are unmarried. Hence the men finding it difficult to support their large families in the new urban money culture, tend to desert their wives and children and take up with other females. This type of a situation brings disaster and irregularity into the social system. The deserted women have to do anything they can to support their children. This means that a mass development of female dominated and supported households arises. The women being neglected, oftentimes continue to have children born out of wedlock for companionship or for protectors and supporters after the males have left them. Children have no male parents to restrain and discipline them so they tend to leave home early and roam the streets living from hand to mouth in various forms of work, legal and illegal. They tend to become "faggitized" in the sense described by Charles Dickens in his studies of child criminals in England. The result is that the family system does not fit into a culture in which order and responsibility is a paramount need. In modern states attempts are made to provide for the orphaned children, the widows and the aged, by forms of social insurance. If a man has eight or nine children with several women, to none of which he is legally married, the social insurance system becomes chaotic. Then if there is compulsory school legislation making the parents responsible for attendance of the children, the state must know who is to be held responsible for the truancy. This mixed family system simply does not fit into the emerging modern world.

In the United States a similar problem of mixed family types, with disastrous results, has developed among the blacks. These were slaves in the country until 1865. Under the slavery system most of the rigid family customs typical of their tribal cultures of origin in Africa, have disappeared. These Southern negroes never entirely accepted Western state licensed marriage partly because, as an "untouchable" semi-caste in the southern states, they were afraid of the white man's legal system. All this was not particularly devastating socially until this past generation during which time the vast migration of the blacks to the cities and to the north commenced

Now the largest 100 cities in the U.S.A. have great masses of Negro workers, as many as a million and a half in New York city. Several large American cities such as Washington D.C. are more black than white. Since about a fourth of black children in these cities are said to be born "out of wedlock" they are supported by the public under a system of public law known as "aid to dependent children." The volume of such public expenditure has reached such proportions that many of the cities feel the expenditures beyond their means. Public steps are now being taken both in the Latin countries and the U.S.A. to remedy this anarchical situation in the families.²

THE FAMILY INTEGRATES THE INDIVIDUAL & THE SOCIAL SYSTEM

As mankind develops the systems of social organisation inherent in the space age, the different family systems are changing everywhere but in differing directions, and at differing rates, and show differing or variable distances of "necessary change". These are motivated by two principles—that of the basic nature of the family unit and that of the necessary similarity of subfamily systems within the similar overhead organisations or governing units. These principles may be explained as follows.

The family integrates and preserves rights and obligations in three basic fields of human interest—private moral-religious and legal status or public law. Certain rights and obligations of the family are private monopolies of its official personalities: husband, wife, parent and child. Certain aspects belong to the moral-religious world in that these social codes demand duties from the family and give it rights not found in the law codes nor in innate individual desires. For instance, education above the compulsory school years, largely at parental expense, is purely a moral-religious right, duty, and obligation. The family is the only organisation which in a free will sense can ordinarily demand extreme sacrifices—all for one or one for all. A mother will nurse a sick child even though there is great danger she will contract the fatal disease. The greatest sacrifices are ordinarily required in family emergencies. The individual family member must also obey the public law, pay his taxes and serve, if necessary, in the armed forces. His relation to public law is a matter of his family of origin unless he has changed that by repudiation.

When sociologists or others overlook this *triple field* aspect of the domestic institution, (private, moral and status) they find themselves advocating, from time to time, ideas which tend to elevate unduly one field of family right to the relative exclusion of the others. Totalitarianism of a state nature for impinges upon the moral and private rights of family members by its exaggerated claims for the state. Refugees from behind

the Iron Curtain once complained that they were not allowed any avenue of escape from impossible family situations. For instance, between 1945 and 1949 abortions were not permitted under communist law in Russia, even though the birth menaced the life of the mother. Other similar tyrannies exist today in many countries. Many youths expect parents to support them in college even if the students do not take the studies seriously.

Similar extreme positions have arisen in exaggerated private and moral conceptions of the family. The "mammalian" idea of the nature of sex relations, popular the last few years in the West, holds that the state has no right to punish sex offences *per se*. Under this exaggerated idea there could be no action for statutory rape, and rape itself could only be prosecuted as mayhem (an assault) or retaliated by a civil suit. A difference of profound nature exists between this mammalian (only) idea and the fact that the human animal is of the primate order.

This philosophy represents a denial of the right of the state to keep order because legitimacy is the basic source of assigning legal right and obligation. Further, the mammalian conception tends to abolish the fundamental nature of the family. A husband has rights against his wife to the exclusion of the whole world and similarly, the wife has comparable ones against the husband. The same balance of mutuality applies to parents vs children and children vs. parents' right and obligations.

Exaggerated religious and moral conceptions of the family also tend to unbalance the institution. Proper rearing must go along with proper birth. Several countries are now producing children more rapidly than school teachers. This is in a century in which literacy is the first basic step toward survival.

The most striking aspect of family change in the developed countries is to be found in the alterations of the conception of "nonage" or the status of *alieni juris* and *sui juris* between parents and children. Legal nonage has now moved up to 16 for compulsory school years and to 18 for marital consent in many developed countries. But the changes in moral or social nonage have been more vast yet. The West now expects nearly all parents to persuade or to cajole their children to finish high school or the Lycee, which raises this aspect of nonage socially to 18. Further the drive is on to get as many of the children as possible through college and professional schools. The length of nonage now, which was 12 and 14 years or even less in earlier Western Society, has practically doubled in two generations or less.

This puts great burdens upon parents. The children in late high school (Lycee) or college are no longer pre-adolescent or in the spanking age. Yet if they do not carry on properly, the resultant discoloration and economic penalties fall mainly upon the parents. The doubling of nonage does more than double the parental job. It increases their obligation several times over. In many respects the longer nonage makes it possible for children to tyrannize their parents as 1 by the acceptance of a very expensive

college education from parents and then loafing on the job.

In the past decade trouble has developed in the American family particularly in parents—child relations. In 1971 the voting age for national and some state elections has been reduced from the former 21 years of age to 18. What this means exactly is not clear but it is a step, at least temporarily, towards the reduction of legal nonage. This is a reversal of the past movements to lengthen legal nonage. It is considered "an answer" to the "youth revolution" disturbing the educational system of the country. It and a number of other changes make the 18-21 years olds legally adults and their parents who pay the expenses for higher educations do so "voluntarily." It seems to put the burden of justification of the educational expense on the child himself.

THE THREE FIELDS OF FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES

As a private organisation, the family, in modern states is legally recognised as of now: (1) as a legitimate hetero-sexual monopoly; (2) as a place in which parents raise their young to the maturity of social responsibility, and (3) as a form of organisation in which close relatives, such as mothers-in-law, grandparents, and other closely related persons, may express, peacefully, within reason, and not contrary to public policy their own ideas about new personality types.

The second field of the family is its responsibility to the mores under institutional religions. All over the world we find certain moral sentiments about the family, and so long as they are not contrary to public legal doctrine, every family must conform to them. For instance, no country probably has a law against sexual cohabitation during menstruation, but religions often prohibit it. The new family code of India prohibits infant marriages but, many Hindu castes still practice infant marriage.

The third field of family responsibility is to the legal state as the governing organisation. Who is a citizen, a voter, a warrior, a taxpayer, a traitor, or the legal owner of property in case of intestate death of the former owner? Who is a legitimate child? These illustrate the impingements upon the family of the legal or state interest. The modern state cannot exist without using the family system as a point of reference for assigning rights and obligations. Who is to be held responsible for rearing the child properly? Who must be held responsible for its school attendance? In case a parent dies with social security interest, to whom should this interest be allocated? Most of the affairs of the modern state are operated with regard to the family relevancy of the individual.

CONVERGENCE OF FIVE MAJOR FAMILY SYSTEM TYPES

of the world's family systems. This division of the world's major family systems depends on how they must change to meet their new responsibilities. The types are based upon the orientation of the family systems to these three fields of responsibilities of the family—private, moral, and status. The force behind movements in divergent ways lies in the basic similarities of cultures developing all over the world today under the homogenising influence of the "one-world" needs of the space age. The guiding idea seems to be that in a fundamental sense.

The necessary similarity of family systems within similar over-head governing organisations is a basic principle of the relations between a family type and the kind of civilisation of which it is a part. Frederic Le Play's famous principle "Tell me what kind of family system you have and I will tell you what kind of a society is yours" is an illustration. A concrete example lies in the similarity between the family systems of Russia and the United States and their changes since 1915. When Russia became Communist, it tried very diligently to establish the "factual family type" by law. Accordingly, between 1917 and 1945, legally the family was allowed to be almost a private or factual sexual liaison. It was not such entirely in fact but legally so. Registration of marriage and divorce was solely for convenience and only a voluntary act having no legal significance. Incest was reduced to primary definition as between parents and children or between siblings. Divorce was not only by consent but based upon individual caprice, without consent of spouse. Moreover, it was not a matter of civil *litigation*. Those, then, were the original communist ideals of family organisation.

This factual family type took on slowly after 1917 and reached its maximum position between 1928 and 1936, after which it subsided. In 1945, Russia crystallised its legal family position back into an ethical one for "the good of the community." Divorce moved again into the legal system and became almost "legislative" in the sense that the local court could not decree a divorce. If, after a year of attempting to reconcile the parties, it failed, its jurisdiction ceased. Then the couple moved to a higher provincial court—almost a legislature—and secured the divorce for a fee—a high one—and without any explanation of "cause".

Thus, the Russian family system made a wide departure from *Victorianism* during this period but in thirty years swung back to ethico-legal foundations. In the United States, without changes in law, but certainly in popular opinion using legal fictions, this "other" emerging world power took the same swings, though not so evidently and so violently. In the so-called "Scott Fitzgerald days" of the "roaring twenties", the U.S. family system of the "mod set" took a rapid movement towards "the beautiful and the damned." The depression of the thirties sobered the people. Then there was a temporary release in the earlier forties, both among civilians and members of the armed forces. Now it seems fairly clear that the movement is to the "right" again. Thus the two world powers in emergence seemingly had

identical types (although that of the United States was never as violent or legal) of family organisation and changes during this period.

CONCLUSIONS

Similarity of family systems within similar overhead organisations or governing units is introduced here simply because it helps us to understand the divergent movements of the different family systems in the world today. *The main influence for most cultures is the world-wide situation now requiring self-governments.* In one way or another all these new countries now springing up or already emerged in the United Nations are going to have to govern themselves. Foreign aid will be a factor for a while but that is declining. In the long run each group is going to have self-government whether of constantly changing military dictatorships or of some constitutional forms. Self-government requires a uniform type of a disciplined citizenry and it is good or bad depending upon the knowledge and the discipline of the citizens.

In this kind of a situation different types of regions have greater or lesser distances to travel in social change than others. Among these the older Sanskritic-Arabic types of countries have a long road to travel toward modernisation, and the first preference will have to be given to alterations of their very strong but presently unfitted family systems. Turkey recognised this early in her movement toward modernisation after the break up of the Ottoman Empire. India recognises the problem but has a most difficult job. The Confucian systems apparently can modernise quickly. It recognised the problem early and made its adjustments. The most difficult situation is the primitive families as in Africa. But disturbances there, no matter how pathetic locally, cannot upset the world as can trouble in North Africa, the Arab World, India, Southeast Asia, and Indonesia.

The new family systems will have to be organised to produce a new type of personality. This new person has to be one with delayed social maturity so that the essence of the intelligentsia culture may be mastered. He must be literate and capable of high technical understanding and training. He has to be a citizen of a self-governing world unless all become slaves to a new form of colonialism like totalitarianism or some other form of external government. He also has to be a responsible person. The new family must be a unit which is:

1. A strongly united "nuclear" type but still empathetic with kin groups. Its dominant membership must be Husband and Wife and Parents and their children.
2. Willing to undertake a long continued responsibility for its children through advanced schooling even to scientific and professional levels.
3. Placing an increased emphasis upon producing quality personalities as opposed to blind breeding and conspicuous display in wedding and other ceremonies.

- 4 One responsible *equally* to the basic needs of the individual the state or legal unity and the moral order.

The more developed technical countries have already initiated significant reformulations of their family systems along these lines. For these reasons the numerous developments projected upon the old sociology have failed to come about. For instance, the old pattern of urbanisation and decay has not come about. In a sense a country like the United States has practically no peasants, yet a very strong "folksy" culture. Neither did Europe "die" when she lost her former colonial systems.

Reference was made earlier to the probable high significance of long immaturity of the human species, coupled with the teachability of the human animal, as the major factor in social creativity and the lordship of man over nature. Now when man is making the most extensive strides towards increasing his mastery over nature, we find him using the same general device as before. This time he is making social maturity come considerably later than physical maturity in order to educate the future generations for this increasing domination of the physical environment.

THE FAMILY IS FUNDAMENTALLY THE SAME IN THE EAST & THE WEST

The family everywhere is the basic social institution. It is the elementary unit of society in the sense that it is a unit of anything in the smallest element which when reproduced makes the mass complete in itself. A society is, in many senses, composed of the mass. Families are each fundamentally like all the others. The family produces raw human material out of its bi-sexual mating and prepares these individuals as citizens. Since it is the major instrument for shaping personalities, each period of social change requiring new personality types also is preceded or accompanied with family alterations or reforms.

In this century of rapid change the Western family has been busy promoting new leadership classes of scientists and highly educated personnel which may be called the new Intelligentsia. These types of persons are rising rapidly to supplement and, in many cases, even to supplant many from the older groups who gained power through success in business, religion and military channels. These same changes are now commencing in India and in the other non-industrialised countries. Furthermore an urban industrial society community requires a new type of person generally. They are minor technocrats who work with the Intelligentsia. The production of these leaders and new types of persons requires a somewhat different type of family system. It must give more attention to quality of product than quantity. So all over the world the family sub-systems are beginning to change and will change more.

This monograph seeks to explain this in part and to show its significance for the probable future of the Indian family. It seeks to give some leads to the new directions and the required family changes. The directions naturally will vary from culture to culture because all of the current major family systems do not start from the same position. But before proceeding with this a short discussion of the family systems is needed to show their *similarities*. The basic point is that, discounting minor details of development and position the human family is the same the world over. This means that *the Indian family is fundamentally just like the Western*. All the major great family systems are behavioural complexes remarkably alike. Whatever real uniqueness is found, conjectured, or believed to be present in one or the other is an illusion. We do not bother about minor variations found in the back-water groups of primitives. The families of the great civilisations are the ones which are our concern.

THE GENERIC DISJUNCTIVE NATURE OF THE HUMAN SPECIES

The importance of the family and its basic similarities arise everywhere primarily because of the *generic-disjunctive nature of man*. How man attained the domination of the world has been a matter of curiosity and concern since the beginning of social thought. The Hebrew Old Testament, sacred to Christians and Muslims alike, mentions that man is the temporal lord of the earth "and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth" (Genesis I). Sociologists have tried to explain this lordship of man by several traits (the larger brain power, the opposable thumb, his erect posture, biological generalisation instead of specialisation and others, and all of these) but have not been entirely successful. The peculiar family system of man seems to be the missing factor in these explanations. No other species has such a family system.

The Vedic Hymns and other Hindu religious works, the Zend Avesta, the Confucian writings, also hold the family supreme. Every great civilisation, every epic or heroic document and every fundamental religion has idealised the family and used it as an example of desirable conduct. God is the Father; all men are brothers. The religions say this; men seldom live up to the ideals. Nevertheless the ideal of human unity has been a dominant factor in civilising men. The family is the agency for the dominance of the species.

An early American sociologist of Columbia University in New York, Franklin H. Giddings (1855-1931) possibly expressed it best as "consciousness of kind." This consciousness of kind, he held to be a pleasurable state of mind which includes sympathy, the perception of resemblances, reflective sympathy, affection and the desire for recognition. United individual minds play upon each other in such a way that they simultaneously feel the same emotions, arrive at the same judgements and "sometimes act in concert." The basic factors of "consciousness of kind" are those which make the family possible and commence building up the basis of general social solidarity from the very moment of consciousness. This social solidarity seen most fully developed in the family apparently can enable large groups such as nations and civilisations to accomplish great tasks.

When we speak of man as being generic-disjunctive we recognise that as male or female each is a separate animal in nature. Yet for him to carry on his biological species, the male and the female must meet and breed. Genetically he is two sexes; but generically he must unite. However this meeting and breeding cannot be casual in the same sense as for most bisexual animals. Among some fish the female leaves the unfertilized eggs and the male who comes along and fertilises them seemingly has no further conscious knowledge of the existence of the particular female. He even cannibalises his own young. Among humans the carrier of the egg and or the sperm are personalities and ordinarily each is conscious of the other over long periods. The family form takes care of that. Thus the very act of breeding tends to

set up permanent relationships of a social nature. In other words, man and woman fall in love, (are attracted to each other), breed and produce helpless children. Arranged marriages are of about the same types and have the same end results. A "whole" unit in society cannot be a man or a woman but a unity of the two. Without this unity and their product there would be no society.

The beginning relation between male and female, upon which the family is founded, arises from the fact that ovulation of a female is ordinarily a discontinuous event happening about once a month sometime between menstrual periods and unmarked by visible signs, different from the case in most mammals which have a definite mating period. Among most mammals the onset of ovulation is marked by certain changes in the female so that even a non-member of the species can tell what is happening. Peasants who wish to control breeding of many of their domestic animals simply pen them up during the ovulating periods and prevent unwanted pregnancies or pregnancies from unwanted sires. Such is not ordinarily possible among the human species because the ordinary stigmata of female ovulation *seem* separate from menstruation and also from unusual sexual desire. Hence social practices which require family organisation, have to be substituted such as the mores and laws which control incest, virginity, marriage monopolies, adultery, legitimacy and other familistic behaviour.

LONG INFANCY OF CHILDREN

A secondary biological aspect of the need for the family arises from the long infancy of the child. Most animals have a period of infancy in which they can do little to protect and to maintain themselves. The ordinary male child reaches maturity at about 15 years of age or more but under primitive conditions in which average length of life is not long, this is a half, or surely a third of his total existence. Other animals practically never have periods of infancy as long relatively to total existence as do humans. Even in some countries modernising today where retirement is often compulsory in the middle fifties, this maturity is almost a third of longevity.

Many other animals are generally adjusted to much higher proportions of infant wastage than is the human species. If a member of a species has many thousands of young, and most of these are wasted due to predation, still the species continue because a few survive. A human female at best can bear only one child a year for a limited time. Females bearing large numbers of children over long periods of years are indeed a rarity.

In this situation of generic-disjunctive biology, small allowance for embryo wastage, and long infancy, arises the further fact that a human being is a person with a *shaped* personality thousands of times more so than is any other animal either wild or domestic. The difference between the animal and the person is the shaped personality. This is made possible by the nature of the brain and the neural structure of the human being. And the

difference between one area, one region, one time, and one culture and another is the shape of the personality. One man plants on a riverbank or in a burnt field without ploughing; another stirs the soil with a water buffalo and a pointed stick; another uses a large tractor; a fourth does not cultivate the fields at all but plants and uses chemical weeders to permit the crop to gain ascendancy on the earth's surface. Each is the same rural peasant or farmer but with different shaped personalities.

THE LONG HUMAN LEARNING PROCESS

Human culture is very complex and requires a long involved learning process. Even in the most primitive cultures the volume to be accomplished by the learning process is astronomic contrasted with what is done by other species. A few years ago an ancient cave habitation was found in the state of Oregon in the Northwestern part of the United States. By carbon 14 dating the occupancy of the cave was nine thousand years ago, or seven thousand B.C. The primitive people who lived there were presumed to have been descendants of hunters who had followed certain species of animals, now extinct, over the land bridge at Bering Strait from Eastern Asia before the last ice sheet of the Wisconsin-Wurm glacial epoch had entirely melted. In this cave was a pair of human sandals made from animal hide. This simple article made before modern civilisations commenced in a material sense represented more achievement in learning than any yet known from animals of other species.

We tend to think it very unusual if a circus animal after long intensive training learns to play with a ball, ride a bicycle, smoke a cigar, or respond to a few commands. A child of a few years of age who can only do as much is generally placed in a mental institution as a hopeless idiot. The human species live by controlling and adapting to its purposes the worlds of the other animals, the plants, the fishes, the birds, the bees and other things. Consequently in the most primitive communities the humans must not only learn about the mastery of these other worlds but also the methods of communicating these facts to others and of seeking the cooperation of others in their pursuit of a livelihood.

Nearly all animals have some capacity to learn. It is amusing to read today articles in which psychologists find that pigeons and other domestic fowl can be trained to respond to certain commands. Domestic agriculture, village life, and the first civilisation beyond direct appropriation, all of which began about the time of the end of the last ice age, circa 10,000 years ago, was based upon this idea of training certain animals to respond to commands and then breeding the ones most responsive. But comparatively even with primitive man this is infinitesimal.

The Inca civilisation in northwestern South America had no large meat animals such as the horse or the cow, so they built a civilisation about the
 is called *alpaca* and *llama* which are related in a distant sense to the

camel of Asia and Africa. They never were capable of taming the *vicuna*, related to these two. Any peasant or rural woman knows about the learning habits of fowl and other animals. Some of the animals learn too much, such as anti-social habits like how to open doors and gates and to get over fences. Being domesticated they have apparently lost some primitive sense and if they get into new fields of crops they tend to eat too much and die of indigestion. Some of the cows which roam the streets around the University of Rajasthan have learned to run and jump the guard structures which have been erected to keep them out of the main University grounds.

Consequently, from the very beginning the human species, *homo sapiens* has had a family system similar to that which is in existence today. This family has been man's school until recently. It has consisted of a man and woman now known as husband and wife and adults and young now known as parents and children. The use of the phrase "very beginning" above is intentional. There may have been types of men on the earth without a human family system similar to ours. But none of our investigations so far has uncovered any evidence of such a group of people. This basic family is called the "nuclear" type. This is believed to have been characteristic of the past millions of years, according to biologists who study the primate species of animals of which man is one. Husband and wife, parents and children form the nucleus of all family types. The nuclear family is the one which is dominated by these four types of personalities.

All studies of primitives by anthropologists show that they have the basic nuclear type or are formed about such a nucleus. This is reported by Murdock as well as Hobhouse, Wheeler and Ginzberg. Since the last ice age, during the important centuries of developed agricultural and urban high civilisation, this always has been the case.¹ The nuclear family has been universal.

It is also quite true many cultures have legends about other family forms and many utopias seek to promote supplementary arrangements of the family. Among these legends are those of the matriarchy as reported by Herodotus and others for parts of present Turkey along the Black Sea Coast. According to these legends these were peoples in which the family and social systems were built upon the community of interest solely between women and their children. Men are said to have played a distinctly inferior role to women in these cultures either as warriors, rulers, providers, and companions to women and children or as disciplinarians. Matriarchy in legend is different from the matrialinear form of reckoning descent through the female line found in some parts of India. In matrilinear form of reckoning descent the woman's brother takes care of her and her family. The father of her children theoretically supports his sisters and their children. However matriarchy is

a very small minority of human families.

Enticing as these legends may seem, the physical evidence of the existence of such communities is so scarce that they have been called by Zimmerman, Herodotan Myths.² Herodotus, Greek historian of the sixth century B C, spread these stories of alleged matriarchal communities in Asia Minor which have been believed to be true but no evidence has ever been found. The women of such communities were called "Amazonian." Sex is such an intriguing aspect of social life that people, particularly the males, spend a great deal of time discussing it, and almost any type of legend about sex can get and retain credence.

The Amazonian legends were rife from the fifteenth century on, with the discovery or rediscovery of the Americas and the new world by the older one. It was finally believed that an Amazonian community was located somewhere near the headwaters of the main river of South America hence it has come down to us today as the Amazon River.³

Family-Less Utopias Have Failed

Outstanding among the family-less types of Utopias is the theory of the organisation of the Guardian class of rulers set up by the Greek Philosopher, Plato. According to him children for the ruling group should be taken from their parents when young and reared in absentia so that they would love the state, and serve it, and not their families. Such a form of social organisation was also characteristic of the Janissaries or social class set up by Suleiman the Magnificent and several early Sultans to furnish a ruling class and civil service to the Ottoman Empire.

Experiments similar to these in part were set up in Russia and also in China, more recently, in the first stages of the communist revolutions. All of these experiments failed. As Aristotle once remarked of Plato's guardian idea, *if persons do not love their families, they will not love anyone.*

This is similar to the observations of Franklin Giddings in his concept of the significance of the consciousness of kind arising from the family and its civilising role. The Janissary experiment finally resulted in the group of civil servants becoming the masters instead of the servants. And in Russia, at least, the facts show that the children raised without their parents were more prone to be juvenile delinquents and criminals than good Soviet citizens

² See Carle C. Zimmerman, *Family and Civilization*, *op. cit.*, Chapter III.

³ Strangely enough the legend could have started because of the city of Macchu Picchu of the upper Amazon. This Inca city, discovered in 1912 had a very high proportion of females in its burial plots and this has never been given satisfactory explanation. The legends of the Incas had much to do with subsequent European Utopias due to the influence of the writings of Garcia Inca de la Vega, about 1550. It is now believed that the preponderance of females in the grave yards of Macchu Picchu was due to the flight there of the females of the upper classes from the Spanish invaders after the advent of the *Conquistadores* into Inca Peru under Pizarro in the early 16th century

So the experiment was abandoned except for day nurseries for working mothers. These in one form or another are to be found in all lands. Women who work away from home have other women oversee their children.

In spite of all these intriguing theories the nuclear family is a basic and universal social institution. Attempts to alter it have not made any basic change. An illustration is the permissive multiple wife system, called polygyny, which was characteristic of Islamic religious law and some practices among the upper Indian castes. Most persons can not and have not been able to support or get along with more than one spouse and one set of children. So even in the countries where polygyny is possible, allowable, or favoured by the authorities, the vast majority of families, 99%, are of the nuclear type⁴

There are major reasons for this. Genetically, this unity of male and female spouses is sufficient. Emotionally, any third person, except an infant child of that union, is disturbing. A third person, if he comes as a sexual competitor with one of the original pair, is often the subject of homicide and seldom is the punishment for such acts of homicide punished as murder. Even a grown up child disturbs a household very severely. In the west, these are generally expected to marry and leave home for another of their own. This is also true in India except in some joint families. In modern China the law of 1950 frees the youth to go his own way.

One partial exception to this nuclear exclusion of virile adults is the very small proportion of multiple wife families where polygyny is permitted. Among contemporary Egyptians, the 1960 census shows 3.78% of all marriages enumerated then as polygynous. In 1937 the figure was 3.1% and in 1947 3.7%. In the urban areas of Egypt the 1960 rate was 3.94% and in the rural, 3.70%. This was true of all families enumerated in 1960. The percentage probably has changed very little although some of the early censuses were not very accurate.

POLYGYNOUS FAMILIES

Discussions of this matter with various sociologists from Arab countries suggests that multiple marriages existed for three main reasons—infertility, labour shortage, and conspicuous display. Every person feels that he should rear children so, if the first wife does not conceive, a second is secured. In many situations, particularly where women do physical labour, the first

⁴ In 1930 and 31, Zimmerman, while making sociological investigations among the Buddhists of Siam (Thailand) and South-east Asia (neighbouring areas of Burma, Shan States, Laos, Cambodia, French Indo-China and the Malay states) where polygyny was a legal form of valid cohabitation, even required in some situations, found less than one percent. Observers in Turkey and the Ottoman Empire, where polygyny was abolished only after the revolution of 1923, found the same to be true, See Zimmerman, *Siam, Rural Survey*, Bangkok, 1933. The report of the study of polygyny in Siam is now published in *Rural Sociology*, issue of March 1972, in the article about Zimmerman's study there by T. Lynn Smith kept a copy of the original report sent to Professor Corrado Gini of Rome who suggested the study

often becomes overworked and suggests that her husband secure another woman to help her. Finally, many of the wealthy, the religious leaders and the ruling officials felt they should have several women for diverse reasons.

We cannot go into all these problems in detail. Insofar as known, no definitive study has been made of polygyny among the peoples of high—not primitive—civilisations. The rate of less than 4 percent of marriages existing in Egypt in 1960 is the highest rate about which information is currently available. Few are those who are born and reared in polygynous families. Since 1960 the government of Egypt has prohibited polygynous or multiple wife marriages. Turkey stopped it under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk about 1930; Siam (Thailand) legislated against them under King Prajediok early in this century.

Thus the nuclear family completes most of the major biosocial environment of the child. The child has an adult male and an adult female to show him the sex-linked sub-cultures of life and his society. Generally the male furnishes the most economic support and the female the social aspect of life. The father disciplines the child and the mother nurses it if it is sick. The major picture of life is completed by the nuclear family.

Thus the nuclear family is the basic social unit. This obvious fact is generally overlooked because of our physical nearness to the domestic institution. However, we dare not neglect this now in planning for the next decades because of vast changes of every kind taking place in our world. The family has to adapt itself and us to a new type of world.

POLYGyny IN RULING FAMILIES

Why Civilisations Fail has become the main question in the current set of philosophies of history. No one seems to have the whole and sure answer but one thing is evident. It does not require an astute observer to note that empires with the custom of permitting ruling class polygyny often get into more trouble from harems than from foreign enemies. This was true in many of the Islamic empires including the Ottoman. It was true of the Chaakri dynasty in Thailand. It was harem trouble that enabled a few Spaniards under Pizarro to conquer and destroy the Incas. Polygyny is an outstanding characteristic, where used; of the wealthy, the upper religious and the governing groups. These are the very families where harem intrigue has for its possible goals money, power and titles—three things that most persons seemingly desire very much. It is in such situations that the custom arises of having all possible competitors to the throne strangled. On a smaller scale this form of trouble devastates any form of family founded on a non-nuclear pattern. Socially, these other family types have proved to be distinctly inferior.

It is also true that under unusual circumstances the families of an artificial or a non-nuclear type can be made to work for at least a while. The first results of the Janissary movement in the Ottoman Empire ed

good. Religious communities, as a substitute for family life often prosper for a while. Mormons in the United States seem to have been very successful with most of their earlier polygynic families. In a modern urban society, such as the United States of America, a sixth of all families at any time are broken, by death of a parent, by divorce, desertion, or enforced absence as in the armed forces and so on.

The society as a whole tries to meet these situations by substitute families. In the case of an orphan with neither parents the state stands temporarily *in loco parentis* (in place of the parent). It seeks legitimate adoption where possible by other families and, failing that, they raise the children in orphan homes. In case the child is a semi-orphan from death or absence of one parent, the state or public officer then gives "custodial right" to the other. The mother is generally the parent most willing and eager to accept the responsibility. In case there are two parents and both want the responsibility there is a hearing of evidence on the matter to find which is most fit.

However, all of these and other devices are expensive and inefficient substitutes for the nuclear family. A most traditional non-nuclear type is a widow or divorcee trying to rear children along with aid, if necessary, from the public in shape of payments in money. This has, at the best, been a very unsatisfactory substitute for the nuclear family. In the rural districts and undeveloped countries relatives often take over these duties and generally have done a fairly good job. But fundamentally a husband and wife have to take care of their own children.

Legends in India indicate some practice of polyandry in the earlier times. According to Kapadia the practice (women with more than one husband at a time) has been discredited as a cultural trait since at least 800 B.C.⁵ Since then a man might have numerous wives but a woman only one husband. The practice may have had something to do with the economic support of widows, or, in some cases the solution to childlessness in the family line. In many parts of the world the support of childless widows by the *levirate* customs is usual. In that case, a living brother married the bereft widow. This was an ancient custom amongst the Jews and in most of the native cultures of the African peoples. Under any circumstances the customs of matriarchy, or inheritance of name, status and property through the mother's line must be kept separate from polyandry which means legal sex relations between one woman and two or more males at the same time. These are different matters with different meanings. Whatever amount of either matriarchy, or polyandry there has been found in man's past it is negligible and unusual. Monogamy (mixed with a minor amount of polygyny in some of the upper classes) has been the world's only real marriage form. Westermarck's famous four volume work, *History of Human Marriage* has shown this in detail.

JOINTNESS IN THE FAMILY SYSTEM OF THE WEST

This brings us to the subject of what is called the Hindu or Indian joint family system. What is it and what does the term mean? To the Westerner, joint family means having equal rights of descent of property, titles, and family responsibility from both the father and mother's side. In the West it came about in this manner. Western family tradition was largely institutionalised by Roman Law. The West's only important now remaining family epics of general importance, the Iliad and the Odyssey were "agnatic". They recognised descent of names, titles, inheritances and citizenship (*i.e.* group membership) as obligation or "rights" carried through the father's line.

The first written codification of Western family law was made during the reign of Augustus who was Emperor of Rome from 29 B.C. to 14 A.D. (He was the grand nephew of the famed Julius Caesar who was assassinated in 44 B.C.) Augustus came to power after the Roman Civil Wars setting in before the times of Julius Caesar and he believed much of the civil trouble arose because of degeneration of the ruling class families of the Roman nobility. To meet this problem he instituted some reforms of family life applying to the upper classes (citizens with property). These were put into laws known principally as *caducary*, or inheritance, legislation. This provided for a man to inherit property and citizenship through his father's line, since descent was then agnate. He was required to marry between 20 or 25 years of age and to have a certain number of legitimate children by the time of full adulthood and to achieve full status as a citizen. At that time property from the mother's side could also descend to an heir but that was only by gift and reached the individual through his mother's private property or parapherna.⁶

This Augustinian legislation impressed two important ideas in the Western mind, namely that family demoralisation was an important key to much social demoralisation and that the needs of national citizenship required strong public law or rule over family matters in the interest of national rule and development. After a century and a half or more the influence of this legislation began to dwindle in the changing mores which arose with the increasing affluence of the Roman society. To meet this situation the lawmakers under Emperor Caracalla in 212 A.D. made Roman citizenship almost universal in the Empire, particularly the European part of it. However an aberrant religious movement known as Christianity had by then gained considerable prestige within the Empire. This movement took over the first idea of the Augustinian legislation that family demoralisation was an important key to social disruption and made it a main tenet of that new faith. Already by the time of the leader Basil (now called Saint Basil, 330-379 A.D.) the main tenets of the new church and religion consisted insofar as the earthly life was concerned in a good family life of

marriage and devoted relations between husband and wife, parents and children.⁷

The rise of Christianity as the dominant religion of Western society is a long story. It began to use the Jewish *Old Testament* as its main epic in substitution for the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. This was adapted to Western Society by some interpretative writings now known as the *New Testament*. By the sixth century, A.D., this changeover had been accomplished. From the standpoint of the family and its organisational theory the main leaders were Hieronymous (Saint Jerome) 346-420 A.D. and Aurelius Augustinus (Saint Augustine) 354-430 A.D.

In the meantime, Rome had been sacked and burnt by barbarians. Nevertheless, by 518 A.D. the new main city of the Roman Empire and of Christianity became Constantinople on the Bosphorous between Europe and Asia Minor. (It is now the Turkish city of Istanbul). The nephew of a military leader by name Justinian, soon became the ruler. His wife, also co-Empress, was Theodora. Justinian was Emperor 527-656 A.D., but he really was regent for his uncle Justin after 518. The Roman Empire was in difficulty again, and after some bloody revolutions and civil wars the co-emperors tried to create order in the empire by reforms and the careful recodification of Roman law.

Up to that time Roman law had grown from one act of legislation to another and its only systematisations had been in books written by law teachers as illustrated by the works of Gaius and Ulpian in the second century of the Christian era. Many of these were accepted popularly but none had official sanction. Out of various works Roman Law was codified between 625 and 635 A.D. and this is now what is known as the *Corpus Juris Civilis* of the time of Justinian. It is the Western complete statement of mature Roman law. To this ancient codification a new section was added, now known as the *Novellae* or New Law or the *Corpus Juris Civilis*. In this new law the Western family system received its definitive form as it exists today and Christianity along with its institutions became the official public religion. Theodora, who dominated the making of this new code felt that both father's and mother's lines should be held responsible for the descendants. That is, she insisted that the "joint" family, both agnate and cognate, claiming descent, inheritance and control through both paternal and maternal lines should be the rule. At that time *Agnate* meant father's line and *Cognate* meant mother's. But since that time the word *cognate* has lost its original meaning and is the only Western term for what is considered the joint family.

In India what is called the joint family is just a large one of representatives of several generations, generally agnatic in character. Western rural society, as in India, has always had such so-called joint families up until the middle of the 19th century. They predominated in the primitive rural districts and in villages on the European continent, especially on the Russian

Mir and the South-Slavic Zadruga.⁸ If we call living together of several generations of relatives, insofar as they are alive at one time, the basic family type everywhere is more or less *joint* as the term is used in India. So the word has no discriminatory meaning.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter the role of the family in civilisation was approached primarily from the standpoint of the relation of the idea to both the East and the West. It is suggested that the family has played the basic social role since the commencement of history and, for a much longer time, in the pre-history of the human species. This is partly because of the genetic-disjunctive nature of man in that only through unity of man and woman is the species preserved. The biological nature of man as primate animal, along with certain unusual traits, has made the basic nuclear family of husband, wife, parent and child, more of a *necessity* of nature than a *cultural* development. However, it is a foundation of this development. Under various coverings of extended family relations the nuclear unit of husband and wife as parents with children has been found universal. Other family forms have never been very common nor successful.

In Western society what is called a "joint family", one uniting both the father's and the mother's lines has developed during the last two thousand years. This agnate-cognate unity, often done under the patrilineal-patrilocal guise, has tended to become the modal type there. However, the western joint family is different from what Indians call by that name. This will be discussed in the next chapter.

The animal part of us is millions of years old and the cultural part has developed only in the past few hundred years. Our basic patterns of behaviour in "feeding, grooming, sleeping, fighting, mating and care of the young" are similar to those of the most developed primates. The patterns of culture which we call non-animal are neither ancient nor deep. In situations such as wars, mob action, panic, and unusual times, when the veneer of civilisation slips quickly aside we revert very rapidly to the animal level.

This may antagonise many who do not wish to face the facts, but in the past 50 years there have been periods of bestiality in both the East and the West, in countries and between countries, among and between whites and blacks and Browns and Yellows which can only be explained by the fact that quick and wholesale reversions are always possible at any time.

That being the case, the family systems which contain these animal traits have not had time to change materially in the short space of time since the last glacial age. Civilised though we might be we are still what Desmond Morris calls "The Naked Ape"; and but one, even though culturally highly

⁸ See the "Original Greek Family"

developed, of the 193 still extinct species of the great apes. The first proof that we are of the same species is that of cross-breeding. The mixture of colours among the Indians indicates that the people of all groups have continuously cross-bred since the latest of the Aryans arrived here from Europe.

As time goes on we may expect that the Indian will move, in many respects, toward the Western type. And, on the reverse, many of the aspects of the Indian family system such as are essential to the West will increase in significance there. These changes must be expected and where considered beneficial should be watched closely and facilitated. For instance, if greater freedom for women is essential to the Orient, as Mahatma Gandhi and Mao Tse-Tung have both claimed, then this should be promoted.

STUDIES OF THE INDIAN FAMILY SYSTEM

Most of the studies of the present Indian family system are of two types (1) The historical analysis which goes back to the ancient Aryan documents and tries to interpret what kind of a family system they brought into India around 1500 B.C. or before. These also summarise the changes in the family as recorded in the main religious documents from the early Vedas to the close of the formation period of Indian as opposed to Aryan society. (2) Preoccupation of the Indian family sociological treatises is with the joint family. What is it? How did it arise? What are its sociological concomitants? In other words what kinds of people does it seek to form?

However so far as known the two types of writings have not been collated—the historical and the contemporaneous of the joint (or undivided) family type. Before we proceed to the studies of the joint family we seek to review briefly the opinions of the Sanskritists seeking eventually to add what they mean to the other school of empirical investigation.

THE INVASION OF INDIA BY THE ARYANS

The Aryans, or Europeans, first came to India well before 1500 B.C., possibly several hundred years earlier. They brought with them a family system which has been reconstructed from references in the Rig-Veda or earliest Vedic Hymns. This seems to have been almost identical with reconstructions of the Western family system at that time as depicted in similar documents and other evidence, in the Mediterranean area. The peoples called Aryans evidently came from the same European stocks and the same regions, either directly from Asia Minor or, having gone north earlier with the spread of wheat culture, returned through Asia Minor and then across to India.

All of these migrations could not have happened earlier than ten thousand years ago because of the ice coverage in the northern hemisphere up to that time. It is extremely doubtful if they could have occurred earlier than five thousand years ago since the people in the interior of Europe could not have lived without some agriculture. The soil there is rather heavy and firm in most places and any elaborate cultivation would have to be with metal pointed instruments. Then also the major cereal of Europe is wheat and the multi-grained wheat, essential for that form of cultivation, is of relatively late origin.

THE TIME OF THE VEDIC HYMNS

Mediterranean areas and reached a stage of relative density of population to force out migrations, then the Aryans must be relatively recent settlers in the Indian peninsula. As such they evidently found a pre-Aryan population in India, but, to this date, no written records or archeological reconstructions give us a concrete picture of their family systems. As a result the story of what is now known about the Indian family systems commences, to all intents and purposes, with the references in the Vedic hymns and later documents of the Aryans.

Since some of the references in the Hymns indicate that the Aryans had moved through Asia Minor and had stopped at Boghaz-Koi, the ancient Hittite capital 150 miles northeast of the present Ankara, this gives us some indication of the time of their gradual or more rapid movements (and route) across Anatolia and into greater Asia. Further studies of Hittites, as these were known in the Old Testament of the Jews and Christians, indicate that their civilization in Asia Minor was somewhat older and more thoroughly established than was believed by the discoverers of Boghaz-koi. This is due to the study of carvings on the rocks near every military camp established then of the same Hittite Warrior who was carved on the main entrance to Boghaz-Koi. All parts of present Anatolia are checkerboarded with such massive carvings, particularly on the borders of the country.¹ Hence it would clearly be possible that the Aryans came into the borders of Ancient India some time before 1500 B.C., (say 2000 B.C.) and were fairly well established by 1500 with deep penetration to the upper Ganges River.

ARYAN FAMILY OF THE EARLIEST VEDIC HYMNS

According to A. B. Keith in his Cambridge Ancient History of India, the earliest written documents about India are the 1017 religious Hymns of the Rigveda which form a mass of material about the same size as the Iliad and Odyssey of the Greeks. It is written for some Aryan tribes who have invaded a land inhabited by a dark skinned people called Dasas. Their major locus at the time of the first hymns seems to have been an area of the Punjab in which there were five rivers all now recognised as tributaries of the Indus. They had also moved further east, south of the Himalayas, to the river Jumna and a portion of the Ganges. Very little is told about

¹ This is noted in Carle C. Zimmerman, *Yeni Sosyoloji Dersleri*, published at the University of Istanbul, 1963, but the exact details are not available at the time of this writing. From observation of the physical types of the modern Turks the conclusion was reached then that the ancient people of Turkey are still the major types as the Hittites, only now they are called by other names. Now that the Turkish peasants are moving into the cities such as Istanbul, the most common physical type seen on the streets is that of the Hittite warrior build. The Aryan descendants in India now are much more slender in build. The Turkish peasant has always been immobile at least until recently. This would also explain why the Aryans did not take over Anatolia and stop there of going on to Western India. The people of Anatolia were even then most capable fighters.

the Dasas except their black color. However they were gradually amalgamated with the Aryans, partly as allies and partly as slaves.

The family in general was of the trustee type in the sense that the property was in the hands of the husband as head of the household. Kindred were traced on the father's side. Women, upon marriage, joined their husbands' family. Sometimes three generations lived in the same household but since persons died at rather young ages, the families were broken up early. Most marriages were monogamic but multiple wives, while not common, were found in the ruling groups. There was no evidence of what came to be called later, the "joint family", except that a married son often lived with his father and succeeded him in the household management. Freedom of choice of marriage partners was quite common. The caste system was just in the process of being formed. Hence hypergamy, or the privilege of second and third or more marriages with lower caste women was not institutionalised. Both dowries and bride-prices were recognised. Marriages were indissoluble. Widows were not supposed to remarry but a system similar to *levirate*, or marriage of the widows by their brothers-in-law certainly was permitted. Incest prohibited marriages of brothers and sisters and fathers and daughters, but how much farther it went we do not know. When a father became old his son and daughter-in-law could take over the management of the house and business, (which was mostly agriculture and cattle breedings).

This was, as we have seen, the kind of family found in Greece until the Golden Age commencing about 450 B.C. and that of the Romans until the Civil Wars which ushered in the Empire about A.D. B.C. How long it continued to last in this democratic form in India we do not know. But somehow or other after this period the caste system grew and became increasingly restrictive. There was no joint family in the sense of property ownership in the earliest Vedas and even later in this same period. However, the family was changing, women were being reduced in social status. (*op. cit.* p. 120, A. B. Keith) Apparently the crystallisation of the caste system and the rise of the joint family customs came together in the period of the Sutras, which was from the 6th or 7th centuries down to about the second century before the Christian era. During this period castes, while not yet rigid in all respects, became increasingly so. According to E.W. Hopkins the word Aryan indicated racial distinctions from the time of the Rig-Veda onwards (*op. cit.* p. 215). Nevertheless the social significance of casteism had not become rigid until this Sutra period.

During this period also the joint family became the preferred type. Even though the village as a whole, possessed all the lands, the families had collective rights therein. The family represented in the law books of that time was one in which the brothers as heirs to the family lived with the father "who may or may not, as he or they prefer, divide his property during his lifetime". (Washburn, *op. cit.* p. 256) Now all this comes together in several ways. Disregarding arguments the caste system was an

adaptation arising from the encroachment of a superior metal culture over one which was essentially stone age. The castes were colour marked at that time in that the upper four were white and the rest dark or black. One group was able to conquer and rule the other, the light colour (*varna*) over a dark one. Later as the people began to mix through various methods—hypergamy, polygyny (with different coloured wives) and natural cross fertility—the *varnas* became four castes of a limited type.

In succeeding centuries Asia began to dessicate and the avenues over the land to India became more and more difficult to traverse. The last conquerors were a sea power (England). During these centuries, even those of the British occupation, India was isolated and rural. It lacked roads and lines of quick communication. It developed itself into a meticulous maze of castes, groups and practices. Since the common people were relatively undisturbed over many centuries, the most ancient communities in the present civilised world are found in India and in them castes, caste segregation and joint families flourished.

Just how castes and the undivided family system were logically meaningfully related we are not sure. One reason is because there has been little discussion of their common origin. Nevertheless we have a caste system which established great social differences between the upper and lower groups. The big jump in this social difference scale came not between each caste but between the upper groups, as a whole, and the lower ones. This required careful control of marriage and that was achieved by arranged marriages. Arranging of marriages required a dutiful and obedient people who responded easily to family direction. In this type of situation a family system and the outside social system had to fit together. There is a substantial order in nature. Peasants living for centuries isolated in the rural areas of India had to approximate closely to this natural order. It shows in other aspects of their lives. Not all families would have to be joint, but those few which found its advantages greater than the disadvantages of quarrels among the numerous pent-up adults would do so. However this subject needs careful thought and logical reasoning. We may now turn to the modern studies of this joint family type.

DR. KARVE'S ANALYSIS

A most thorough analysis of the modern Indian family system is given by Dr. Irawati Karve in her *Kinship Organization in India* which will enable us to study the institution known as the *Joint family*. (The most comprehensive 3rd edition of 1968 is used here). She points out that the three essentials for understanding India are its linguistic regions, its castes and its families. When she mentions family she adds "by family is meant here the joint family" (p. 8.) The issue here is not great significance of the family in India, (or elsewhere) but the Indian meaning of "joint". Is the basic family system in India any different in essentials from that of the West? If not, then the

cognomen "joint family" may be merely an Indian "anglocisation" of an expression which has no scientific utility since it is unique and not classificatory.

A joint family, says Dr. Karve "is a group of people who generally live under one roof, who eat food cooked in one kitchen, who hold property in common, participate in common family worship and are related to one another as some particular type of kindred". (p. 8.) She specifies "who generally live and eat together" making allowances for members who might be away from home as in the armed services. This specification would also allow for the modern American family of today to fit into the classification of "joint families" if the words "away for the armed services" were broadened to include away at college or anywhere else a youth still either legally or socially *alieni juris* to his parents, might be in the modern world of high temporary (daily, weekly and seasonal) horizontal mobility.

In clarification of joint family organisation, Dr. Karve points out "a joint family always has an ancestral seat or locality". "However humble an Indian might be, he will always refer to his ancestral village as his home". There are two types of "joint families" in India, she continues. In the northern one "those men who trace descent from a common male ancestor form the core of the family; with them are associated women who are brought as brides and the young unmarried daughters of the family". Thus the northern type is patrilineal and patrilocal.

However in Kerala (extreme southern India) there is another type tracing decent through the mother's family which has in it no relations by marriage. The married women with their children live with their mothers "whereas the husbands live with their own mothers and are only occasional visitors to their wives and children". "Every existing family is a piece broken off from a larger unit. . . . In most Indian houses one corner of the room is given to the Gods. This room however, whatever its other uses (as store-room, dining room or kitchen) is often referred to as *deoghar*—the house of the Gods". (Ibid, pp. 9, 10)

In Western civilisation we ordinarily have only partilineal and patrilocal families but the other features discussed by Dr. Karve as belonging to the Indian *Joint Family* are still existing in the West and were almost unanimous up to the present generation. The room called House of the Gods or *deoghar* in India is the old fashioned parlour in the United States. Here only the pastor and important guests were entertained when they came to visit. The family bible was kept here with its record of births, deaths and marriages going back to several generations. In one corner of this type of room in older houses in New England is a little alcove known as the "parson's cupboard". Here the family bible was kept along with a bottle of special wine to offer the religious leader when he came calling. When modern birth, death and marriage registration came into effect in the U.S.A. (mostly since 1920) the old custom of keeping family records in the bible gave way to public

In the villages of N

Europe the family data have

been kept increasingly in the local church records since the Protestant Reformation. (Generally prior to that time no one in the villages, including the pastors or priests, could write down the records even in Latin).

In discussing family property and inheritance Dr. Karve makes a distinction between land (real property) and "things acquired" property, mostly personals. The head of the Indian family has possession of all real property in most cases, but possession does not mean absolute ownership. Rather it was trustee ownership for the duration of life of the head, after which it usually went *intestate* to the male heirs (in the patrilineal family type which was most usual).

This type of relation of a man to family property is most common in the West even today, and is the only one found till modern times. All money received by children under 21 belongs to the family legally and the moral belief in duties to parents requires their support by children even today. The making of wills, or dying testate, was not in existence during the medieval period of the West even until modern legislation. Although property law was highly elaborated during the Roman period and up through the sixth century A.D., it was not used again until after the 12th century. Until later centuries, whether in England or in Northern Europe, even right to tenure on the feudal estates passed on *intestate* according to local practice. In England this was largely by primogeniture. A considerable amount of the settlement of the Americas and Australias was made by younger sons, who were cast out of the manorial villages by the primogeniture rules. Either they had to go to the developing cities, into the armies or to the colonies, where often they settled as indentured servants. They worked for several years to pay for transportation and went elsewhere to their own lands. The relation of absent members to the ancestral home and family found in Europe has been formulated in a systematic manner in the ideal type *famille souche* in Frederic Le Play's famous six-volume work *Ouvriers Europeens* (Paris, 1883) (see Chapter III above).

K. M. KAPADIA ON THE JOINT FAMILY

Another careful study of the Indian family is by the late K. M. Kapadia, *Marriage and Family in India*, Second Edition, 1959. Three chapters of this work, X, XI, and XII, dealing with the Hindu Joint Family and some of its recent trends deserve consideration in detail.

His first significant generalisation is that the original Hindu family was "Patriarchal". This was held to have been transformed gradually very early in history into a "joint-family with a head who managed the property in the interests of the members". Later with the passage of time "there was a growing tendency towards the disintegration of the joint-family into individual families but the old patriarchal tradition was used to fortify the joint-family". This is essentially an evolutionary theory of development. The evidence for the first stage was rather sparse but it was bolstered by

Kapadia through references to works of A. B. Keith and A. A. Macdonell, both Sanskritists and students of ancient Aryan India. Neither of these authors were sociologists and both wrote in a time when the evolutionary theory of the family held full sway.

Much of this patriarchal idea prevalent in the Western world arose from a misinterpretation of *Patria Potestas*, which is a term in Roman law used to designate the power of the head of the household. The confusion of this word with "patriarch" and private control of the family funds was then quite general in Western writings about the early times. But certainly the Greek family which was related, if not a precedent, to the Roman family was of the "trustee" type as this term was used in Zimmerman's *Family and Civilization*. In a sense the absolute right of the head of a household over family property could only arise, presumably, in a modern period with the emergence of the conception of individual property.

The discussions of Keith and Macdonell on the Hindu family system arose in the interpretations of passages in the Vedic Hymns. At that time a patriarch would be relatively powerless to alienate the property which was used by the family. In the main this property would consist only of supplementary hunting, fishing or of appropriating things of nature by the village or tribe collectivity. His "absolute power" in this early family system could only be *ex officio*. The concepts of responsibility and accountability was familial, not individual. If an individual committed a wrong the blame and its correction were both allocated to the family.

Magistrates in Western Society did not then send officers to arrest the individual but summoned the head of the family and ordered him to produce the culprit. This meant that the family had to align itself with the head and hence held power over him as he did over them. From the sociological point of view the primitive family system was bound by *active* and *passive* forms of social solidarity. Under active solidarity they took steps to avenge what they considered wrongs to members and, under the passive type, they sought to protect members.

Certainly the Greek family which, according to well established primitive Greek and Etruscan legends, furnished the pattern of the Roman Family, was of this "trustee" type as Zimmerman used the term. This meant that the head of the family merely held the main property only as its manager or "trustee" during his lifetime. Now this is one of the main tenets of what is called the Joint-Family in India. In one type the living members or most of them, eat from a common firepot, and live together. In others the Joint-Family, as it is called, is dispersed into a number of households, but have property in common under direction of a head.

In discussing the Roman Family in earliest times (as to its unique so-called patriarchal nature) it must be remembered that civilisation in Europe moved from the East to the West around the Mediterranean. Scientists hold that modern multiple grained wheat originated in Asia Minor and was established in Anatolia long before it furnished a of food supply

which would enable settled villages and the embryonic developments of that type of civilisation in North and West Europe. Contrary to Popular belief, the renowned cities of the Ancient Greeks were not in Greece but in Asia Minor. The Trojan wars were between Greeks, one group on the European side and the other on the Asiatic.¹ They, presumably, carried the wheat plant to Europe and Westward.

Kapadia refers to cross cousin marriage and points out that it was permitted in certain sections in India. That puts the Indian family system right on a line with the Western, where in many regions this form is permitted and in many others it is forbidden.

Joint Family, a Misleading Term of British Jurists

Kapadia also traces the emergence of individual property as a push towards the "individual family" and the gradual development of some conceptions of personal rather than family property, particularly of things acquired by the individual during his life time and the idea that a woman could have a certain amount of her own. However, he holds unequivocally to the idea that the "family constitution was strictly declared to be, and maintained as joint and agnatic". In addition it is not only Hindu, but essentially Indian, non-Hindu as well (pp. 232-33).

The author also discusses changes in the joint family system with modernisation, increased mobility, urbanisation and the education of women. These changes began to emphasise the development of the nuclear family households and the bilateral recognition of kinship.

Kapadia also shows that the joint family as it is called, had its great significance in the self-sufficient villages where trade was restricted more or less to the village and there was little money income. (This is exactly what Le Play found in early 19th century Europe where the social organisation remained more or less as it had been in earlier agricultural times and modernisation had not gained headway). To carry on this village system in India, Kapadia showed that the needed factors were self sufficiency, rigid

¹ The basic nature of the early Western family system is studied in detail in Zimmerman, *Family and Civilization*. The Le Play studies in the 6 volumes of *Les Ouvriers Européens*, while based upon the 19th century still approached the relatively unchanged family system of Europe as it had institutionalised itself earlier in the rural villages. These developed with agriculture certainly after the recession of the Wisconsin-Wurm glacial sheets. This covered much of the northern hemisphere for about fifty thousand years up to the beginning recession of the ice thirteen or fourteen thousand years ago. Prior to that ice age we have no evidence of anything except personal property and tribal rights over territory used by collective nomadicity. In the four volumes of rural sociology by Sorokin and Zimmerman the nature of the Western peasant community, which preceded the modern world, is discussed in detail. See *Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology* (3 volumes) originally printed by the University of Minnesota Press 1930-1933 and *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology* New York, 1929.

caste organisation and the joint-family. With the change of this village economy due to development of trade and money incomes, the joint family lost its hold and "respect for the individual became the slogan of the new era" (p. 247) (This also parallels the earlier European development).

Before the situation had changed materially in India the British courts came into power and ruled on matters concerning the family and its rights versus the individual. "The English legalists misunderstood Hindu law as it was changing and misunderstood the family because the social class from which they came in England had no close connection with peasant life" They unquestionably coined the term joint-family. After 1868 also the Sanskrit texts as "interpreted by the Pandits were dispensed with and English translations took their place." Although already Hindu law was undergoing "profound modification with the bilateral recognition of kinship", this development was arrested because the legalists did not understand Hindu traditions nor could they "understand the Hindu life depicted in the sacred literature." In a large degree the whole Indian family system like the caste-system uses a Hindu model and is the same no matter what the religion of the Indians.

The new influences then coming into being, were urbanisation, industrialisation, money incomes and particularly, the education of women. Most important of all was the last, education of women, which did away with the purdah-like existence within the four walls of the house. "The political movement launched by Mahatma Gandhi brought women from their hearths to face lathis and bullets, and gave them a consciousness of their own strength, but a new vision of their true place in society." (p. 254) Thus Kapadia does not prove that the joint-family system was uniquely Hindu or materially different from other types on the Eurasian land mass

I. P. DESAI ON THE JOINT FAMILY

A number of other studies also analyse the joint-family, particularly those which are of the monographic sort about regions. In 1964, I. P. Desai published an analysis of the family systems in Mahuva on the Gulf of Cambay in West India which is in the Gujarat language area. The population of the town was about 27,000 in 1956, 78 percent Hindu and 22 percent Muslim. About 55 castes existed there among the Hindus and a number of others among the Muslims. It seemed more or less a typical place insofar as caste and areal organisation was concerned.

Prof. Desai points out that the main question for understanding the Indian family is whether it is joint or nuclear. He argues that the size of the household was not the measure of jointness but rather the joining of persons by the rights and duties which arise at several key occasions in the individual life cycle, as for instance birth, marriage and death. Statistically he holds small sized houses may be considered nuclear with tolerable a cy

but others of different sizes can only be called joint with "intolerable inaccuracy." He also suggests that the "concept of nuclear family is a cultural borrowing from the West" (p. 30) and that the Hindu law of property never recognised the husband, wife and children group as the family unit.² Essentially he notes as did Kapadia, that the word "joint family" in the Indian languages has always been a translation from the English. (p. 31)

Desai developed a scale of degree of jointness or of nuclearity and used that to classify the selected 423 families studied. His main index (the number of generations in the household) showed two-thirds with less than three generations residing in the residences and these could be considered nuclear. The other third contained mostly three generations, but six percent had four or more. In other words about a third of the families had living grand-parents residing in their households. (This would not be unusual even in the United States at that time). The largest family in Desai's sample consisted of 27 persons eating and living together and running a common business in gold and silver ornaments. That would be rather difficult to find in some Western countries at this time but similar aggregates certainly have been noted by Zimmerman in others such as Japan, Cuba, Mexico, Peru, Spain and Italy. It is a common early type of family. They have also been seen in large cattle ranches in Canada. Four generations in the same family are hard to find anywhere because, before this generation, even in Western countries with their greater longevity, only a small proportion of persons even knew personally their grandparents.

The author says his study shows "how segregation based upon caste and religion restricts social intercourse," (Section VIII *et passim*). As we note further in this chapter, this "segregation" may be considered antithetic to social change and the development of variant new types of personalities. Also the more the families of the U.S.A. attempt to produce scholars, scientists and professional graduates, the more do they keep out of their households kindred who do not have the same ideals. They seem to prefer instead non-kindred who also wish to encourage their children to rise vertically (See Ch. V).

Desai evaluates the evidence he has on the existence of jointness or nuclearity in his families as based on their memories of the composition of the households in three previous "states", without specifying the time concerned or how he measured the designated past "states" of the family. He does not find any particular present temporal trend toward nuclearity, or jointness. Examining the reasons for separation of joint families into nuclear ones he comes to the conclusion that, among *natural* reasons, family quarrels stood

² Western society has always had a joint intestate form of descent of property. The testate form, which can recognise the nuclear family, fell away during the Dark Age at the end of the Roman Empire but was revived in modern times. The point of this is that family jointness in the sense of rights and duties has been totally the same in East and West but divergencies have developed at

out whereas, among *circumstantial* ones, the mobility of persons in society was the main factor.

[Needless to say these are the exact reasons for breaking and reconstituting close associations of large kin groups in the West. In the villages of peasants known as the *Mir* in Russia in the 18th and 19th centuries, collective lands were redistributed ever so often according to the number in each household available to cultivate the area and the mouths to be fed. Nevertheless when the village families became large, with more than 5 to 6 members, they broke up anyway, not from economic necessity but due to the inability of some members to get along with the others when so many lived in the household.

Then again turning to "circumstantial" reasons the large-scale migration of Europeans to the United States during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries resulted in the vast extension of nuclear families in the new country. All of these began to aggregate into more jointness as the conditions settled down and the American families had their own kin living nearby. The first of these assertions above about the Russian *Mir* is discussed in Sorokin, Zimmerman *Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology, op cit.*, and the second is demonstrated in detail in a work, Zimmerman-Cervantes, *Successful American Families*, New York 1960].

AILEEN D. DOSS ON THE JOINT FAMILY

In her book *The Hindu Family in its Urban Setting*, Dr. Ross says she is not trying to prove, or disprove, "the familiar thesis that the large joint family in India is giving away to the smaller nuclear type typical of the middle-class, urban Western societies...but rather to study the strains and problems which arise when families change from one form to the other" (p. 10) She agrees with the ideas put forth by a number of the Indian family system that the joint family, as it is called, plays many roles and serves various functions which are necessary to a strong and satisfactory social life. It makes a life which is "family centered", characterised by intimacy, mutuality, face to face controls and mutual assistance. In it "family traditions and pride are strong, and individual members are dominated by the opinions of the larger group." (p. 14) On the other hand, she agrees with the ideas suggested by Kingsley Davis that joint familism tends to limit social mobility and social change because it binds the individual to others by duties inherent in birth. It ties the young to the old, and forces them to support their indigent relatives regardless of their own efforts to help themselves. Also it is supported and upheld by the caste system in India. (She might have added that it also supports and upholds the caste system.)

According to Dr. Ross the joint family is fitted mainly to a simple society where the patriarch is the main one controlling the system. Hence, she implies, it is inimical to the development of control by more complicated political agencies (such as those to the

essential to self government). (Italics added by Zimmerman).

This type of family has certain social advantages in that the dependence is diffused so much among numerous relatives that the loss of even an important member is less critical for the remaining individuals than it is in the nuclear family system. There is always a full complement of young and adult members to carry out the various social and economic functions of the family group. "However, the very factors which make it such a satisfactory haven make it a frustrating unit for deviant members—who desire to exert their own initiative and independence". (p. 16). "... the penalty for non-conformity is high".

Dr. Ross points out that urbanisation and industrialisation are supposed to be the influences undermining the joint family. This is difficult to prove because when urbanisation was not very rapid the urban population groups gradually extended their own joint family systems through the movement of country people to join up with the branches of their relatives in cities. But she points out that many factors connected with city life, such as ease of attaining higher education, freedom, and greater intensity of life tended to separate parents and children in their mental outlooks as well as physically so that situation enhanced the breaking of former close-knit family groups.

It is evident from this discussion and her later classification of the 157 middle and upper class urban families interviewed that she used a comprehensive approach to jointness which included the number of generations in the household, the presence of more than one married couple and the number of dependent members. With this comprehensive definition in mind she put the 157 studies into four categories; 19 large joint families, 44 small joint families; 77 nuclear families; and 17 nuclear families with some dependents. Her analysis included the families of the persons interviewed when they were growing up and also reported on them at the time of the interview.

DISCUSSION OF THE THEORIES OF DR. ROSS

In her classification Dr. Ross found that each category of families had shown a great deal of social mobility from one type to another during the lifetime of the person interviewed. At one time or another 128 or 82% of her 157 interviewees had lived in nuclear families as she classified the domestic units. This may be contrasted with 18 or 12% who claimed they had never lived, even temporarily, in large joint families. In other words, the nuclear family identical to that which is supposed to be almost universally typical of the West had predominated by a ratio of 7 to 1 in the life experiences of her correspondents as these were reported to Dr. Ross.

One of the most common types of families found in the West, based upon three fourths of a century of observation of domestic institutions in the United States and Canada, is that in which a young couple when first married,

lives with his or her parents for a few years until economic circumstances enable them to move off into a house or apartment of their own.

Most of the elder family is that of the bride's parents because she can get along with her own mother more easily than she can with her mother-in-law. There is some substance in the classic "mother-in-law" jokes. Two women in one kitchen have more difficulty in getting along with each other than two men in a household, since they are away from the residence most of the day. Very often even in families of modest affluence the elder generation helps the son or son-in-law start a household of his own. People in the West also generally start off in a joint family, if we use the same logic and concepts as Dr. Ross.

This is followed by a situation in which, if there are children born in the new family, the daughter returns to her parental home for the delivery and the young mother learns first hand the art of infant care from her mother or mother-in-law. This can be repeated with each child and it becomes more and more necessary with later children, as a woman cannot easily take care of a young child or two and, at the same time, give birth to another infant. She calls in her mother or mother-in-law or any kindred available.

The basic "jointness" of the Western family, if it may be called so, is supplemented sooner or later by other circumstances which introduces the living remnants of the older family into the home or into the neighbourhood of the younger children who are married. This consists of a whole gamut of accommodations. If the elder couple are both alive, they often choose to stay near their young, or whichever of their children is most helpful and available, for company and help. If one is dead, which is most often the male, the widow, even if able and not helpless so as to need oversight, moves to a household of a son or daughter where she is taken care of by either the married child's family. Very often, an unmarried son or daughter devotes his or her life to taking care of the remnants of the family of the last generation. The Cubans call this practice of the honourable older child—*Hermano Major*.

It is not necessary to embellish this with further details. A family community interest in property, if death is intestate, is axiomatic in every American legal jurisdiction of 50 states, a territory and the District of Columbia. A testate death in which the family property goes to outsiders without consent of the descendants is generally always broken in legal contests. The aged are nearly always in need of guardianship or if they have any property the young oversee them to conserve the family funds.

In addition to the above main sources discussed a large number of other Indian and foreign students have written about it.³ Essentially they are all alike that so little seems to be gained by a us They have added very little that is new to the analysis "The studies so far have primarily

a picture of the traditional joint family and analysed its structural setting. The method of research has been mostly empirical, though some like Kapadia have based their work primarily on library resources and scriptures" (Sinha, *op. cit.* p. 33)

WILLIAM J. GOODE ON THE JOINT FAMILY

Professor Goode of Columbia University in his *World Revolution and Family Patterns*, (New York 1963), reports in detail upon the same documents analysed here. It provides additional data from certain statistical analyses; from public opinion attitudes collected in India; from the summary of proportions of such families given in a number of village and regional studies, and materials from censuses as early as 1901.

Goode reaches the same main conclusions as are found in this work. The so-called joint families living separately (but coming together for festivals or holding property in common) seem to him not "joint" at all. "Defined thus, almost all family systems in the major cultural areas of the world, including the West become "joint families." (p. 243) At other places he indicates that he is sceptical of the contention that the joint family is undergoing disintegration, a belief which has gained some credence since E. A. Gait remarked about it in the 1911 Census of India. Goode holds that the "general opinion" in India is in favour of joint families. However, at no one time in the past were more than a small proportion of Indian families joint in composition, so that claims of their change now could not be proved. He finds for the censuses of India from 1901 to 1951 as we did for that of 1961 that the average size of the Indian household was relatively modest. In 1951, 77 percent were of no more than 6 members. In 1901 the average household was 5 persons. These figures allow little room for more persons in families than would ordinarily be present in the nuclear unit, parents and children with an aged but dependent grandparent still alive.

Without defining the joint family Goode seems to equate it with the "extended family" in the West. (p. 238) The two are not interchangeable. The extended family of the West included relations of both lines, those formed through intermarriage of the sons with other families and also of daughters. It was a ruling and protective device. A woman came under the *manus* or protection of her husband's family and took up the sacred obligations as if descended from a common ancestor as her husband. Nevertheless she was still the daughter of her parents and a member of her parental family. She could not be subjected to any extreme punishment as whipping and banishing for adultery, unless she was convicted before a primitive court of elders in which her family of origin was represented and which agreed to the judgement. Otherwise, the two clans would enter into a feud over the matter. In other words, the extended family in the West was cognate as well as agnate. The West knew nothing of the sub

of women to the position which they have in the joint family of India. This is shown in all the Western epics whether *Beowulf*, *Morte d' Arthur*, *Iliad*, *Odyssey* or the accounts in the *Germania* of Tacitus, among others. The Indian joint family is a unique creation of India and its resemblance to the extended family of the West is purely a surface similarity as the caste system has surface similarities with the class system of the West. It is highly probable that the same early circumstances which led to the rigidities of the caste system also led to the formation of the joint family. The joint family is a thing of itself whereas the extended family is a protective aggregate of kinsmen and clients which appears or disappears according to circumstances and need.

Supplementing the analysis of statistical figures by Goode, the 1961 census shows the average number of persons per 100 households in India to be as follows by regions:

INDIA	T	517
	R	519
	U	508
I Northern Zone	T	547
	R	554
	U	519
II Central Zone	T	504
	R	506
	U	491
III Eastern Zone	T	532
	R	535
	U	508
IV Western Zone	T	518
	R	519
	U	515
V Southern Zone	T	501
	R	498
	U	510
Andaman and Nicobar Islands	T	473
	R	484
	U	435

of 517 does not allow much leeway for many others in the household other than a married couple and their young children.⁴

NIRAD CHAUDHURI ON THE JOINT FAMILY

A literary analysis deserves comment here. Nirad C. Chaudhuri's recent book *To Live or Not To Live*, presents an "exciting, provocative testament on (Indian) social and family life." Chaudhuri is an essayist and not a professional sociologist but he analyses the family problem with great verve and spirit. He speaks disparagingly of the joint family saying that he doubts that Plato (Greek Philosopher, 427-347 B.C.) would have advocated the removal of children from the care of the parents if he had seen the joint family work. He suggests that the joint family almost succeeds in eliminating the influence of the father and mother upon the child "in abolishing parental exclusiveness, and in throwing the child upon the lap of the community" (p. 96).

In his analysis he points out that joint family is a sort of co-operative society based upon kinship and a sort of replica of the village community. The "tribe" as he calls it, was an extension of the joint family. The family gave the individual members security and enabled the young men to marry early thus favouring a high birthrate, "...early marriage and the joint family are closely related...because young men could marry even before economic independence." He claims also that there is a good deal of chicanery in which the incompetent take advantage of the others and quarrelling is common between children and parents and among the children. When things go well it is a fine situation but when trouble arises internally the members often go to emotional extremes. From his point of view "...the joint family remains the least satisfactory form of family life." (p. 100)

Chaudhuri also holds that the development of salaried and mobile types of occupations tends to break up the joint family. They work best where there is a common relation of the group to land property which is immobile. He reiterates that a joint family is an "economic" institution though organised on the genetic tie. But he goes further and seems to think that the problem of aged widows and mothers-in-law is more or less an exclusive product of the joint family. He says they often go for extended visits or reside for long periods in the homes of sons thus creating "joint families" in camp. He seems to think that if anyone lives in a family household other than the man, his wife, and their own children, that makes a joint family. (That being the case, in a large degree the whole world is formed of joint families and the only nuclear ones are temporary and accidental either because no aged relations are su g or because the residence of the son is completely in sible (Zimmerman)

DISCUSSION OF CHAUDHURI'S VIEWS

Chaudhuri evidently has studied the Indian family systems rather carefully through experience and introspection. While he often contradicts himself and goes to extremes in his analysis, he makes several original points worth noting. One is the claim that joint families are closely keyed to early marriage and birthrates higher than the average. To our knowledge not much has been made of these although Kingsley Davis in *The Population of India and Pakistan* seems to accept that these relations are self-evident facts. (*vide* Ch. 14). Davis puts into this situation two other related circumstances, the immobility of the population (measured by very low rates of horizontal mobility) and the stability of the caste system. It might be added that since horizontal and vertical mobility are also highly correlated, the joint family could be closely related to the over-population problem. These ideas are not conspicuously evident in the joint-family literature which seems to bear most heavily upon encomiums to the institution.

Another point suggested by Chaudhuri is that of the confused social definition of personality roles in what is considered to be joint family practice. He notes that the marriage in joint families are limited largely to procreation and legitimate physical satisfaction. He feels that the young children belong to the family and not to their parents. He quotes his own autobiography to note that family relations in these units get mixed up. "The father, the son, the son-in-law, the mother, the daughter, and the daughter-in-law were all having children at the same time." He implies that the children called the elders and one another whatever they liked, such as "the fathers were called brother, the grandfathers and brothers, father," the mothers were called daughters-in-law, uncles, father and nephews, brother until there was indescribable confusion in the idea of blood relation.

FAMILY IDEALS ARE SIMILAR IN THE EAST AND THE WEST

Thus there was no clear-cut understanding of social roles in the family. Just what this means to the personality of a typical product of such a system has not been analysed. But some evidence of this condition and its consequences is suggested by the faulty analysis of the concept of the joint family itself by the writers. The writings on the subject seem almost universally to classify normal behaviour in the nuclear family all over the world as a "joint family" manifestation, when found in India. It is needless to dwell upon this point but aged parents all over the world are taken into "nuclear families" for support and care, if at all possible. Mother-in-law troubles are found in nearly all families, and not only in the phenomenon called joint families by Indian sociologists. All this leads to internal bickering in Western families but it is considered a normal family obligation whether agreeable or not.

It is in the nature of civilisations that they make on demands upon

all the individuals concerned. These call for a basic form of social solidarity in which the individual is bound to the group by ideals of collective interest of a self-sacrificing nature more profound and long-enduring than are found in the primate instinctive level. The relations between husband and wife, parent and child, and inner members with near kin have to be standardised and idealised in a deeper sense than is found in the ordinary relations of non-human animals to each other. If we look at the skein of social relations as something like the weave of a cloth it may be noted that the succession of closely related knots gives the whole a standard strength in every part. In the same sense every normal human being is constantly enrolled by his varied family roles in a series of repetitive situations which give him "training" in all the major "human" aspects of life. He starts as an infant receiving selfless attention from parents and relations. After going through life playing consecutively all the other roles of the family he finally ends his career again, if he lives an unbroken span of life, as the recipient of the same selfless attention from the children he has brought into and trained for life.

There are numerous forms of social solidarity ranging from mechanical to organic, to use the Durkheimian terminology, or from mechanical adjacency to logical-meaningful in the words of Sorokin. A great civilisation has to be held together, fundamentally, by common sentiments the inculcation of which into the individual in the vast majority of cases is unavoidable. This is the civilising role of the family. Hence no matter what other differences there are between East and West we should expect to find essentially the same family ideals. That is exactly what we have found. A civilisation is an organic meaningful uniting of a large number of persons lasting over many generations.

FAMILY IDEALS BASIC TO INDIAN CULTURE

We have pointed out by stressing the incidental statements of Kapadia and Desai that the whole idea of the uniqueness of the Indian family could have stemmed originally from the inadequate knowledge of the system by the British jurists who had to settle cases of civil law in Indian courts. However, a second factor seems to have been the unacquaintance of the work regarding the basic forms of the Western family by Frederic Le Play and his school of sociology. To help remedy this in part a chapter on the Le Play school and its major conclusions is added to this monograph. Contributing to this lack of knowledge in a considerable degree is the lack of attention given to the family by most of the foreign sociologists. These sociologists did not know the Le Play fundamental ideas about the family. Hence they accepted the same misinterpretation of the Indian family system as did the Indian scholars.

No matter what else may be said about the Indian family system the facts are that its ideal type as seen in the early epics the religious

documents and the law codes are almost identical to those emphasised historically in early Western society. While we summarise it from the Hindu documents (which do not comprise all Indian families) yet the others such as those of the Jains, Buddhists, Moslems and Christians have ideals similar to those of the Hindus. In comparing the ideals we may make certain the key points:

1. What is the family?
2. What is a full or complete individual?
3. What is the basic nature of the union of husband and wife?
4. What are the roles of husband and wife in the family?
5. What is the ideal psychological conception of husband-wife unity?
6. Are there differential conceptions of the relation of husband and wife before the Deity or does God consider them the same?
7. Is it a duty for the public law to stand *in loco parentis* when widows and orphans are bereft or cast out by unjust relatives or kindred?
8. Are there fluctuations or periodicities in the relative levels or conditions of women in the East as well as the West?
9. Finally, is killing of a mother a most heinous crime in the East as well as the West as illustrated by the famous Greek legend of Clytemnestra or the similar situation in Hamlet when a version of this legend was redone by William Shakespeare?

The data on these practices and beliefs in India may be summarised from the 1954 revised edition of *Hindu Social Organization* by Pandari Nath Prabhu, Bombay, 1954.

The most significant statement by Prof. Prabhu is that "the Hindu home is the dwelling place not only of the living members of the family but also of the *pitris*, the ancestors, under the care and blessings of *Agni*,—the sacred Fire, the presiding deity of the home." (p. 219) "Thus the psychology of spiritual continuity forms the basis of the Hindu's family and its traditions. . . . The living members of the family are, so to speak, trustees of the home which belongs to the *pitris*, the ancestors, in the interests of the *putras*,—future members of the family. All the property enjoyed by the members of the family belongs to the home and not to any particular member or members of the family. And the home consists of the continuity of all the members of the family—past members that are no more, present members that are living, and future members that are to come into being. The home, therefore, is the place wherein there is common kitchen, common property, common good, common weal and common woe."

in the continuation of the race, and actually commences his efforts in that direction." Ibid, 225. "Man is only half human, not complete until he marries and begets children; then only he becomes a full man." The "Hindu writers have devoted much of their energy not only in praising monogamy but have gone further in eulogising life-long union of one man to one woman" . . . Ibid 229.⁵

The Mahabharata declares that the housewife is necessary to the home. It suggests that a home without a wife is a wilderness. According to Manu the husband is declared to be *one* with his wife. "He only is a perfect man who consists of three persons united—his wife, his offspring and himself" "Mutual fidelity till death is the summary of the highest law for the husband and wife to follow."

THE POSITION OF WOMEN

Disregarding what is practiced at any particular time, the ancient Indian documents (Mahabharata, Ramayana, Vedic hymns, and various codes of the Law of Manu) give women a very high and protected place in their basic moral codes. Husband and wife stand as equals before God. If the relations are unjust to female orphans or widows without defenders, the king has a duty to stand *in loco parentis* to her and to see that the woman gets justice. Women in the individual families are protected by the same antipathy to incest as in the West. About the same rules of incest prevail as in India. In some American states first cousins are allowed to marry each other and in others this is forbidden. In some Indian groups first cousin marriage is allowed and, in others, prohibited.

Finally, the mother in India plays the same role as does the mother in the West. The most dramatic expression of the reverence for the mother in the West is given in the Greek legend of the return of Agamemnon to Clytemnestra. This is a pattern which Shakespeare uses for much of the drama in Hamlet. Orestes, the son of Agamemnon, avenges his father's death at the hands of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus by killing them. However, when Shakespeare takes up this theme in Hamlet the taking of his mother's life by Hamlet is considered so dastardly that the story has the mother removed by accidental poisoning. The mother has such a close relation to a child that it is a most dastardly action for the child to kill her.

This same type of situation is found a number of times in the Indian Epics. To carry out the father's word is the supreme duty of the son. "The father, the mother and the priest are always to be obeyed." Yet when Gautama ordered his son to kill the mother, Ahilya, with whom Indra had committed adultery, he, like Hamlet, failed to do so. (Prabhu, *Ibid*, p. 256-7)

We could go on with this in great detail but these examples borne out by numerous other studies of early Hindu culture seem sufficient

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis here suggests that the Western and the Indian family systems seemingly stem from the same basic form of social organisation. The words *Joint Family System* cannot apply any more to India than to the West except as a local term with no unique meaning and, if characteristic of the Indian family system, only temporarily so. It is to be noted that the Indian Census Reports commencing in 1961 use the term "undivided" instead of Joint Family.

As it stands now we have taken the position that the family is basic to the social structure. It is in a considerable degree also the most *important part* of the social structure having to do with the maintenance, the preservation, and the growth of the above society or civilisation. The human family took its origin and stabilised its most fundamental traits in the primate condition of life during the past two million years. Its adaptation to civilised conditions has taken place only within the past ten or twelve thousand years since the recession of the last ice age. Up to that time the ice on the Eurasian continent came down at least to the Himalayan mountain barrier. This condition had been in existence for the previous forty or fifty thousand years. Our carbon 14 and other datings prove that high civilisations have appeared since the Ice Age retreated.

The family conditions and legends as well as its basic structure are almost identical in India, on the one hand, and in the regions adjacent to it both on the West and East. This applies on the East to the group of countries who have the Confucianist legends (such as China and Japan) as well as to South-eastern Asia where Polynesian, Indian and Chinese culture traits are mixed. It applies equally well to the European—Mediterranean area where the same legends and basic family organisation appear under different names and guises.

Thus, the family is the basic social institution and that form of social organisation is, with minor variations, the same in both East and West. However, we add two ideas of importance. The joint family appeared in temporal relation to the rigid caste structure and to the derogation of the female. Insofar as that is important the joint family will weaken with the reduction of casteism and subjection of females. Further the joint family is largely antithetical to the problems of over-population and complete modernisation of the economy and government of India.

THE WESTERN FAMILY SYSTEM

In the previous two chapters the conclusion was reached that what is called the Joint Family in India is not unique but a variant type of world-wide family organisation inherent in the primate nature of man and the processes of higher civilisations. Here, it is sought to pursue this topic and to show that, in its essentials, the Western family system has all the characteristics of the Indian joint family.

The family is composed of persons with "personalities." These "personalities" assume or take on basic roles played in life. The typical ones everywhere are husband, wife, parent, child, daughter, son, grandmother, grandfather, uncles, aunt and other kindred. Over their own natures they wear masks and these become second personalities. Essentially the roles played by these second personalities are the same in the West as in the East. However, at any one time, a person in one of these roles may have to play his part more distinctly and immediately in one culture than in another. That is, a country with unemployment insurance, as is found in most of those of the West, does not require the son to rush immediately and wholeheartedly to the aid of his parents upon cessation of the father's income as in the East. For instance a typical man whose brother may have died recently in a Western country is expected to take an immediate interest, if necessary, in the economic support of his sister-in-law and her children, but this support may be of only a limited nature on account of social security, pension rights, insurance policies or accumulated property which comes to the widow upon the death of her spouse. In an Eastern country without these payments (particularly in the rural districts) the whole burden may fall at once upon the husband's brother or other immediate family member or members. At the beginning of this century, the responsibility of caring for the widow and her children fell directly on the husband's brother as it does now in many cases in the East. A son in a polygynous family oftentimes "inherits" his father's remaining wives upon the father's death. He supports them as if they were wives he chose himself but, in those cases to our knowledge, never had connubial relations with them. The same happens in tribal families in Africa where the levirate custom of marrying a brother's widow is almost axiomatic.¹ The roles remain the same; the methods of carrying out these roles often vary considerably. But in spite of varying emphasis in the roles played a mother is still a mother and a son is basically the same

COMPARISON WITH THE AMERICAN FAMILY

For purpose of our analysis of this problem in a contemporary situation we concentrate upon a statistical study of the American Family. This deals with the kinship and close family friends who have been constant visitors in the households. No contention is made that the two family systems are identical. In fact, at any one time they differ fundamentally. However, these differences are of emphasis at any one time and not of nature. The American family is used for two reasons: it has been studied; and it is the most extreme Western type, but representative.

The basic materials are from 130,000 families studied by Zimmerman and Cervantes between 1950 and 1960. These families consisted of 60,000 who were grouped around urban households in which a child had graduated from high school the year of the study. The six cities chosen for the national sample were Boston, Massachusetts; St. Louis, Missouri; New Orleans, Louisiana; Omaha, Nebraska, Denver, Colorado and Los Angeles, California. Each of these cities had a population at that time of more than half a million persons and two more than a million. The cities represented the different areas of the country from the East coast (Boston), the West coast (Los Angeles), the South, New Orleans; the North, Boston and Omaha, the centre, St. Louis; and the great arid plains of the mountain plateau, Denver. In addition, two were cities in the colonial days before 1775; three were new cities rising to prominence after the Civil War 1861-65; and one the very newest, Los Angeles.

The first part of the study took groups of high school senior families of the classes graduating between 1956 and 1960. The second part took the same cohorts of age groups as these finished colleges or nearby universities between 1960 and 1965. In order to get the same types of persons the second study was based upon college upper-classmen and graduate students in those colleges and Universities surrounding the cities studied. That is for Los Angeles we took the three major state colleges in Los Angeles and in the two major universities in that city. Where a city was on a state line we took all the colleges and Universities in both states bordering on the line, and where the city was inside a state we took a sample of all the colleges and universities within that state. In our college and university sample we studied 70,000 families, which with the original group from the high schools of 60,000 gave a total number of 130,000 families.

The choice of urban families was made because in a large sense the USA is now an urban country and becoming increasingly metropolitan. The most recent Western migrants there, those whose parents and grandparents were born in Europe, live in these types of cities. Further the problem of family cohesion has been more of a moot point among urban families than among rural where, at least until recently, the older country family system might have continued to carry on. The reasoning was that if the urban family in the United States showed a basic pattern of aggregation

then it could be said that it was a universal family trait of the West and of the human species (insofar as Western Society is representative of the present civilised human animal).

The American population is very heterogenous in its origins and includes within it a great many millions of persons whose original family systems of two or three generations ago are from all the countries of Europe and still have the Western family traditions. Germans, Russians, Poles, Italians, Austrians, Hungarians, Czechoslovakians, Roumanians, Turks, French, Spanish, English and Irish, not to mention all the Scandinavians, are there by the millions. These are generally grouped in solid blocs so that whatever basic trait was characteristic of their European family systems would be still preserved more or less intact. It seems clearly evident that, if the characteristics of the joint family in India are universal patterns, due to the basic nature of the human family and its emergence under civilised conditions, we should find those same traits in America and in every one of the large cities of that country. The modern American cities are filled with transplanted Europeans just now becoming a new American Folk.²

One point should be made clear at the start. These were not families of the former upper classes of Europe. Rather they were from the lower groups, such as the poor peasants, the farm labourers, the marginal agriculturists of the hilly and poorer lands and labourers and the small tenants of the large farms of the richer lands. W. I. Thomas studied the backgrounds of typical examples of these people in the famous three-volume work by him and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* published during the first third of the 20th century.³ Hence what family arrangements they finally resolved in the United States were more or less basic Western folk patterns.

THE METHODS OF THE STUDY

With the co-operation of the educational authorities, the senior classes in representative schools in each of these six cities (one of high class and

² Most of the material in the study presented here are to be found in Carle C Zimmerman and Lucius F. Cervantes *Successful American Families*, New York, 1960, and *Ibid* "The United States Friend Family System", a paper presented to the *International Conference on the Family*, Columbia University August 25, 1960. The study was aided by statistical advice from the Harvard Social Relations Laboratory. The Ford Foundation gave Cervantes aid to free his time for the field work. Most of the computer time was donated by American United Airlines Ticketing Agency. The computer machinery was made available for use in the early morning hours (from 2-5 A.M.) when it was not needed otherwise.

³ See also three studies by Zimmerman of the migration of Italians to the United States and their settlement in the new continent. See "American Roots in an Italian Village", a monograph published in *Genus*, 1955; "Some Aspects of Collective Settlement of Italians in America", published in Vol. 2 of *Studies in Honor of Corrado Gini* by the Institute of Statistics of the University of Rome 1962. The third study is in Spanish in the *Revista Mexicana de Sociologia* about 1958.

others of middling and lower districts were asked to fill out, while in supervised study sessions, a one page report about their families and the families which had been in their households most frequently during the previous decade. Since the average student was 17 or 18 this included the persons visiting in the students' parental homes since each was about 7 or 8 years of age. He could remember well back that far. Each student rated these informal family friends in order from closest, and seen most often in their homes, to least intimate family friend, and seen least often. Ordinarily each student could remember 4 or 5 family friends whom he knew and with whom he and his parents had most familiarity. Families seem somewhat exclusive and do not familiarise with large groups in their homes.

Then each student reported the income class of his parents, their religion, their region of origin, whether they had been separated or divorced (or one parent had been missing for other causes) and whether any child in his parental family had ever been arrested (to the extent of making an appearance before the correctional legal authorities for juveniles). He also provided identical information for his parental friend families which he had seen steadily and frequently about his home. In addition he answered a question as to whether the visiting family were "kindred" (by blood or intermarriage) to his parents. Also the student checked the most probable place of the commencement of the association of the two families—that is at the church, at their employment, at ethnic gatherings or elsewhere.

All this was done in a minimum of time by mere checking items. The average time required for this work was 5 or 6 minutes. It was done without forewarning, without discussion, and as a class duty. The idea was that this commonplace information which each knew intimately could be put down in a hurry. No time was allowed for the student to consider what might "seem best" to report. The question sheets were anonymous. The teacher who administered the Q's was given a short statement to read to the students beforehand telling them exactly what to do and nothing else. If there were any deviations the whole sample was discarded and another class was substituted.

These schedules were then transposed to computer cards each of which covered the basic data for the family of the parents of a student and its surrounding friends. In each case the student had been so guided by his parents and home surroundings that he had reached the final months of high school graduation which meant he was launched upon the educational ladder and could now try to become a college graduate and eventually a professional man as a medical doctor, a scientist, an educator, an engineer or any one of the new emerging class of the scientific intelligentsia. These groups are necessary to and are assuming new leadership positions in the technical cultures of the Western nations of the 20th century. This computer card also included similar data for the close associates of that family.

Thus for the high school study there were about 60 000 families divided into about 12 000 groups since each one consisted nearly always of a family

from which the information was secured and for its 4 or 5 very close and intimate friends. Since the later study of college and university classes (highly educated and professionals) who had gone on from the same age cohorts and the same school systems, bore out earlier findings, we report here only upon the high school study.

Any analysis then made carried each group as a unit so that relations between the family of the student and of his friends could be reversed to study counter or mutual influences. For instance if the student families had gained from selective social environmental association, it could be ascertained if the friend families in the same group environment had also gained in strength.

SOCIOLOGICAL NATURE OF THE STUDY

Now we have the set up of what might be called a "statistical experiment" In the words of Charles Horton Cooley, eminent American sociologist, we have selected details on 12,000 carefully chosen primary or "face to face" groups. These groups were alike in that each consisted of 5 or 6 families in one of which, at least, a 17 or 18 year old person in an American city has far surpassed the educational achievements of his parents. Not only had he become literate but had mastered the intellectual and social difficulties which made him or her a promising and available candidate for vertical mobility into the newly emerging managerial class or "Intelligentsia" of that technical society. These face-to-face groups are the traditional ones of most sociological discourse in that they would be called "gemeinschaft" by Tonnies, "kurwille" by Max Weber, "mechanical" by Durkheim, "mutual aid" by the Russian Peter Kropotkin and "multibonded" by Sorokin. They are general phenomena found wherever social thinkers have cast their eyes on the intimate fabric of society. Aristotle, the primary Western Philosopher, devoted the two most important books VIII and IX of his *Nichomachean Ethics* (c. 330 B.C.) to an analysis of the significance of this type of human relation in Greek society since its Homeric days and he called it "the perfect friendship."

In this experiment we have extracted friendship groups such as these from situations in different cities, different areas in each large city, and from all the ethnic, racial and religious groups of Western society. These types have migrated to and developed in the United States. Hence what we find out about them may be attributed to Western society to the basic nature of civilised man in relation to his family systems and to the significance of the use of the family controls as civilisation building forces.

The manipulation of these statistics provides us a glimpse of the essence of the family influence upon the social system, since we have only one constant in each group—that of family interrelations with like-minded families. All other variables have been nullified by the heterogeneity of the situations in which these families existed. It also affords us an

comparison with the statistics on the Indian family system to which the name "joint family" has been given.

COMPARISONS OF JOINTNESS—INDIA AND AMERICA

As noted earlier the joint family system in India is described by its exponents as having a number of statistical, legal and psychological characteristics. It is claimed to be larger than the nuclear group in the sense of the number of persons other than husband-wife, parents and children living in the household. It is said to have several generations in the household, such as the living grandparents, if any, the parents, sometimes siblings of the parents if unmarried, the parental children and perhaps some of their grand-children, if any. This looks like a formidable group of persons. However, no current study finds any great number of persons in all Indian households, at least in any other than a very few. From the legal point of view the property and income is said to belong, at least for management purposes as trustee, to the head of the household. Income acquired by the others is considered legally a portion of the joint family fund. From the psychological point of view the religion is familistic, family worship being the order. The family works together in the sense of joining energies in a common aim to promote the group but they are not necessarily always engaged in the same occupation. They may be connected with the same enterprise but their occupations naturally have to be divided according to ages, sexes and capabilities.

In India, according to the 1961 household sample, the average urban sample of 100 houses had 497 persons whereas the rural had 520. This does not seem extremely high considering the facts of poverty and overcrowding generally in the country and also that an extremely high proportion of the people were then unschooled. With the relatively semi-tropical temperature in most of the country the houses were used more as sleeping places and for cooking rather than for isolated studying or reading. The suggestion is that, allowing for differences in wealth, literacy, climate and the necessity for the use of the house for varied purposes, the number of persons per household in India is not unusually greater than in the West, and more urbanized, world.

In 1930, for instance, the American population 10 years of age or older had 4% illiterates. Now the censuses there no longer enumerates illiteracy because of universal compulsory education. But in 1930, 91 per cent of the Indian population above 10 were unable to read and write, and this figure was 85 in 1941. The later figures for 1971 are not available but for 1961 only 23.5% of *all* the population could read a simple letter or write such. However it is to be noted that the 1961 figure is for the entire population whereas the earlier was for those 10 years of age or older. While literacy has improved, particularly in the urban districts the ratio is still relatively low.

The main similarities of the two family systems come out in the role that kindred play in the households, and its surroundings, whether they reside there or not. A table for American *cities* showing this, which is based upon the 60,000 high school families studied, but which was verified later by the 70,000 supplementary families of college, university and professional school is as follows.

American City	% with 4 or more "friend" families about the homes	% of these friends about homes 10 or more years	% of all "friends who were kindred among	
			Closest friends	Third closest friends
Boston	85	73	44	40
New Orleans	91	67	44	50
St. Louis	81	64	49	43
Denver	83	58	43	41
Omaha	85	57	43	38
Los Angeles	79	47	29	30

AMERICAN FAMILY FRIENDS ARE EITHER KIN OR KIN-DOMINATED

From these elementary statistics it is clear that the surrounding and responsive group in the Western households are mainly kindred. Those who are not kindred were picked mainly from the neighbourhoods such as at churches, places of employment and at other local institutions such as clubs. The "other friends" (including kindred) had a deciding influence in the selection of these non-kindred friends and household associates. In other words, the family is surrounded by similar people who are either of the same blood or bound together by marriage ties. These groups have lasted over many years, fitting into the Aristotelian definition of "true friends" who have associated with each other until they have consumed a "requisite quantity of salt together."

In addition certain other pertinent information was recorded for each friend family in order to compare it with the family of the student.

1. How many children were in the family?
2. Was the present marriage a first or a subsequent one?
3. Had there been a divorce or desertion in the family? (Desertion in the USA means abandonment of home by a spouse without legal steps or a divorce suit).
4. What was the religion of the family? In the USA the main religions are classified as Protestant Catholic or Jewish. The Protestants are

a group of sects broken off from the original Catholic Church at the time of the Protestant Reformation in the 16th century.

5. What was the region of origin of the family? The USA has 5 distinct geographic regions all of which have a cultural coloration. These are the Northeast which specialised in urban-manufacturing; the South which seceded in 1860 and brought about the American Civil War; the Arid West where wheat and cattle are produced on large farms; the Cornbelt in the upper Mississippi river valley; and the Pacific Coast which is dominated by California. To these 5 were added a 6th, born abroad. Generally immigrants cling to their own ethnic groups for several generations.
6. What was the income class of the family? In the USA as in other countries, families with about the same incomes and standards of consumption associate with and feel more at home with others of the same general levels.

It may be reported that the heads of friend families averaged younger in age than did those of the student families. This was expected due to the fact that children and their spouses made up a considerable portion of the kindred in the family friend group. This is exactly what is noted in the joint family studies in India.

KIN-DOMINATED GROUPS PROTECT THE FAMILIES

From the above data we sought answers to some questions concerning the possible influence of the groupings of the families by similarities and the success of these families in avoiding divorces or desertions and having children arrested by the police. We could not make any objective statements about the effect of these associations of families upon the ability of the families to avoid children dropping out before the completion of high schools. We did not have contrasting measurements on the families of the ones who had dropped out. It was argued that family friends form protective layers of guidance and influence. Thus, it was possible to measure by the relation of types of friends to the lower rates for divorce or desertion and juvenile arrests in those families. We could arrange them into groups of those associating with friends most and least like themselves. We could see if this variation of homogamy of the groups influenced the families on two axes—the ones that existed between husband and wife and the other between parent and child.

It was found that Boston families whose friends had none of the four measures in common had 11.1% divorces but this rate went down to only 3.5% when all four things were held common. (These 4 measured characteristics were kinship, income class, region of origin and religious confession) In other cities the relation was the same as in Boston except that some like Los Angeles had generally higher divorce rates. In that city it started with

one in five having had divorces or desertions in the families of groups with no traits in common but reduced itself to one in eight among those with four things in common. In Boston, a low divorce city, the separation rate for those in the most homogenous groups was 31% of that from the last; in Los Angeles the rate of separations of families surrounded by the most similar groups was 63% of those in the least groups.

The same general pattern held as to the relation of similar family friends and lower juvenile arrest rates in the families so surrounded. In St. Louis' families which had none of the four factors in common the arrest records stood at 11.6%. (Most of these arrests were not for serious crimes, many being for motor traffic violations). In other cities, the records were about the same as to trends with occasional slight variations. It was found in every city that family behaviour was interrelated in the sense that broken marriages and remarriages were associated with much higher arrest rates among the children.

Different cities also had variant arrest rates. A very "familistic city" such as New Orleans, reported that only 2% of all its high school senior families studied had arrest records. This may be contrasted with rates in "less familistic" cities which had 6, 8, 9, 12 and 15% of all families with some arrest records. The high one again was Los Angeles which is a relatively new city with a mobile population and an almost universal dependence upon motor cars, in place of public transportation, to schools.

We also reversed the situations and computed the divorce and arrest records among the families associating with the student families. That is, each "pocket" in the statistical tables contained a large number of pairs of families, one of each pair being a student family and the other that of a friend family which visited often in his home. The above statistics are for families of the student. However it was also found that the same relations existed in the friend families in that *the more the groups had in common the less were the internal breakages* of the husband-wife and parent-child bonds in those units.

However, these relations of lesser breaking of familial axes were more pronounced with the increase of value homogeneity in the friend families than in the student parent families. Two explanations were suggested by these results. Families which had any difficulty were much more selective of these friends permitted in their homes, more so than families without difficulties. Further, the kin of the student family were a considerable proportion of all surrounding families. A large proportion of these kin families were younger than the student families and hence had had fewer years of exposure to the factors causing marital and parental break ups. For instance in St. Louis 89% of the student parental families but only 60% of their parental friend families had been married at least 15 years. All other cities had the same differences in length of marriage of the student parents and their friend parents. As a result more of the friend families were

childless or had only one or two children compared with the families of the parents of the students.

It is clear that American families of all kinds and types were using the joint-family principle as a protective device. In addition to helping hold the family relations intact it also kept out outside influences which would have tended to distract their teen age children from completing their school work. School dropouts in the USA occur generally between the 13th and 18th, or teenage years. This is the environment we studied to find out the significance of use of family groups as protective shields against the distracting influences of the large cities of America.

DISCUSSION OF JOINT-FAMILY TERMINOLOGY

Social scientists naturally have the right to call the basic Indian family system a "joint-family" if they wish. However it should be made clear that the name is merely a localism and has no scientific significance. It plays no role in the placement of the Indian family as a type in the scientific terminology about familism. The scientific terms have been developed gradually to denote variant types of the human family systems. Some of those are such words as agnate, cognate, patriarchal, matriarchal, patrilocal, matrilocal, exogamic, endogamic, hypergamic, trustee, domestic, atomistic, nuclear etc. These have scientific significance in that they are names of classes of things and as such describe a family system by attributing to it all the main characteristics of that class. The Indian census calls it "the undivided family." This is more appropriate than joint family.

For instance, the nuclear family is a class composed mainly of a married couple with their children who live together and have the same firepot." This unit is "legitimate" and where it exists, places the members in expected roles in the social system. A member of a nuclear family has a social place in and around his family firepot. Generally some dependent relatives such as grandfathers or, more likely, grandmothers live with them for a while. Women outlive men and there are always more widows than widowers in a society. As these widows grow older they tend to live with one or the other of their married children as part of the nuclear family. It is not a matter so much of economic dependence at all times (although that is an important factor) but simply that of psycho-social isolation. No one anywhere, except one or the other of their children, will care for aged and senile persons and will have them around. If there is no one unmarried child who is willing to devote all his or her time to living with and taking care of an aged parent, then there is no alternative but to attach themselves to a nuclear family of a married child.

India has millions of nuclear families. As a matter of fact, all studies of the modern Indian family show it to be in a preponderant majority. This is particularly true in the larger villages towns and cities. What is often called the "joint family living in separated households" is ally a

misnomer applied to units engaged in family businesses or having economic relations in common for other reasons. They work together. Where the household unit is the business firm, and the joint stock company is not used very much, this kind of a family arrangement is very prominent.

Oftentimes, in all the nuclear variety, dependents or isolated relations live with the family. The amount of this depends upon need, size of the birth rate, number of persons who have no other alternative, the complexity of the culture, the mobility of the population and a number of other factors. Some of these other factors are the division of labour in society, the occupation of the main persons of the household, the climate, the physical paraphernalia required for living and the amount of available housing. A society with great division of labour cannot use extra persons in the household to the same extent as one in which these supernumeraries are of some potential use. In the most urbane societies where extra persons cannot really contribute to the family common income, the elderly grandmothers are most welcome for their contributions with the child rearing tasks—built-in baby sitters—as they are sometimes called in the cities of the West.

In a country where there are many poor people, in which most of the people are rural and illiterate, where the paraphernalia of living is relatively simple, and the climate is rather mild, one can expect to find crowded situations in which several nuclear but related families occupy the same residence, or even use the same firepot. This is quite characteristic in India but may be declining rapidly. The excellent work by D. N. Majumdar, *Races and Cultures of India*, which has been reprinted and revised repeatedly since 1944, has claimed this in each edition.

Volume I of the Census of India, 1961, part IV-A (iii) Report on *House Types and Village Settlement Patterns in India* discusses the use of outdoor space in the peasant homes in great detail. "The central and most important fact in the traditional Indian house, whether in village or in town, is *not* the house but the courtyard (*angan* or *Uthan*). The courtyard is where most of the family's life is lived and the house is where the property is secured and shelter sought from the rigors of weather. "The courtyard is for living, the house or room mainly for storage and retiring." (p. 1) This study describes and gives sketches of typical units in every state of the country. The idea of development is to take people, insofar as can be done, out of the poorer classes. It seeks to elevate them to the level of somewhat greater economic well being. In this attempt they must naturally become literate and learn to do new things in new ways. Obviously the old style crowded houses cannot fit into this new order.

This is not to say that only poor people have joint-families, as these are called in Indian writings. Wealthy families follow the same patterns. Poor families have common quarters often because they have no alternative. Rich families have them because of their economic and social advantages. We know now that business and financial ability is an unusual trait and, when one person in a family has a large ability of this type he generally

runs his whole family and they keep him because of economic gain. An illustration in the United States is the family of the late Joseph Kennedy, father of former President John Fitzgerald Kennedy. Joseph Kennedy, made so much money that ten million dollars spent on electing one of his sons Senator was mere pocket money. In India the Kennedy kin groupings would be called a joint-family. They lived together at times, in the same neighbourhood at other times, and always had their financial deals and politicked together. Members of their kin group who wished so went their own ways, but the jointness of living on a grand scale persisted and does, today, to a considerable degree.

Joseph Jr., who set out to be a politician, was killed as an aviator in World War II. John Fitzgerald took his place and ran for and was eventually elected president. Robert was made Attorney General of the U.S.A. by his brother, the President. Then, with his father's money and the campaigning of his mother, Rose Kennedy, the youngest son Edward, won the Senatorial seat in Massachusetts formerly held by John Fitzgerald, the President. After the assassination of John, Robert moved his official residence to New York so as not to compete with Edward and ran for and was elected Senator there (All the Kennedys in the U.S.A. were originally Boston Irish). Robert was in the run for President when he too was assassinated. Then everyone remarked that Edward now had to be responsible for all the family children, those of John, Robert and his own, 15 in all. After the Chappaquiddic scandal he used the "fear" of assassination (with so much family responsibility) as an argument to delay active candidacy for the Presidential office. Other famous families in the USA, such as the Rockefellers, for example, have a similar "joint-family" history, to a considerable degree.

THE PROBLEM OF INCREASED VERTICAL MOBILITY

In 1960, we gathered data from colleges and universities ranging from Harvard and Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the East and University of California at Los Angeles and University of Southern California in the West. (We gathered data in 49 colleges and universities). The family and family friend background of college seniors, graduates and professional students were studied since these are representatives of the future creative persons, engineers, scientists, doctors, lawyers, educators, Ph.D's and humanitarians needed in the Western technical culture family.

We secured information about 70,000 families in the college and university groups. In addition, we secured information on about 2500 families where it was a common practice not to complete high school, and 2500 others who did not finish high schools but entered the defence services. These latter 2500 had been found to be of superior intelligence by the U.S. Air Force and were selected for training as high-class technicians. In our 70 000 college and university families we made a special group of about 10 000 which belong in the highest level where a Ph.D or its equivalent

was the normal expectancy of a high proportion of the children.

The atomic or space age needs a new family system where the highly qualified are vertically mobile. This has required a great deal of devotion and sacrifice by the parents furnishing this new family environment and high motivation of their children. 61.2% of all our elite group of parents had less than 10,000 dollars a year income and 20% less than 5,000. (This elite group as first constituted included all Harvard graduate and professional schools, and all graduates and undergraduates of the same category studied from Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the University of California at Los Angeles. These three schools are in the few very top graduate and professional institutions of the United States.)

This group forms an entirely new type of family. A rearrangement of the sample excluding undergraduates, but including all graduate and professional students from the 50 colleges and universities did not affect our conclusions. This newness is shown by the occupational origin of the parents of the elite group. Their fathers had been in unskilled labour in 16.2%; skilled labour, 13.3; lower white collar, 21.3; and armed forces, less than 1%. Only the parental groups of the 21.3% of professional and executive families had any higher education themselves. The other 80% represented new recruits to the American elite. They had moved up via the educational ladder.

In our opinion, the main device they had used to rise had been that the parents only permitted similar highly motivated families to have any constant familiar access to the homes. We used, as noted above, the measure of similarity the preponderance of kindred, same religion, same economic standing and same regional backgrounds of origin of the parents among the friends. For similar value systems we reversed the order of the correlations (first from friends to parents of students and second from parents of students to friend families) and found out that the whole groups had similar successes in holding the psychological bonds of husbands and wives and of parents and children relatively more intact than could possibly be expected from random association within the households.

The more they used this device of selecting and letting into their intimate family life *only* families with their same values, the more successful they were in avoiding trouble as divorce, desertion, juvenile arrest and school drop outs and promoting the higher ideals among their most capable children. The further the families were able to influence their children to go up the educational ladder, the more rigidly had they used the similar friend device. We can compare the steps up the ladder: unfinished high school; high school finishers; college upper class and seniors; and elite (doctorate) groups. In each stage the exclusion of variant value families from the childrens' home backgrounds was made more rigid and drastic.

The upper elite did not even let their kindred into their houses very often unless these relatives entirely up to cy Apparently when an elite onal family gets well on the Ph.D, trail (or its

equivalent—that is, the children so motivated have almost finished high school) they cast aside all useless baggage and begin to go fast. Only a few very intimate and similar friends are allowed to come into the households after that. Old friends who do not measure up to the newer standards are seen fewer and fewer times and the children soon forget them. This is due in part to the fact that in the elite families 23.5% of the mothers work in gainful employment away from home when the children start college. Most of them have to do this in order to help to pay the higher educational expenses.

Broken families (for any causes desertion, divorce, death, or bona gratia) are a handicap to the new creative social unit family. The children raised in these broken circumstances have much greater difficulty in finishing high school, have still greater difficulty in getting into and through college and have vastly greater difficulties in the movement into elite professional careers. This is apparently the result of psychosomatic disturbances from broken families to a greater extent than from economic disturbances.

The educated woman or the education of women must not be underestimated as a factor in the production of creative elite families. A very prominent pattern was a woman who finished high school or one who had a junior-college education but married a man of lesser education. For instance, 34% of the fathers of the elite had not finished high school, 19.2% of the fathers only finished high school; and 12.9% only had a year or so of college. But these only fairly well-educated fathers tended to marry women with higher formal educations. These educated women nurtured ambitions for their children and made their tastes dominant in the kinds of persons allowed to be intimate in their homes.

The superior education of women seems to have a delayed reaction in producing the elite. The women often become housewives and mothers, but their children are influenced greatly toward doctorate education and similar careers.

Any new discovery such as this leads us to consider the mechanisms or processes by which it was possible for the results to be achieved. At present, we have a logical explanation of how it is done through the family unit. That aspect of the family which is an individual possession of its members has extensive rights (against all others) to privacy. Husband and wife have mutual monopolistic rights against each other to companionship outside of family obligations (work and community chores). Children and parents share similar carefully guarded monopolistic rights, although not on the same level. These ancient customs persist. Although the "unwritten law" in defence of homicide is no longer allowed by our written statutes, yet by legal fiction, it works as a clear defence in 99% of the cases where it is used today. These customs are not only ancient but founded in the biological nature of man and woman and the young. Only a parent can speak his own child.

In a given situation where a culture is challenged and a new type of

personality is needed for a newer world, the parents must accept this challenge first of all as their responsibility. The parent of this generation in the Western World receives this challenge for educated youth from all sources. He is told that it is his duty to encourage his children to finish high school, to go to college, and, if possible to become a doctor, a lawyer, a teacher or a scientist. The newspaper advertisements in the U.S.A. for "help wanted", in which high education is stressed, are now even beginning to offer tuition refunds and payments to personnel while they are doing advanced work in the universities. The demobbed soldiers are offered free higher education if they wish.

A generation of parents which accepts such a challenge finds that, to accomplish the objective, it must control childhood motivation in a more profound manner and in a more sophisticated world than has been met by any previous generation. To do this it retreats within its three monopolies, spousal, parental and household, and fortifies them. Hence only such persons as can wholeheartedly share the values necessary to meet the challenge, are allowed within the domestic confines. This is the basic mechanism of family creativity today. Its development within the American family system explains many new forms of behaviour now current in our society which are not explicable by any of the older theories of sociology.

One phase of this is that the vertical movement up the educational ladder must include the lower groups. The present higher groups are not sufficiently large in proportion. Further, they have already arrived and oftentimes see no particular urgency in career matters. The newer recruits do feel this urgency, and are easily excited by the possibilities of achieving a new rank. Further, the newly recruited elite from the middle and lower classes have different viewpoints about life and understand the handicaps of the masses more than do the upper. Those from the masses are more willing to do new things and have less aversion to dirtying their hands.

BASIC OBJECTIONS TO JOINT-FAMILY TERMINOLOGY

If Indians wish to call their family system a "joint" one that is their privilege. From the point of view of a developing science of family sociology, however, there are certain problems which arise from the use of improper terminology. One of these is the probability that it obscures the fact that the Indian family system belongs in the general category of world primate family systems and, presumably, will under the same general circumstances behave as the other basic family systems of the higher civilisations. Consequently, if this be true, a considerable loss of predictive value may be observed by the use of joint terminology which more or less implies that all primate, or human, family systems may be divided into two different types, the Indian Joint Family and "all others."

This possibility of obscurity may be of considerable importance for Indian sociologists in their attempts to understand the "real nature of

Indian society, on the one hand, and the place of the family system in vast social change which is now on its way in the sub-continent, on the other. If Indian society with its caste system is unique, all societies are stratified socially and also have the constant process of vertical mobility up and down. One of the most interesting of P.A. Sorokin's early monographic studies was entitled *Social Mobility* (New York, 1925). This dealt with the movement of persons and ideas (or social values) from one region to another and also from one level on the social pyramid to others. A whole school of sociology arose in the 19th century under the leadership of Gabriel Tarde which was built around the "laws of imitation." Despite these generalities, when one thinks of caste, or extreme stratification of a society, the most obvious example is India because layer and group stratification is most remarkably manifested in this large culture.

It is repeatedly pointed out that to understand India one must be well aware of the interrelations of family, caste and language groups. Davis⁴ pointed out, after his summary of the census materials and others on Indian population, that the main factors in the relative immobility of the people starts with predominance of agriculture, with caste and with family relations. Language diversity came next. To break this intertwined situation one or more of several things has to change. The educational system is now endeavouring to make Hindi a common language. How far agriculture can be reduced in significance as a universal occupation is a moot question. Caste, now at least thirty centuries of age, is bound to last a long time. The family system can change remarkably, if it is a type which follows the Western pattern. Possibly not so remarkably if it is uniquely Indian. The thesis throughout this work is that the Indian family must be seen as one which can clearly follow the West since it belongs to the same system as that of the West. Further the remodelling of the family, thus breaking up the interrelated system of caste, language group and family, may be the easiest step towards modernisation.

This raises the question why is it important that the family system be encouraged to remodel. The "jointness of the family", applying that concept to the major factor holding up population and ideational immobility in India, is a major bar to vertical mobility of individuals from the lower castes. It is a prominent influence in maintaining horizontal mobility on a small scale to the detriment of urbanisation and vertical mobility. The young are married before they have a chance to explore the world and seek new opportunities away from parents and the familistic branding of caste allegiances.

While there has always been vertical mobility in India it seems until recently to have given a prominent position to *group* rising. Individual castes or more correctly sub-castes have been trying to raise themselves. This

has been discussed in detail in the instruction to census enumerators for the enumeration of castes for the censuses between 1881 and 1931. But the probable need now is for a form of individual vertical and occupational mobility, which probably would be connected also with an increase in horizontal mobility. This is probably the only way in which the caste system may be nullified on a large scale within a foreseeable time. It seems a general agreement among the outstanding scholars of caste that this form of stratification, or over-stabilisation of social strata, is the principal hindrance to the modernisation of the country.

Consequently the main problem of *Family and Civilization in India* could be this loosening of family ties upon the individual. In this situation more persons could rise through the schools and universities and contribute to the non-caste elements in Indian life. This would, of course, bring about a change in the common attitudes toward labour and in educational curriculae. These changes would be all for the better.

THE JOINT FAMILY AND CLASS RELATIONS

One other point deserves discussion. In the villages, specific sections are set apart for the use of different castes. The upper castes tend to live in one section and the lower ones in another. This is particularly true for the extremes, as the Brahmin section, on the one hand, and the scheduled castes and untouchable area, on the other. In a village with a number of residential aggregates, oftentimes the small surrounding built up sections of houses also comprise one caste. Indian villages, especially in the uplands, often tend to have several centres, one major and others minor. The well-to-do farmers often live in dispersed single households or family compounds. All sweepers in one village area studied lived separately in a sort of an adjacent unit, except one, a new family permitted to move into a sort of isolated area of the main village. Residential locations seem to be controlled by the village *panchayats*. Apparently they must give permission for a residential location.

This kind of untouchability, since all castes are either considerably or absolutely "untouchable", seemingly has two effects. One is the support it gives to the aggregates called joint families. Human beings are social animals and need companionship. Hence the aggregates called joint families are lateral social units held up and reinforced by casteism. Since the people cannot have real friends with castes either above or below them, they associate with their own and that makes kindred cling closely. In a sense one might say that the first major principle of *Family and Civilization* in the Indian sub-continent is that it could not exist without the enlarged family system, once casteism became established some centuries ago.

But such a situation as this has its handicaps and these are increasingly very significant in the new culture that is developing. That is, in essence, the friends of a family under the old system are ordinarily no better qualified

or informed than is the family itself. It is exactly the opposite from the principle of *Godfathers* in the Anglo-Saxon world (called *Compadreziago* in the Latin countries). Under this system, the parents try to select someone at birth who serves as a sort of second father to the child. The Godfather tends to be someone more fortunate economically and socially than the parents of the child. If the child shows any real talent the Godfather tends to promote him by providing opportunities to him, such as paying for an education or leaving him money in his estate. This is an important vehicle for vertical mobility in the West as it tends to bring the better qualified young to the top. An illustration in America is shown by such institutions as Harvard University. This has alumni groups all over the land which help pick and promote local youth of talent to become free scholarship students at Harvard.

From this also arises another important consequence. Where vertical friendships are possible, even though not intimate, the local people of wisdom, sophistication, and knowledge are constantly called upon to advise with problems facing the masses. In one village studied in Rajasthan a crop of grain developed a poison, possibly from a fungus parasite. (It was later identified by a professional agriculturist as on Millet c.c. 3) The crop was banned when a number of those who consumed it became sick and one or two died. No one ever went to the agricultural college 15 kilometers away and asked about the matter. In another village a number of children developed grossly enlarged abdomens. The health centre was three miles away in another village. The children, all from a low caste, were never taken there. But in that same village were some Brahmins—or at least three were seen. One was prematurely blind; one had been crippled by polio; and the third had a young daughter with hair prematurely white from some disease. In the long run, the upper classes cannot escape the consequences of such a situation.

This intense stratification of people, emphasised by caste and joint familism, is divulged repeatedly in the "house type and village settlement" volume of the census cited above. Segregation and lack of intercommunication seem general. In Orissa we find that "the layout of a village naturally reflects the caste and barrier ridden society that is ours." "Cases claiming superior status—stay together separately. (Their hamlet) is considered the main hamlet of the village (and) lower caste people, whose profession is considered to be unclean, are made to reside in separate hamlets at some distance away from the site of the main village." "The people of the intermediate castes often live together in one or more hamlets of the same village." (p. 158) This same separation or lack of "community jointness" is noted (or accepted as not worth particular notice) in the other states. In Rajasthan "in nearly all (villages) the lower or depressed classes are compelled to live in either a separate quarter or outside of the village altogether" (p. 185 a)

The same situation exists in the South in the United States where

slavery existed as late as 1865. The blacks, who were the former slaves, tend to live in the same areas as do the whites, if there are few of them, because they are household servants. On the front streets live the whites but on the rear ones live the negroes. This is somewhat similar to the *Jajmani* relations in Indian villages where the serving castes live near the upper castes but distance is maintained by social restrictions. But where the blacks are numerous there is a definite segregation of the negroes into areas all black. However, the living conditions of the negroes affect the white standards when diseases break out and spread without regard to colour. However, this situation has a mitigating tendency where caste is not stringently developed. The negro women are often employed as domestics by the whites. As such they talk very freely with the white women who are their mistresses. The white women use their influence with their husbands to see if the situation can be remedied. This is what is called a system of "clientage." Under this system the two races established fairly amicable relations for some years. But now that millions of blacks have moved to the industrial cities of the other areas of the United States the segregation of colour groups has increased immensely.⁵

⁵ On this see Carl C. "The Negro American Cities and the Rise of Race Violence" in *Rivista Internazionale de Sociologie* Series II Volume V No 2 1969
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THE F OF THE FAMILY IN AMERICA*

What are the possible and probable changes by the end of this century in the American family system? The family, and the social system of which it is a part, has changed very much during each century of modern history since the Middle Ages. In the 12th century it was ruled almost entirely by canon law and the Church. The only exceptions to this were on the manors or large farms where the leaders of the feudal system dictated most of the practices. As modern society emerged, we need only mention the family codification by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), the reforms of Martin Luther (1483-1546), and the subsequent rise of secular law as the chief systematising influence. These changes have gone on down to the present where many innovations, some still being developed, are now attempting to substitute existential or "factual" familism for the former "ethical" and community sanctioned types which have predominated since Medieval times.

Now the marriage vow "till death do us part" has become anachronistic and has lost much of its meaning. The idea is moving toward extinction in the same manner as did the well-established conception of the 12th century that marriage was a holy sacrament. The ideas of sacramental union or even of expected lifetime monogamy have now been abolished in many parts of the Western world. These changes and many others associated with them are very fundamental. The Medieval age of free consent of free-will marriage at twelve for females and fourteen for males has changed for most areas with the development of modern civilisation to eighteen for females and twenty-one for males. At present it is moving backward towards the younger ages, possibly because of the earlier physiological maturity of the young now, and partly also because of the general breakdown in family controls. Whatever the reasons, we are now reducing the ages at which the young are free to vote, to drink alcohol and to become more fully adult in contractual and legal matters, with particular reference to criminal actions. This could presage a general substitution of legal control or movement from *alieni* to *sui juris* much earlier than formerly.

During this 20th century we have witnessed the movement of many other values formerly connected with family membership over to the individual. In earlier periods a person remained *alieni juris* for much longer periods than now, and oftentimes only became *sui juris* or independent and responsible upon marriage. These movements toward individualism and away from family control were called "social atomism" in Zimmerman's *Family and Civilization* (1947). He noted that the modern family might in

*1971 Burgess Award Address by Carle C. Zimmerman. National Council on Family Relations reprinted by permission of the National Council of Family Relations. Published in the *Journal of Marriage and the Family* in May 1972

ality be called the "atomistic type" simply because while it had increasing social responsibility it was, at the same time, losing power to meet these responsibilities.* The word "atomistic" was intended to convey the idea that rights formerly considered family oriented and controlled are now turned over to the individual. This, along with a very great increase in responsibilities which the family can hardly avoid, seems to be a key important factor in much of our present family troubles and weaknesses. "Good" parents now oftentimes wear themselves out before the last child has gotten out from under and then, having little time to build up a nest egg for their own old age, retire on inadequate pensions, and, with currency inflation, live very penurious lives. Many communities recognise this, at least unconsciously, by granting such small favours to the elderly as free passes on public transportation. The term "genteel poverty" has disappeared from our lexicon. Free passes on the subway and reduced cinema prices are a poor substitute for family oversight of the aged.

THE PROBLEM

By now these small surface changes toward atomism have given the individual a false feeling that he is a free and self-contained social unit. Even definitions of the elementary social unit by contemporary sociological theorists now speak of it as "a social relation between two individuals". This is new because, up to the last century society generally recognised the isolated non-family-orientated individual as an outcast (Zimmerman, 1967). An illustration of this elevated individualism is seen in the contemporary movement to free from any penalty any and all sexual relations between freely-consenting adults. This raises the question as to *what is a free, consenting adult?* If he is a husband or she a wife, or either is a parent, or an adult child (over sixteen years of age), then can the individual be a free-consenter? Almost everyone lives in one or more of these family roles throughout life. These social roles have been up to now considered sexually and socially monopolistic by the law and the mores. We show further on that family relations make these types of conduct "discolouring" upon others in the group. Thus, the suggested new definition of free-consent abrogates family-right. However, the basic mores change very slowly, if at all. This example seeks to illustrate that the family, as a collection of integrated value principles, has now lost much of its age-old public support in the battle for social control.

Hence, the problem of the future of the family system is still the same

*This is contrary to the cliché that the family has lost nearly all of its functions except "affection." (Zimmerman and Cervantes, 1956: 64-80) Up to the present changes freeing youth at an earlier age, the length of *alieni juris* and of family responsibility has increased in modern society. No previous society has had to send its children through high school, or aid them through college and professional schools. Adolescence is about three years earlier now than formerly but life occupational-preparation period, other than in the ranks of manual labour and the proletariat, has moved from about fourteen to nearly twenty-four years of age. The modern youngster first must ordinarily finish high school and his military training before starting his main personal life even if he does not go to college and to professional schools.

as it was raised earlier by the famous student of the family, E.A. Westermarck, in his last book, *The Future of the Family in Western Civilization*. He summarised it as "Can the family continue to exist?" This work, published in 1936, has already been answered negatively by a number of writers such as Aldous Huxley in *Brave New World* and George Orwell in "1984". A number of prominent social movements from the time of the French Revolution down, have seemingly been trying to substitute public control and support of members for family action. Many of these recent attempts may be unplanned but nevertheless they exist. "Transferral income", historically a religious gift, is now made a "right" so family responsibility is negated. "And now abideth faith, hope and charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity". (I Corinthians 13 : 13.)

We now have to ask and to seek an answer to the question—will the next one or two generations see these same trends continue and enlarge themselves? If so, will the wedding license, the ceremony and the marriage vows then be abolished? If the meaning of the words such as father, mother, husband, wife, parent, child and kindred consistently weaken in the same direction as in the past, then the integrational concept of family almost entirely loses its distinction. So why should persons have a marriage ceremony? Why agree in public, before a pastor or civil official, that one is taking this man or this woman as a "lawful wedded" husband or wife if the duties of husband and wife are no more strict than those of ordinary politeness of one distant member of the community to another? To take an extreme case, why should a man, who as a freely consenting adult can do as he wishes, not expect the same rights to apply to his wife; to his sixteen-year-old son or daughter; his young father or even his mother? In other words the trend is towards what is called "factual familism" or social relations between the sexes considered to have no fundamental meaning beyond present company and the present moment. This is the question which faces the family sociologist of today. Will we continue in the same direction until we eliminate mother-love, paternal obligation and spousal loyalty?

To see an answer to this question or to clarify many of our mental dilemmas about the familistic future it is necessary to introduce a few principles which apply in the field. We may list and try to clarify some of them but fundamentally a full exposition goes far beyond the boundaries of this type of essay. (For further exposition see Zimmerman, 1971a and 1971b.)

1. The family is not a simple group in the sociological sense but is a *unit in the web of the total sociological structure*. A group in the ordinary use of this term in sociology is limited in its functions in the sense that it serves only one or a few needs. It is set up by people for a purpose and when this is achieved it tends to decline in member interest. It generally gives a member no unspecified rights against the others and, consequently, does not imply extraordinary obligations. A club member or contractual partner may receive small assists but the family serves many unspecified needs

of its members. It gives the members "roles". A member of an ordinary group remains always a member but a member of a family becomes a husband or a wife, then a father or a mother and eventually, as a widower or a widow, the sole possessor of the family property and head. A soldier may be decorated for "actions beyond the call of duty" but whoever heard of a mother being decorated for nursing a sick child when she herself is subject to contracting the same deadly disease? These roles have "rights" (monopolies of sex and companionship) and "duties" (support, discipline, obedience) attached to them. The family is "part of society" not a social creation of it.

2. Ordinary groups have strictly specified fields of action, but *the family has as many as necessary to life*, mostly unspecified. The family may start with one, such as physical attraction, but immediately commences to involve others. Physically it has to satisfy the individuals. Even in the cultures with "arranged marriages" the mating seeks to match physically compatible persons. However, after this comes the religious sanction or "moral world". The governance of the family is even more influenced by the mores, many of which are structured into the religious and moral codes, than by the civil law. Finally the public social structure, or legal rights and duties, comes into the arrangement. A child of American parents is an American unless he repudiates his national loyalty and moves to other national jurisdiction. As an American he must obey our laws, pay taxes, and register for military service. On the other hand, he is subject to our protection, our succour and other benefits as a citizen. This is what Zimmerman calls the "triple field theory" of the family (Zimmerman, 1967). "Triple field" means that when one considers understanding the family system it is insufficient to view it from one point of view alone. To give a pertinent illustration as of how the increase of infants born out of wedlock tends to impinge upon the mores and morals concerning child neglect, which are very strong and inelastic indeed. Eventually these types of neglected children tend to be most easily recruited into the delinquent, the vagrant and criminal classes (Zimmerman, 1960). They add to the relief loads, the cost of crime, and to the uncontrollable growth of population. The enormous growth of moral and legal considerations from these types have tended in the past examples, and now again, and may become exceedingly significant before the end of this century. One main influence in the family re-emergence in Russia in 1936 and after was the rise of vast hordes of hippies in the streets of the cities. These were called "wolves". (See Zimmerman and Cervantes, 1956 : 33-42 on the idea of countervailing values in the family.)

3. A third basic factor peculiar to the *family is the fact of colouration or discolouration or "stain" of all members by the actions of one**. This has been the central core of introspective family theory since the commencement of recorded time as from the ancient Confucian doctrine on the essence

* Stain or *discolouration* has been a basic factor in social solidarity in the entire history of the human family system. (See Zimmerman, 1947: 647-652 *et passim* as indexed under social solidarity active and passive)

of filial piety down to and including many current major ideas of Freudianism and psychoanalysis. Acts of virtue reflect upon the reputation of the whole family. As a matter of fact, virtue itself has been defined largely by classifying together those acts which improve and uphold the family. The Ten Commandments of Christianity, which have their co-ordinates in all the world's great religions, form a sort of "constitution" of universal virtue. These are about family behaviour. This nature of the family, the fact of colouration by good behaviour of a member and discolouration or stain by the opposite type, makes the good domestic unit the fountainhead of citizenship. This is a principle which was well understood by Frederic Le Play who developed the first real school of modern family sociology. He stressed that societies with strong family systems tended to recuperate rapidly from conditions of adversity whereas the opposite types recovered only with great difficulty (Zimmerman, 1935). This would seem to explain the rapid rise of Russia to world power after the Communist excesses of the first twenty years following the 1917 revolution. It may also explain in considerable part the present upswing which seems to be taking place in the mainland Chinese world.

BREAKDOWN PERIODS IN FAMILY AND SOCIETY

These basic things about the family explain that when the ideological structure of the family system loses its virility and strength the social system generally gets into trouble. It also explains that when the family system and the society both get into trouble, then the causal nexus between family and society continues but the flow of direction reverses itself. Up to the breakdown period the agents of the big society work against the family because people, as individuals, do not ordinarily like restrictions—such as against divorce and sex freedom, or duties and responsibilities such as unlimited family support and other family oriented social obligations. In the new situation of weakness in family obligations and of the rising of social anarchy, the family enters into a changed role of leadership and responsibility, a condition which may be called the rise of *basic finite causation* (Zimmerman, 1955). The family system then has to be recreated by intellectual family-oriented forces in order first to recreate the society (Zimmerman, 1949 : 778-782, 1970, 1971a, and 1971b *et passim*). Whether we recognise it or not, the rise to prominence of the National Council on Family Relations has been due in considerable measure to this subconscious need and is not a fortuitous event. If the family is not recreated as a controlling social institution, the total society tends to lose its power to continue and to enlarge on its previous course.

The "mammalian" aspects of our present family are as ancient as is the human species. While numerous scientists hold that Robert Morris, in his book *The Naked Ape* (1967), has gone too far in explaining the human family almost entirely by the biological characteristics of the h

species (those traits man holds in common with the apes), yet there seems no doubt that man is a primate animal. All his basic actions connected with the roles of husband and wife, parent and child, and kindred and clan are closely similar to those of the other primates, and to a considerable extent, with the wider order of mammalia. But we are dealing with modern society, which is of relatively recent origin (about eight thousand years at the most) contrasted with the several millions of years it existed as the primitive family. This modern family has been influenced by its expansion from small group governance to a new role co-ordinate with the organisation of nations and of the world at large. All the great world religions, without exception, are familistic. In this new order of things, as noted above in the first characteristic of the family as a "unit in the web of the social structure", the domestic group has enlarged itself from local to world responsibility. The legal and moral functions of the family increase vastly as compared with the almost complete domination of the biological in the primitive group.

CIVILISED FAMILY SYSTEMS ARE MOST COMPLEX

Insofar as the family is only local and biological, its organisation is relatively timeless. It always makes one cringe when he reads that some sociologist said that "divorce is now here to stay", implying that there were times when there was no voluntary severance of the relations between husband and wife, and that now this breaking by divorce is a relatively modern characteristic—a new freedom. This is not true. Some men and some women simply have never been able to get used to the closeness of their marriage and family relations. The most ancient family systems ordinarily achieved the necessary breaking of unworkable husband-wife relations by *repudiation*. They did not divorce because they lived under a social system with neither marriage nor divorce laws. In all the Oriental World, where most of human beings now live and have lived since the end of the last ice age, at least one, and generally all of three forms of arrangements for dissolution of nuptial consequences exist. These are repudiation, polygyny (reducing former wife to a domestic and replacing her by a second), or parricide (in the broad sense of killing a spouse). Women poison husbands or call upon their brothers for aid. Unless the kindred take up the matter the ruler or his deputy seldom does anything about unexplained deaths.

The modern family of the high civilisations still has its timeless mammalian aspect but, added to it, are the changing relations represented by the other parts of the family triplefield. In other words, it is a legal organisation which is an integral part of the formal structure of the "Great Society" and, at the same time, is a part of the moral structure. Here the word *moral* is used to denote that aspect of society which is ruled almost entirely by the mores, the folkways, public opinion and feelings. The law requires the citizen in most states to keep his children in school until the age of sixteen. The moral structure now expects the parent in America to send his child

through high school and college, if possible, and if the child is capable (Zimmerman, 1962a). While the "mammalian" or primate aspect of the family is fairly constant, the legal and moral aspects are cyclical. They tend to override the extremes, particularly toward individual freedom which leads to anarchy. We now seem to be in one of those extreme periods verging on anarchy in family controlled social relations.

When a modern type of civilisation emerges, the legal and moral structure connected with the family becomes enlarged, relative to conditions in the mammalian or primate type. The primate family is always basic, but in the family of the higher civilisations the mores become generalised over larger units. This is due, in a considerable degree to the influence of world religions as factors in the spread of similar family values over greater areas. We see this also in the standardisation in modern life of almost everything from bathroom deodorizers to the age-of-consent by females. The legal systems begin to apply in the same manner to all aspects of the national units. Out of this type of community and family the family values integrate and coalesce into units with somewhat the same colouration or meaning. Thus, many phases of the family, earlier very much biologically limited in their variations to individual temperaments, now show greater tendencies to change and become cyclical in nature. They move one way until they become ridiculous. Now in some of the recent rallies and encampments of the youth, young boys and girls fornicate openly in the middle of crowds in broad daylight. This type of reversion has not been seen before since the 12th century except in revolutionary demoralisation or in war combat.

When this extreme stage of anti-familism becomes prominent the "cure" has to be applied to the family mores and practices because the foundations of the other basic social processes are weakened. This is most strikingly exhibited in the United States by the demoralisation in the educational institutions. It makes no difference whether we look at the high schools, the junior colleges, the state universities or the private, the religious, the public or the national institutions—we now find the same demoralisation. The institutions are in a bad way. Almost without exception they are out of money, are unable to finance teaching and research as before, have had to raise tuition, have been getting less from the alumni gifts, find funds from the governments and tax sources reduced and face retrenchment otherwise. Libraries and laboratories have been vandalised and bombed. The students are rioting instead of studying, the libraries are not being used and the faculties cannot agree on what to do, and when they do agree, do not stick to a course of action. The teachers in the grade and high schools have adopted the strike tactic, partly for salaries, partly for control and partly because they are just plain afraid of the violence around them. In Boston, which has boasted that it was one of the nation's most important educational centres, the police have had to occupy many schools just to maintain order. Vandalism and mob action have destroyed billions of dollars of public property. Now arson is taking over and the situation is moving from bomb

threats as harrassment over to actual bombing of institutions. The whole educational process upon which we depend for selection, training and promotion of future scientists, has lost headway.

These are self-evident facts because they are so universal now. They may be illustrated for any university and its "city" which includes most of the country. President Nathan Pusey of Harvard, whose tenure was cut short by the lack of support of the faculty when he called in the police after University Hall was forcibly occupied in 1968, resigned not long after that. He has recited details in his 18th Annual Report for 1969-70 (pages 1-9) and this makes startling, but pathetic disclosures in spite of its careful editing for public relations. He had already pointed out in his previous report that the use of books in the Harvard libraries, including the Widener collection (one of the few great collections of scientific books in the world) had dwindled down to almost nothing. It may be said that if it happened at Harvard and in Cambridge or Boston it can happen in any academic or public situation (It not only can, but it has and is, including Washington D.C., the White House, the Capitol building, and elsewhere in spite of police, soldiers, and the FBI). We have developed a type of criminal not well-known before in America, the young educated anarchist. He is a former student, generally one expelled for vicious behaviour, who now moves from place to place where trouble can be stirred up and who leads the local amateurs to do as much destruction as possible. He (or she) is an expert at making and using bombs, Molotov cocktails, and other weapons of destruction and at picking targets the destruction of which can be explained most easily to naive, inflamed and excitable groups of youth.

A brief resume of some of the experiences at and around Harvard since September 1969 will suffice for illustration of what has happened to the educational institutions in most of the leading areas and scientific centres of the country. Unless said otherwise, these are taken from the last report of President Pusey.

September 1969: Violent attack and takeover of the Centre for International Affairs at Harvard.

Two weeks later: Noisy "mill-through" of the same centre with intention to disrupt and stop the academic activities.

November: The SDS took over University Hall and disrupted its activities for a day or so for a propaganda meeting.

Week later: Another invasion of University Hall and detention by force of the Dean of Arts and Sciences. (University Hall is the centre of Arts and Sciences and Faculty of this part of the University. It is one of the "sacred places" of the University.) Its files have been rifled repeatedly for personal information for propaganda purposes such as stealing copies of correspondence between Henry Kissinger and the President of the United States. In September 1969 for possibly the first time the leadership was "professional" These first time "profes-

sionals" were revolutionary former students of Harvard who had finally been expelled the year before. (They were still around the college but not as students.)

Same day: Negro students "liberated" the Dean from the white students and harassed him further.

Early December: Organisation for Black Unity took over University Hall

Six days later: Organisation for Black Unity took over University Hall, the Harvard Faculty Club and the construction site of Gund Hall (Previously Harvard disruption had been white-dominated with Negroes playing a secondary role.)

ACADEMIC DISRUPTION INCREASES: REAL VIOLENCE

During the second semester (the first months of 1970) the difficulties at Harvard increased. Other offices (Office of Graduate and Career Plans, Pierce Hall, Centre for International Affairs, and an office holding a meeting of a special committee of the Board of Overseers) were taken over in a disruptive and destructive sense. Then the "real" trouble began about mid-April. Harvard Square, an expensive and elaborate business centre which serves the University, was subjected to "hideously destructive" and "shocking trashing" (Mr. Pusey's words). (This is one of those kind which causes the insurance companies to cancel much of their property insurance.) Then in May two unsuccessful attempts were made to burn the ROTC building and even to take over and deface or destroy the President's house. From then on, until August, the end of the Academic year, the same tactics continued, only getting worse, including the burning of Lawrence Hall ("which might have been accidental"). In the summer of 1970 there were two additional "trashings" in Harvard Square, and finally in the fall of 1970 the first bombing began, this at the Centre for International Affairs.

Before this period, academic work had come to a sort of standstill as evidenced by the cessation of circulation of library books. Associated with this was the almost complete cessation of academic activities by the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. In 1969-70 it held nineteen meetings, twice the usual number. A faculty council was established in the spring of 1970 with twenty members. This was not a small executive body. It met twenty-two times during the second semester, eleven times in the single month of May. The powers of this faculty committee, as well as of the Dean were severely limited, because it was established that nothing they did could forestall retroactive direct action from the floor, so the committee had no power. All this means that the faculty did not meet its ordinary responsibilities for the two years, but sat around and talked.

Coupled with this situation was the decline and decay of academic work by the undergraduates. To understand this one has to know about the ordinary high quality of academic work in Harvard College (as contrasted to the University) Originally developed as an exclusive (and expensive)

private school it had been moving, since 1930, over towards a scholarly democratic institution, in which the undergraduates did creative work on a scale above the average of graduate work in most universities. Very often it was possible to get undergraduate theses of an original and creative quality superior to most graduate studies and even professional writing. In the 1930's Harvard began to raise tuition and money so that the rich had to pay heavily to attend or to support their alma mater. The money was then used to establish national scholarships, generally at least two from each state, so that capable boys without money could attend Harvard with support thus garnered. Before, when Harvard had been an exclusive rich man's school, although, some students were well motivated and exceedingly scholarly and competent, many did their "academic work" through "widows". These were tutoring schools which concentrated entirely on getting the students through the examinations by non-intellectual means such as compiling notes, examination questions and writing term papers for their courses. However, during the thirties, idealistic students around the Harvard Crimson got together and forced the faculty to drive the "money changers" (widows) from the temple (Harvard Square). (at that time test questions were not even allowed in the hands of graduate assistants before test time for fear that the widows would get possession of them beforehand.)

Now, according to the very reliable Harvard Crimson, the "widows" are back. In the spring of 1971, the Crimson study showed that the four main firms around Harvard Square sold about 10,000 term papers for \$ 250,000 to students who used them to "fulfill" their course requirements. Since each student is limited by the faculty to two papers a term (on the assumption that it is their own honest intellectual endeavour), this means that about five thousand students hired all, or many more a good part, of their academic work done. This is a large share of Harvard undergraduates.

The largest of the four firms in Cambridge has 80,000 papers on file, employs 300 writers (on part time basis) and two secretaries. The firm keeps detailed records of its transactions to make sure no instructor receives two identical papers. Moreover, any paper which gets less than a B twice is immediately tossed out of the files. (Adapted from an editorial in the *Boston Herald*, May 15, 1971).

In the same *Boston Herald* for May 15 was a report, not from Harvard but from a neighbouring institution in Massachusetts, the University at Amherst. A drug raid there led to the arrest of 53 young, nearly all undergraduates, on drug charges. Police claimed that \$ 10,000 in drugs were confiscated in this raid but this was "believed to be only a fraction of the total drugs sold during the past few months on and around the campus". Also, reported continually, in Cambridge and Boston the police have had to occupy a number of high schools during the 1970-1971 year to keep order. These details are cited here as significant of the general

At different times various occupations and institutions serve as "elevators" of social mobility. The present age in the United States, and in the similar Western countries, may be considered as one of "The Rise of the Intelligentsia". The technocratic culture is so complex that an entirely new form of leadership has to be recruited from the lower middle classes and elevated through the schools and universities to the top of the pyramid. In other periods and cultures the church, the armies, the business firms or the kindred-clans have been the necessary "social elevators". Now it is the university trained scientist or technocrat who furnishes the needed leadership. With the decay of the family, this basic social process of our society is being thwarted and starved. The police, the soldiers, the faculties, the teachers, and the other groups involved have shown a complete inability to handle, leave alone master, the situation. It comes back to a reconstruction of the family system. Only properly motivated and active parents backed by the public seemingly can control this irrationality. (See Zimmerman, 1962a, 1962b, and 1960).

The results of stopping the "Rise of the Intelligentsia" through the universities cannot be elaborated here, but *it is unquestionably a fatal blow with severe consequences for a civilisation such as ours* as it inevitably has to be. When the United States and Canadian territory were first settled by Europeans, there were possibly two and a half million natives scattered over this upper part of the continent. Now there are 250 millions and the numbers, even with the rapid extreme limitations of the future birthrate towards zero population growth, will be more than three hundred millions by the end of this century. These numbers cannot be fed, housed and accommodated on the continent except by the most complicated and technocratic type of culture. Such can only be developed and managed by a continuous infusion from the universities of needed scientists and management bureaucrats. The statement that 90% of all the scientists who have ever lived are living today is true and not an idle comment. Hence, a real crisis situation is already on our hands. The family crisis is here whether we realise it or not. Faculties object to police on the campus; but, the faculties have shown no ability to control the academic situation. Basically, it seems that the family system, aided by police, faculty and an understanding public, will have to meet and correct the situation.

THE CYCLICAL FACTOR IN FAMILY BEHAVIOUR

It is necessary to clarify here what may be called the cyclical nature of certain family behaviour. As pointed out above, the mammalian aspect of the family activities, that which is more or less set biologically, while it varies among individuals is somewhat constant in a system or group. (See Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* 1155A-1158B). There are anomalies, even among animals such as in cattle who sometimes refuse to nurse their young. There are also similar anomalies among human beings. Hospitals

and medical men are well-acquainted with the "baby beating syndrome" and police have to protect and often remove some neglected children from their parents. But the cyclical nature of family behaviour is different from this series of biological anomalies. The cyclical effect lies chiefly in the additions to family behaviour brought about over the more primitive, by the highly developed civilisations. We note an illustration of this in the birthrates in the Westernised countries during this century. The real birthrate in the United States (the number of children born to the average adult woman of the same age groups) had been going down for a long time, but it began to change and to increase among the female cohorts born between 1915 and 1920. As a result, our national population, which was predicted to reach about 180 millions by the end of the 20th century, grew so rapidly after 1940 that now thirty years beforehand we already have almost 210 millions. Further, this growth rate in a real sense changed again and went down between 1955 and 1960. Thus, the birth rate, which is fundamental, seemingly fluctuates on its own private determinism or for unknown reasons. Other attributes of the family can also change. As a matter of fact that is what seems to take place, and the tendency should be understood and promoted in the social interest. We have not been able to note this type of change before because previous "highly developed" nations contained many isolated peasant families where the mores of mammalian custom obscured the situation.

Most family behaviour is connected with what Aristotle called "virtue". According to his insight each virtue trait has three position meanings; one when the situation is excessive, another when it is minimal and a third when it is median. A good family trait "is something median between excess and deficiency" (*Ethics*, 1106B). Thus, each trait in the family can vary until it is *too much* or *too little* to sustain its meaning as a "virtue". These family traits or virtues are both of "emotions" and "actions". Parents can discipline their children *too much* or *too little* (an action) and attachment between family members (an emotion) moves in the same fashion. "Spare the rod and spoil the child" indicates one extreme and its opposite, that life should be free from any discipline, is the other. Every continuous entity in the family, whether of emotions or actions, is about the same in that too much or too little is a vice and the median may be a virtue. Psychoanalysts speak of the Oedipus complex. Only in the median behaviour are most traits beneficent. Even "mother love", if carried too far, can be harmful.

The first principle of family behaviour is that it consists of a large number of traits, each of which has three similar positions—a median one which is beneficent and an excess or a minimum both of which tend to be harmful. The rhythm is *bad—good—bad* in moving from one excess to another. The second principle is that traits tend to be integrated with others in groups of similar meanings. Generally "good husbands" tend to be good fathers and good wives tend to be good mothers. The opposite also tends to be true. As a result of this integration or fusion of actions which have the same

meaning, family traits tend to move en bloc so that in extreme social situations it is possible and usual to have whole family patterns which have moved to excesses or to deficiencies.

Thus, it is in the areas of relation between "Family and Society" or between "Family and Civilization" in which these excesses or deficiencies of family patterns tend to fluctuate most violently over long periods of time. To put it concretely, the inability of some men and some women to get along together always exists. Ordinarily the joining in marriage is an amateurish gamble as John Milton made clear in his writings on divorce. In such a situation as this the avenues of escape seem beneficial. It also explains why "arranged" marriages tend ordinarily to work as well or better than "love" choices. On the other hand, we have two extremes—*no escape no matter what reason and the current practice, at least in some circles, of much avoidance of family responsibility without sincere and deep seated reasons*. Hence, in a sense, family behaviour of the type found in the advanced literate civilisations tends to move in cycles like most other known behaviour. Illustrations are the diverse examples of changes in the length of women's skirts or the fluctuating bear and bull markets upon the stock exchanges. It is often repeated in business circles that when the famous financier, Bernard Baruch, was asked what the market was going to do, replied that it was going to fluctuate. Also in the field of social change we have the valid generalisation that "No social trend continues endlessly in the same direction".

THE PROCESS OF FAMILY COUNTERREVOLUTION

Since any change in family behaviour is the result of a compromise of many forces, individual, ethical-religious and political-structural, its movements are rather slow. In addition, the cycles are irregular. It may take some generations for a family system to reach an extreme position, but once reached, the resultant social anarchy becomes so disruptive that one generation apparently sees most of the effort toward recovery achieved. The demoralisation in Russia arising from the change toward "factual familism" after 1917 prepared the society for the "remoralisation" achieved in the family codes of 1936 and 1945. In a sense this is the probable pathway the American family system may follow.

Our trouble in analysing this is complicated by several facts. First we have few thoughtful summaries of previous grand debacles in the family systems. Historians generally write history as if there were no families. In addition, in the field of sociology those who write about social theory are equally blind to the family situation. With the exception of Frederic Le Play, few, if any outstanding sociologists consider the family as a legitimate field of analysis. Second, the problem is somewhat new as a factor in the life history of large civilisations. Most of human life has been lived under conditions in which the equivalent of our present administrative law was

handled inconspicuously by the local-family clan units themselves. Taxpaying, military service, inheritance of position and property and most criminal responsibility were handled by the family groups of kindred. The modern legal systems with their courts and the individual relation directly to the legal authorities is very recent indeed. So, we really know very little about the family except from modern empirical studies and these have been made by persons who had not ordinarily had any experience with types existing prior to those found in modern states and since the industrial revolution.

As a result, an attempt to picture the future of the family for any given national or regional group has to proceed carefully from limited evidence and with few historical analogies. However, what is available seems to suggest a pattern as follows. Our present family system is becoming a very extreme type. Its integrated system of values, collectively and in each individual part, is being challenged successfully by persons who deny the social needs for and validity of any restraints. Out of this has arisen a great deal of confusion and anarchy. This revolution has penetrated the churches, the schools, the social welfare institutions, the public law, the mores and the domestic institutions as well. Those churches, particularly Catholic, which have upheld ministerial celibacy are being pushed to give in. Those which have opposed the marriage of clergy with divorcees are not upholding these former inhibitions. The public schools are not generally allowed to discipline the children. The parents do not ordinarily uphold the teachers or inculcate the needed discipline at home. The social welfare institutions are forced by legal pressure to consider "transfer payments" as "rights". It is generally very easy now for a parent to abandon his wife and children to the society for support and upbringing. Millions are doing it. The mores concerning sex relations are being challenged seriously.

This is not a parade of complaints but simply an attempt to show that the numerous values which make up a workable family in our urbanised civilisation have all been challenged successfully. Neither is it an assessment of blame. A society which permits men to breed carelessly and then go off casually with other women should not be surprised if it becomes the mode among the proletariat, leaving the demoralised woman with the total burden. Consequently, we seem very close to a general limit such as one which Aristotle would call the line which separates the family from a *no-family*. As the no-family unit becomes more and more dominant the social structure becomes weakened. It is interesting to study the family backgrounds of many of our new types of young anarchists. Somehow or other the parents who reared them from the time of their conception until they got to Harvard, Columbia, Berkeley, or Michigan, were unable to give them a system of civilisation—adequate values. At least, when in the new environments for a few years, they seem to embrace anarchy as devotedly as a primitive mother is supposed to embrace her child in her arms. Could it be their substitute for being raised in an amoral purposeless environment?

In this the public is confused. At first the reaction is that

"We as parents have failed... our children are right and we are wrong" The calls for discipline are unheeded and the proponents of discipline and leadership are branded as monsters of misunderstanding and reactionaries. As the violence moves on and grows of itself, particularly as it is taken over and directed by adult and professional leadership (and develops its own leaders and martyr-heroes) the older generation begins to embrace self-doubts and becomes troubled. Apolarization begins in which the mammalian aspects of the family values commence to rise to the forefront. Women begin to pray that their children will not also become "draft-card burners" The former family values begin to reassert themselves and small groups to clamour for reforms. Families turn inward and exclude from their households and friends anyone of opposite types, beliefs and experiences. This is happening everywhere in the United States among the lower middle class, first, and now spreading to the others. (See Zimmerman and Broderick, 1954 and Zimmerman and Cervantes, 1956.)

As this situation moves on, with the pro-family forces becoming stronger and the anarchical more knowledgeable, assertive and violent, the issues move very rapidly, as social things go, towards a confrontation. One or the other side has to win, the violent or the traditional. (However, it cannot even be called traditional now because traditions are obsolete.) A strong factor in the victory of the traditional—of what can be called the "counter-revolution", is the nature of the society in which this trouble takes place. Societies with weak governments and fairly naive upper classes most often see the violent side win. Societies with strong governments, deep involvements in a course of history, and possessing upper classes but a generation or so from shirt sleeve and wheel-barrow experiences, have greater chances for the traditionalists (or counter-revolutionaries) to win.

No matter who wins, it is fairly evident that in a deeply involved society, such as the United States, and one which, whether true or not, the people at least feel that it has numerous strong outside and external enemies, the struggle cannot last through more than two or three generations. The beginning is the generation in which the trouble becomes evident and violent. The second is the generation of battle to victory—for one side or the other. The third is the emergence of a new order of one type or the other. Hence, when we talk of the first generation, this is now in the USA, and the second will be that emerging to maturity before long. The third might be here by the end of the century. This war, if we may speak of it as such, will not be a purposeless or preventive one. If the pro-family forces win, as they have to do if we survive as a world leader, then we can go forward as a civilised group.

"unorthodox conclusions". The only justification for continuing them is that, on the whole, insofar as they have been predictive, they have been proven to be fairly accurate. Inaccuracies have been largely in regard to *when* and not *what* is going to come about. These results have been due to the fact that he has tried to assess each problem by the use of additional forms of logic above and beyond the common sense or the Aristotelian method and also the neo-positivistic or statistical school. The methods he has opted allow him to use "immanent determinism" to a very full extent, when it seems applicable, and also to control the *meaning* of concepts within very narrow ranges. Family words such as love, marriage, divorce, desertion, and illegitimacy, for example, have *many different* meanings. Natural language is a much more sophisticated tool of expression than most of the statisticians have conceived. The major problem of much family analysis is that of the *clarification of concept meanings*. Aristotle's idea that any concept had at least three different ranges of meaning, each of which was contradictory to the others, is helpful in that respect. Also helpful is the basic idea that any form of behaviour, starting within the normal range, generally tends to change meaning before it is out of favour. Consequently, it is possible for others to "prove" logically that what he says is *wrong*, but when it later turns out to be right, his contribution is forgotten. The problem of *what* is going to happen is more easy to answer than *when* in all forms of change.

There are two aspects of the problem of the family system and our present decade. One is "cause" and the other is "cure". There can be no "simple" causal analysis in which all the current woes are laid onto the shoulders of the family system. Sin, vice, crime and meanness are always found in the social system, each phase seeking to enlarge itself. Many factors promote this—wars, economic difficulties, urban life and compact living, as in slums and ghettos. But to become a mass movement, as it has, it has to find an opening in the between generations services. Established persons of any generation are generally too occupied, too old or too burdened to plunge far into risky and unorthodox things. Only the young, those between adolescence and full commitment in life have the vigour, the daring, the inexperience and the lack of forethought to venture. School dropouts, juvenile delinquents, criminal recidivists and the like all come from this group. At any time this group is the potential seed-bed of social troubles. A broken family system, or one which has no clear directives and well-guarded responsibilities, is more vulnerable than other groups and families in different situations.

Once the "new social situation" gets started, it has the capacity to grow of itself. When revolution grows rife around Harvard Square, Radcliffe students and others from excellent families and good homes, often are engulfed. The professional agents of corruption soon work into the movement. It makes no difference whether one studies at Berkeley, Columbia, Harvard, or Michigan State University, or even San Marcos or the other universities in Latin America (or Japan) one always finds the "professional

hovering about the student revolt (Zimmerman, 1960).

However much one may quibble about the contention of the role of the weakened family system as the main vehicular agent in the cause of current difficulties, the place of family system rebuilding in the "cure" is more clear and self-evident. The most characteristic pattern of those thoroughly involved in this type of endeavour is to continue. It is something like drug addiction except that once there is a clear-cut record, the social system seems unwilling to accept them back. In the new anti-social business they find careers, support, a certain prestige among their associations and a way of life. The renewing of family mores is largely an attempt to prevent others from involvement. Police, soldiers and strong legal measures, although inevitable and absolutely necessary, only hold the situation together artificially until the family can be remotivated.

New programmes for the family can never be stated as a return to the traditional. People always "move forward"—never backward. The Russian family system is probably now back to its prerevolutionary condition but it got there from its demoralised state by moves announced "for the good and glory of our socialist state". "If a woman works and raises children for the promotion of the communist community, she should not be at the mercy of husbands who can abandon her easily and without cause".

In our society some millions of single parents have to rear children. The great majority of these are women with deserted or absent husbands. This form of family (one female parent and her children) has been studied casually by some sociologists and they, after hedging around, more or less suggest that the male parent is not a primary requisite or an essential necessity for the rearing of children. An examination of this claim (Zimmerman, 1960) finds it false. Some children are reared successfully in almost any environment. They appear to have come through without emotional and character blemishes. However, the proportions of "failures" (from the expectancy of a "good" society) is very great. This is true for the slums of our cities as well as among the broken families in Latin America. This goes back to the statement made above that a major handicap in neo-positivistic or statistical type of family analysis is the variation in meanings of the concepts used. Illegitimacy in Latin America is a case in point. Each Latin American nation tends to have several forms of marriage, and only a minority are wedded by the officially accepted rites of the Church or of the State. All others are classed as "illegimates". They have married by village and group customs, the enforcement of which are neglected once they migrate away from the village or to the city. A child without a father present in the home has as much or more difficulties of coming through successfully there as in the United States. "Statutory" illegimates are not the same as children born out of wedlock because their form of wedding is not recognised away from the community.

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CONTEMPORARY FAMILY CRISES AND SOCIAL CHANGE

As noted through out this work, a family system is very much subject to disturbances during periods of rapid social change. The last great period of change before this present one in the West (See Zimmerman, *Family and Civilization*, New York, 1947) was that of the 16th century of the Christian era. At the time the Protestant Reformation coincided with the movement of power from Southern Europe to Northern, the opening up of the new world of the Americas, and the commencement of the colonial regimes during which Europe took over the political and economic control of most of the Eastern world. That was a period in which the family system of Europe was remodeled. The powers of the clans and other family groups were reduced and the public courts were given all the job of settling civil disputes and of punishing criminals.

Prior to that time for some centuries marriage had been called a *religious sacrament* uniting the couples before God. Now it soon became a public arrangement between a man and a woman and could be ratified by a licence and a ceremony before a public official. Church or canon marriage law and control of the family began to give way to public family law. Public officials were soon empowered in many Protestant areas to divorce couples. Before that time these separations, if allowed, were by religious courts, and could only be from co-living, not absolute divorce. If one had a great deal of money or influence he could use a legal fiction to purchase a nullification which was an absolute divorce. One fiction used was the contention of an earlier clandestine marriage which made the marriage wished to be nullified theoretically invalid.

In the New England colonies in North America after the Reformation it was made a crime for a Minister of the Gospel to marry a couple. The Church was eliminated, at least temporarily, from direct family control.

In this discussion there is no time to explain the reasons for the deep involvement of family system alterations with social change in detail. Nor is it necessary to give further historical details about the last great period of such type that of the 16th century. Rather it seems better to suggest a few principles and to discuss in some detail the problem as it is emerging in the United States and India of today.

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE 20TH CENTURY

Social change is omnipresent. It is a fact of life inherent in the social process. We do not have to explain change because it is in the nature of

things—*de rerum nature*—. In Western culture we have historical documentation for at least the past 30 centuries and we know that no century ever ended like it began. Every century changed remarkably during its course.

However social change is never at a steady pace for any great length of time. Vast alterations seem to come periodically and after these periods the pace seems to slow down for a while. In the West the Roman Empire began to break up violently in the 5th century of the Christian era. By the end of the 8th century Europe was in a Dark Age of starvation and despair. Then there was a revival and the 12th century was called a "Golden Age" of creative development and hope. Our present 20th century is one of such vast alteration. It has been one of great changes in both Europe and Asia as well as in the whole world. We are now, due to modern communication, in an interconnected world which has no isolated regions safe from the current turmoil.

At the commencement of this 20th century Asia and Africa, and, to a considerable extent, the Americas, were colonial possessions or economic appendages of Europe. The USA and Russia were minor powers. Japan defeated Russia in 1904. When the United States had war with Spain in 1898 the German Navy threatened the American Navy but the British Navy stood off the Germans. From Istanbul the Ottoman Empire, although weakening, ruled much of the world. Then the "Sun Never set on the British Empire". China had been crushed by Europe in what was known at that time as the "Boxer Rebellion". Now all these things have changed. This is common knowledge of what has happened and needs no documentation.

Most of the mechanical changes of our century, such as the atomic discoveries and the moon shots, may be considered sideline effects of the major social changes. That is, we got into wars and other troubles on account of the success of some of our major ideological changes. Then we started to explore the use of rockets and atom bombs as ultimate war weapons. Out of this came moon shots and earth satellites. Then realising that we took a good chance of exterminating ourselves if we used the atom bombs against each other, we have entered upon a "moon-race" for prestige. Russia and the United States now are each trying to prove its superiority by economic methods, by ideological propaganda or by sending manned space ships aloft. Out of this situation arises a general world of vastly increased change, unrest, ideological movements and unsettlement.

FOUR BASIC SOCIAL CHANGES

The four major basic changes of the 20th century may be noted in the following fields: (1) Vast shifts have taken place in territorial power control (2) Internally there have been drastic changes in the social classes and in the power exercised by the various social classes. (3) Physical space as a factor in isolation and protection of groups and cultures and their insulation and safety from each other has p y disappeared in the Space Age

(4) In the whole world all peoples have developed the feeling that "we are but dwarfs standing on the shoulders of giants".

Every century has seen some changes in the government of given pieces of territory. The 16th century was the one in which the colonial system had its major expansion. From about 1500 to 1600 the three great empires of the new world (Aztec, Mayan and Inca) were put under the control of European countries. Some of this colonial growth was still being carried out even in the nineteenth century. But by that time most of the world was already under the colonial system so that this type of growth was largely on the fringes and in the less desirable lands from the then commercial point of view.

Further, by then colonialism had changed in two other aspects. One of these was the development of what were called mere "zones of influence". This meant that a given European country did not necessarily claim the new territory as a colony but is claimed the right to insist upon the country being managed so as to give the major commercial rights in the territory to the European power claiming a "zone of influence". In the first case—colonialism—trade followed the flag. In the second case—the zone of influence—the flag followed trade.

This meant often that the advisers to the government of the "zone of influence dominated country" would be nationals of that European country which claimed the zone of influence. For instance, Indochina was under the French either as colonies or as a zone of influence. Across Siam, Malaya and Burma were two British colonies. Siam (Thailand), which separated the two colonial zones of government and influence, was supposed to be free. But traditionally certain of the ministers in Siam had British advisers, and certain others French. In later years the odd ones were given to Americans.

The second change in the colonial governing system during the later 19th century was the yielding of rights to the territories among European countries as the result of wars, trades or agreements. This continued into the 20th century and was particularly active as a result of the treaties made after World War I.

COLONIALISM IN THE 20TH CENTURY

Thus it was that early in this 20th century the world was very much under territorial rule. The largest aggregation was the British Empire. In a considerable degree it held the majority of the people of the world under it. Even China with its British trade ports, such as Hong Kong, was largely British dominated and ruled. South America, through the Monroe doctrine, was fairly independent in most areas. However, partly in South America but generally elsewhere many European countries governed areas ten or twenty times larger than themselves and many times more popu-

in Europe and an area of 12,850 square miles, had among its colonies one, Indonesia, with an area of 735,000 square miles and a population of eighty-five million. In 1958 it was claimed that there were only 46,000 Dutch citizens in Indonesia. In addition the Netherlands had other colonies scattered over the world.

Now nearly all of this is broken up. India, Burma, French Indochina, and Indonesia, to name only a few regions with almost a billion population, are decolonised and now have self-government.

The shifts in territorial power control in the 20th century affect nearly the whole world. The British, French, Dutch, Belgian, German and Italian colonies are largely broken from the colonial system or in revolution against it. The European countries concerned have themselves been affected by new adjustments, as for instance the losses of the Dutch in Indonesia or the financial and blood cost of the various colonial crises through which France has gone. Needless to say, each of these minor changes has fanned the flame of various ideological movements.

Within Europe itself the territorial changes have been vast. Germany expanded under Hitler and then contracted. Russia contracted after 1919 and then expanded after World War II. The various smaller countries affected by these movements have been influenced by a different ideological movement about once every decade during the century.

NEW SOCIAL CLASSES RISE TO POWER

A second major type of change in the 20th century has been the internal shifting of political, social and economic power among the older social classes. In many cases new classes have risen to power and older ones have disappeared entirely. Every country has seen a great deal of this. Russian aristocrats were exterminated during the Revolution and the Communist Party took over. Within the party there has been a constant struggle for power among the various segments so that first one, and then the other, has been purged and replaced. The whole peasant class in Russia has been reshuffled juridically and locationally. Workers of an urban skilled type have risen to prominence.

This shifting of power among classes is marked in the United States of America by the almost total disappearance of common labour as a commodity and its replacement by machines and skilled labour. In 1900 almost 80 per cent of American workers were manual. Now less than 10 per cent are. The farmer class is rapidly disappearing in numbers and in political significance in favour of factories in the fields. We now have less than two million farms, only one million of which are important. At one time we had nearly eight millions. The class of household servants has almost disappeared. Now the "household servant" is a service-skilled worker or salesman of automatic washers, driers or refrigerators. He either sells you a new washing or cleaning machine which you must operate y If by

pushing buttons, or he is there to repair the ones you have so they will continue to be serviceable.

Organised labour with its bosses has risen into great power in the U.S.A. In many sections of the country these labour bosses have become even more powerful than the elected governments. The illiterate in the country have been replaced by the literate. We no longer count our illiterates because they are such a small percentage. The Black people of America have entered the urban areas and are rising to power. The teaching profession has increased in its social significance and in its influence. Scientists have come more to the fore-front. In the early days the scientists who took public positions were called derisive names such as "braintrusters" and "egg-headers". Now they have assumed a more important role and are not the subject of epithets. The scientific associations have risen in numbers, in strength and in influence. Many of these persons are given government positions for their scientific knowledge alone just by the sides of cabinet members. Large amounts of money are spent each year to promote scientists and science. The aim is to promote scientific discovery. Many lengthy discussions are held and scientific books and papers are written on the best methods of doing this. Questions are constantly raised as to whether this scientific promotion is being done better in the United States than in Russia.

Since the defeat of Germany in World War II, the conquering nations, particularly Russia and the United States, have been wooing the scientists of the old Germany trying to get them to move to Russia or America to spread their ideas and techniques. We have even tried to develop translating machines so that the findings of science reported in other languages may be made available mechanically in English with the least of human effort and loss of time. These describe the new position of technicians and managers.

Similar changes have taken place in the European countries. In the former colonial countries, the natives who once were largely merely errand boys for the colonial administrators have replaced their former bosses. In China the feudal war lords have now consolidated and risen to national power through the military bureaucracies which control the Communist state. In Russia the scientist, doctor of philosophy and the "stakhanovite" (or unusually skilled worker) are now given preference in living conditions and material comforts.

DECLINE OF SPACE AS A SAFETY BARRIER

Physical space has declined as a factor for the safety, the isolation and the insulation of peoples and cultures from others. News and new ideas get everywhere fast through the press, radio and television. Men everywhere hear all that seems important in the whole world each day and before that day ends. In one or two days at the most men and machines in the free world at least can and do move from any one section of the globe to another.

Little is now left for priv
igno of events or privacy

from public affairs

Associated with this extreme proximity of men and events of nations and cultures now with one another is the problem of the newer weapons of war. Everyone has a feeling and is given to understand that the weapons of one section of the world are but a few moments away from their targets in any other part of the world's domain.

Also there is the immense possible coverage in terms of space and the long-lasting effects of each weapon. An atom bomb contaminates a large area and its effects continue to carry out destruction over a long period. These effects have become so massive that we daily monitor our air for "fall-out". We study corpses to see if contamination is increasing. All this is to find out if the use of these newer weapons has contaminated the surface of the globe to a dangerous level. We want to know if these poisons reach humans through consuming animals which eat the grass grown in the contaminated earth.

No longer in any part of the globe is there much left of pastoral isolation or insulation from the mighty forces let loose in the world. All this gives rise to tremendous new fears and ideological movements, that make it possible to reach vaster numbers, that can be more easily swayed. The psychological resistance levels of people to ideological movements has been lowered. We have entered the age of "the crowd mind" as Gustava Le Bon noted at the end of the 19th century.

This century has witnessed the capacity of some ideological groups to completely pervert and overthrow long-established and traditional moral values and human character traits, at least for a time. Several countries—in fact, a number of large areas—have seen these reversions. Peoples who have lived in friendship side by side for generations have been turned into mobs, killing each other allegedly because of ethnic, colour, economic or religious differences.

WE ARE DWARFS BUT CAN BECOME GIANTS

The fourth great social change of this century has been the rise among nearly all peoples of the idea that we are but dwarfs standing on the shoulders of giants. Several regions of the world are peopled by the descendants of ancient cultures which have at least once been more powerful and successful economically and socially than they are now or were in the first third of the present century.

Whether or not this is true, it is obvious that at the beginning of the 20th century many of the peoples of the world with few exceptions, were living among the ruins of their former greatness. India, Egypt, China, Southeast Asia, Indonesia and all the Arab world in the Middle East and North Africa are illustrations of these types of people on the older continents. In the Americas there are the Aztec, Mayan and Inca ruins. These cover all of present M Central and the northwest third of South

America. The poor Mayan, with his *milpa* or corn plot on streets of a ruined former city, did not know much about his former greatness.

The "we are but dwarfs on the shoulders of giants" idea is one which inspired Western Europe during the Renaissance of the twelfth century. At that time the peoples of Europe had begun to find from the recovery of classical documents during the Crusades, that in the days of the Roman Empire they had been much more cultured and civilised than they were. So leaders like John of Salisbury and others went about Europe proclaiming their former greatness. This dwarf idea was used as a challenge, and inspiration, to get the then European "fellaheen" to rise again toward their former greatness.

The point of importance is that now many peoples in the world have become aware to a considerable extent of their former greatness—or their abilities to better themselves. This has inspired many ideological movements. Pan-Arabism is an example. The inspiration of this ideological Arab movement lies in the hopes of recreating the greater former Arabic civilisation which was no powerful during those centuries (sixth to twelfth) of the Western Dark Age.

MAJOR PROBLEMS RAISED BY THESE CHANGES

In the remainder of this century at least four great problems will be outstanding in their significance. (1) New leaders from new sources and social classes are needed and rising all over the world and this will continue. (2) These new leaders are and will be from social classes which, in their previous experiences, have had little training in large scale leadership and its responsibilities. They now have to lead and they make up a new and inexperienced group. (3) While the present century has some of the greatest possibilities to offer mankind it also has some of the greatest dangers. Already the 20th century has proved to be mankind's bloodiest and most difficult period. (4) To meet this situation a new sociology is called for. Old ideas seem inadequate. Many words and ideas considered sacred to the past epoch appear out-dated now.

This century has witnessed the end of the colonial system and the rise of new world powers. Others seek recognition. This means that everywhere new groups have come into power. In the former colonies throughout the world the people govern themselves.

The emergence of Russia and the United States as world powers brings entirely new leadership there to the forefront. Now China with its 850 million people is emerging, seemingly without foreign aid. Decisions in world affairs made in Washington and Moscow have replaced in importance those formerly made in London, Paris and Berlin. In each case—Washington and Moscow—the decisions are made by persons whose background has been largely that of a new people hardly equipped to deal with the great problems of a world of diverse culture. It seems probable that Peking, Cairo, Tokyo

New Delhi and other places with similar new leadership will soon join the others.

Newness in leadership is also reflected by the new social groups coming to the forefront. These new groups (or old ones re-emerging) have had relatively little recent experience in leadership of this nature. What is now true of a few lands can apply to the whole world. New groups have risen and are rising to power in the world's most difficult century. They have to learn to lead us in our perilous atomic and space age, but their backgrounds for centuries have isolated them from the experiences of leadership.

The newness of leadership in the world today has certain good aspects. The leaders have everything to learn and nothing to forget.

FAMILY CRISES BROUGHT ABOUT BY SOCIAL CHANGE

This period of radical social change has upset family systems in most parts of the world. Political movements in Europe in the first half of this century, such as fascism, nazism and communism, each had a very decided family programme, an outstanding one of which was that in Russia between 1917 and the involvement of that country in World War II. Each of these movements sought to take the family out from its control by religion, ethics, and the older mores and to make it responsible directly, in its entirety to the state. In addition, each movement had its own peculiarities such as is illustrated by the attempts to substitute overnight a complete *factual* family for the former mighty *ethical* one. All three of these movements have passed away due in all probability to the fact that each violated, in a fundamental manner, the basic primate mores of the people as well as the needs for necessary social order in the new societies which have now been formed.

In this series of drastic family changes which have now involved both the East and the West, attention in this study shall be paid only to two—those now occurring simultaneously in the United States, for the West, and those in India, for the East. Somewhat similar changes are underway or imminent in other Eastern and Western countries as well but this study focuses on only these two. However most of the general principles are the same for all countries. Some of these are as follows.

In the Western, or industrialised lands, the major problem seems to be a family system which will produce large numbers of *creative* individuals in a hurry. This has meant the enormous and very rapid extension of social *non-age*. This is a part of the process of creation of the *Intelligentsia* and its promotion to power. It is a new form of rapid social mobility of a vertical nature in which scholars and scientists, trained by the Universities, rise very rapidly to power and assume considerable dominance over the former business and other classes. First it is the replacement of business leaders by products of the "meritocracy" process. Later, the new business leaders become infused with the same type of training as the scientists. The reasons are evident. The West, with its industrial processes is using up the world's

traditional resources so rapidly that it has to learn new and less wasteful ways of doing things in a hurry or else a crisis will soon be at hand. The rapid exhaustion of supplies of fossil fuels, the pollution of the air, the water and the surface of the land, even the ocean waters are examples. Every few years the use of energy of all kinds doubles whether it is from coal, gas, petroleum or atomic power. This cannot go on for any great length of time. Clean air and water become increasingly rare because of the domestic and industrial waste befouling them. To meet these foreseeable problems, along with the remedying of the destruction already brought about requires an entirely new type of approach—one which only the fields of science largely organised about the universities—can furnish.

However this process increases free living because of the requirements for long technical preparation of the young. The ruling class in the technical societies are increasingly becoming Ph.D.'s, engineers and scientists. An average person of this class is now hardly ready for life until he is 25 years of age. With the earlier onset of adolescence, physical maturity, and full adult growth, now a general phenomenon in the better dietary lands of the West, non-age, or legal *alleni juris*, is divided into three, instead of its former two parts of childhood and youth. Now there is childhood, to 6 or 7 years, youth from 7 to 14 (adolescence), and then free adulthood to an average of 25. Many, of course, stop earlier than 25, but increasingly there are no jobs for persons under 19 or 20 because manual labour has been supplemented by machine processes.

This means that the modern family system in America is now given a double job. Any parent can spank a baby; most parents can outguess a growing youth; but not everyone can cope with young adults who, with specialised educations, often know more in some fields than their parents, (or think they do) yet are dependent upon parents for support, aid, encouragement and guidance.

This is the crux of much of the problem between the generations and the youthful unrest and violence now on the increase in many lands. Youth has to be free to go farther than the parents; yet freedom at this age of life can be used for destructive purposes. In the period from adolescence to twenty years of age the young have most energy, but at the same time, the least experienced judgement about life. This is where the "revolt of youth" arises, particularly in those societies in which the mantle and duties of adulthood are withheld from them because of the longer time needed for preparation in the technical societies.

As a result of this (and a number of other factors) the family system in the United States faces a crisis of an extreme type. The same social conditions which upset the young adults also have influenced and loosened the relations between husband and wife so that other factors have added additional fuel to the youth revolt. In 1970 Zimmerman was given the Burgess Award by the *American National Council of Family Relations* and in 1971 he delivered the Burgess Award Address on "The Future of the

Family in America" This is reproduced here by permission, as Chapter VII. In the order of this chapter a few links will be made about possible changes in the Indian Family System.

FAMILY SYSTEM CHANGE IN INDIA

Family systems of the Indian type exist in many areas of the world where, great cultures have flourished and decayed and have as of now not yet been considerably reconstructed on a large nationalistic scale. In this system certainly are India and Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, the lower Indo-China, and the new Indonesia. These people have retained their strong ethical family systems in a confused mixture of variant religions such as the Moslem sects, the multitudinous castes—both Hindu and Moslem—in India, Zoroastrianism, Jainism, and Buddhism. Smaller groups have sects of other religions among them—Druse, Jews, Christians etc.

These people now have strong family systems of a very ethical character but no overriding civil law with significant preference. Since the religious sects are many, but none of them markedly territorially inclusive, there is no strong church-state rule over the family systems. Even a small village in India can have half a dozen castes and versions of family rule. Each of the tribes of India, which number many millions of people, has its own overhead family control, seemingly separate from any variety of Hinduism. The same general territorial confusion of family rule pervades and plagues most of the ancient world.

The people of these older family system are of extremely vital importance to the world in the space age. They include more than a half of the world's population. They sit astride some of the basic avenues of communication such as the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, and the Malay Straits. Their territories include much of the world's future petroleum supplies and probably of other necessary raw materials as yet untapped. The masses are utterly poverty stricken and in their ignorance, along with their devoutness, are capable of extreme violence to one another and to the others there. Small recent illustrations are the uprisings in the Arab World, the violence between Arab and Jew, and the millions massacred over the partition wars between Pakistan and India. Mass violence of one people to another has spread from the West to the East. Genocide once said to be Western, is now familiar to the East.

In addition, these peoples have adopted some modern health measures which have reduced their death rates. Therefore, a population explosion is now seen in practically every segment. Finally, the passing of colonialism means that from now on whatever order, peace, sanity and improvement exist in these countries will have to come from self-governments.

The family system characteristic of this world is of primary devotion to the religious or moral field of family responsibility to the exclusion or very strict limitation of the individual or public law aspects of the unit. Some

of the young now mix in the developing cities and universities but are often thrown out of their castes and religions if they cross-marry. Some demographers maintain that the birth rate excess is so great in these countries that illiterates are increasing now more rapidly than literates and the ratio of scientists and professionals to the masses is decreasing instead of increasing.

The situation is not so grave in some countries as in others, but everywhere it is critical. All these older countries have long roads to travel toward modernisation, and the first preference will have to be given in alterations of their family systems. The three volume *Asian Drama* (1968) by Gunnar Myrdal, implies family remodification as primary in most of his major conclusions. School attendance is lax because of non-enforcement of compulsory regulations; hence literacy fails to make great headway. Since literacy makes little headway, economic development lags. Traditional methods of doing things in the everyday activities of life become repetitive and conservative. The caste system holds the family rigid. Child labour is enhanced by the ensuing poverty. He says it would be a mistake to try and improve the lot of the child economically unless the rewards were given directly to the child and not the families. The families would just produce more children. This handicaps any attempt to promote what he calls the "welfare state". He avoids overt commitment but in a hundred places, he makes suggestions which involve the alteration of the family system. His appendix 12, Volume 3, on family planning (and other writings on population and food supply) clarifies two or three main issues. Unless the population is controlled, little else for improvement will make much difference; and, looking at family planning realistically, nothing so far done, or envisaged, to 1968 has or is going to check the population explosion other than usher in a new type of rational domestic order. In South Asian life children are bearing and rearing children. The young can be looked upon as an investment, since children are expected to fulfil obligations to parents more than parents to children. (p. 1515). He quotes seemingly approvingly the statement by C. Chandrasekaran from a Mysore study that the joint family system "is known not to afford opportunities for the husband and wife to communicate frequently on family problems, especially those pertaining to family size" (pp. 1517)

CONCLUSIONS

Both family systems, those of India and of the United States, as representative of Eastern and Western culture, are in a peculiar position of not being adapted to the new social orders which are emerging before them. In the one it is the responsibilities of being a world power and example and of adapting the economic system to sustained yield production thus to avoid wasting of resources. In the other it is the need for a family type which is more adapted to national self-government, to control of the burgeoning population and to technical development for food production and increased

per capita gross national product. In each case the countries have a major problem which is so urgent that most of the measures for its solution must be taken decisively within one generation. The mass of sociological thinkers in each country should be more cognizant of the immanence of the problems and the basic steps needed to find solutions. A first step in the remodelling of their family systems is to produce new types of standard personalities.

FAMILY AND RELIGION

The ten or fifteen thousand years since the retreat of the Wisconsin-Wurm glacial sheet, which is called the end of the last ice age, has seen the appearance of "historical" time. In this period widespread religious faiths have risen and these along with the nations and civilizations which also arose have been upholders of "universalistic" family doctrines. Canon law, a term which we shall use for church rule, and civil law, have both been deeply concerned with family affairs. Of these two, canon law has taken the earliest and most primary steps in standardizing the human family unit and its inner relations between husband and wife, parents and children, and inner versus outer kin and strangers. The main Eurasian religions of this historical period have been Confucianism, Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Islam and Christianity. Three others of significance were found upon the discovery of America after 1492—those of the Aztec, the Maya and the Inca. All these religions were or are familistic in their doctrines, which means that without exception, they concern the sanctity of family relations more than any other mundane subject.¹

This does not mean that there was nothing else in these religions but that, in addition to the rituals and obligations to God or the Gods, each had a fundamental and fully stated code of rights and duties of family members to each other, to kindred and to the outer world of strangers. Each main religion, or subsidiary branch thereof, no matter what else it made sacred, always specified the major rights and obligations of husband, wife, parent, child, family members and kin versus each other and non-members and strangers. Some of the religions seem more specific in their family doctrines such as Confucianism, on the eastern side of Hinduism, and the three arising on its western side which stem from the Hebrew Old Testament, namely the Jewish religion, Christianity and Islam. However, all were fundamentally the same. We need only mention the works of Confucius or the fact that in regions dominated by this religion the household shrine is the most elaborate and expensive aspect of the domestic dwelling. The relation of religion to the

¹ Any discussion of religion and the family must start with a careful reading of Max Muller's (ed.) fifty-volume set of *The Sacred Books of the East*. The inclusion in this category of the religions of the Aztecs, the Maya and the Incas is based upon experiences and studies among these peoples, of their reconstructed histories, and of their ruins. Hinduism is used here to designate that conglomeration of beliefs and faiths which, along with Islam, is dominant in the Indian sub-continent. It includes everything from the simple faiths of the autochthons to Brahmanism and B

home and family in the Hindu areas is marked by the general prevalence of a small shrine of one kind or another near each home as well as worship within the household. A well-to-do Hindu home is "partly a temple".

CHRISTIANITY AND THE FAMILY

In the Christian Protestant West the domestic shrine still lingered, vestigially, until this generation, in the family-bible and the parlor room of the houses. This parlor was almost unused except for family functions like preserving the Bible and its family records or to entertain and meet with the pastor when he called. The room in which this is being written has in its upper corner above and to the right of the fireplace a special little cupboard which was placed there in 1760 when this colonial New Hampshire house was built. It is called the "parson's cupboard" and always contained wine or rum as well as the family bible for use when the parson visited. Family worship was then the rule as illustrated by Grace at meals and nightly prayers.

The familistic aspect of Christianity as a typical world religion should need no explanation to anyone who has read the Jewish-Christian *Old Testament*. In the 26th Chapter of Exodus the Ten Commandments start with the statement: And God Spake All These Words, saying:—

1. The first four commandments establish the primacy, the significance and the importance of Jehovah and His day of the week for worship of Him.
2. The fifth—Honor thy father and thy Mother.
3. The sixth—Thou shalt not kill.
4. The seventh—Thou shalt not commit adultery.
5. The eighth and ninth concern stealing and lying (bearing false witness against neighbours)
6. The tenth returns directly to the family again—thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife.

Thus this basic document of Christianity consists of two parts—injunctions on "how to be a religious person" (religious observances, 40%) and specific acts considered most important in the daily life of a believer (60%). A half of this sixty percent devoted to the daily life of the believer concern the family directly and the other three concern the cardinal sins of killing, stealing or lying.

The next several chapters of the Bible elucidate primitive law in detail but the recurring themes always come back to the family as: "He that smitheth his father or his mother shall be surely put to death. And he that curseth his father or his mother shall surely be put to death". (Exodus, Ch. 21) There is much more to this. It is reproduced here because one can never be sure if modern persons really know what is in the Bible.²

² The signifi of the family in the rise of Christianity is explained in detail in Carlo C. Zimmerman, *Family and Civilization*, New York, 1947

Shortly before he died, the sociologist P. A. Sorokin had two visitors from the Russian Academy of Science. In the course of the conversation it came out that one had never seen a Bible of the Christian religion and the other, who taught social science in Russia had only seen one casually. While this was an extreme case, I believe, it does support the fact that our literate elite in all Western lands, where Christianity is the modal faith, are not now well informed about this or any traditional religious document. The strange character of our present time is indicated further by the inability of many to understand the language in the King James version of the Bible. For instance the words "when the cock crowed" play a considerable part in the New Testament with particular reference to the Garden of Gethsemane and the subsequent betrayal of Christ by his disciples. Now the question arises as to the recognition of the meaning of this phrase by moderns. Roosters crow about sunrise and this expression is a standard timing for early morning among peoples without clocks. But under modern conditions of the poultry industry cocks are penned and in most cases raised for broilers. They are fed hormones to reduce their maleness as they add weight more easily. Hence they do not crow. Very few of the million living in America since 1920 know this expression.

In a large degree the New Testament is the main Christian version of the biblical sacred work. It too is equally familistic as the Old in its substantive teachings for Christians. After the Apostles have told the story attesting to the sacredness of Christ as "the only begotten son of God" the Epistles (letters) of Paul of Tarsus (St. Paul) dominate the work. Each is largely a condemnation of unfamily "pagan" acts continuing in the new Christian Churches in the Anatolian peninsula and the Western Mediterranean civilized world.

FAMILISM IN THE GREAT WORLD RELIGIONS

All the great religions have been similarly familistic in fundamental senses. As noted above they have devoted more of their code of ethical conduct to the family and to prescribing its social relations than to any other mundane subject. Some of them, as for instance the Catholic Christian Church, made the union of husband and wife the basic start of the family, a Sacrament. This meant that God sanctioned each act of marriage and consecrated it forever after as an unbreakable union. Some of the Protestant churches keep marriage as a sacrament but others instead make it a "first act of God".

In addition, the greatest religions—the six mentioned above—not only devote more of their ideas to the family and make it their major subject of control but have similar ideas about marriage, family relations and the relations of family members to the world at large. In other words the family of one of these religions is almost identical with the family in another. Marriage customs are different among various groups but only in an ephemeral

or non-important sense. Fundamentally everywhere husband and wife have monopolistic rights with each other against the world at large. So also do children and parents. There are many attempted anomalies as for instance in the so-called joint families of India but these have not worked very well. Expressions of religious unity are: "Do not come between the bark and the tree" (Scandinavian); "Only he is a perfect man, one with wife, priest and dog." (Persian)

THE AZTEC, MAYAN AND INCA RELIGIONS

The great civilizations which did not arise under the aegis or along with these six world religions of the Eurasian axis, notably those of the Aztecs, Mayas and Incas, also followed similar family practices in their local religions. The family systems of the Aztecs of Mexico, the Mayas of Yucatan and the Inca civilization in northern and western South America were in all fundamental senses identical with those of the conquerors who came upon them in the early sixteenth century.

The ruins of the last Inca city, Machu Picchu, in the upper Amazon river valley over the mountain ranges from Cuzco the capital, were not found or discovered by Europeans until 1912. One of the interesting things noted about the place was that a high proportion of the burials in the cemeteries there were of women. The only reasonable explanation of this phenomenon is that the upper class families took or sent their wives and minor children to that hidden city to avoid having them taken over by the conquering Spaniards. In general the conquering invaders wanted booty—gold, lands, and women—and took them from the "pagans" as they wished. The natives who were living there in 1912 and even for some 25 years after that remembered the old marriage customs and rehearsed them to me in the late fifties at the religious shrine in the ruined city. These were religious promises to be **faithful**, to be **honest** and to be industrious. That is approximately a duplicate of the Western promises at marriage, to love, to honor and to obey.

Since the last ice age began to retreat what is now known as Europe finally became liveable (or liveable again). The crossings of people to America over the Bering Strait upon dry land (due to the fact that the glacial ice cap by consuming water had lowered the ocean level) were made during that ice age before there was a Europe, a European people, or any of the religious doctrines of the "big six"—Confucianism, Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Islam or Christianity. But when the Spaniards under Cortes invaded Mexico (Aztec-land) in 1519, and Pizarro entered what is now Uruguay and Peru in 1531 on his way to the capital of Inca-land at Cuzco in the mountains they found family systems just like, in all fundamental details, the Catholic Christian system they had been reared under in Spain.

³ See Nirad C. Chaudhuri, *To Live or Not to Live*, Hind Pocket Books, New Deh India (nt) The author a Bengali has discussed the Hindu (Indian) family in detail. See also his *An obitography of an Unknown Indian*, Macmillan, 1951.

Cortez took a wife—Malinche—from the Aztecs, and she was faithful to him. She helped him conquer her own people. She learned Spanish and by her knowledge of the customs of the Aztecs and her ability as a translator facilitated the conquest and dismemberment of the Empire. Similar examples are found in the conquest of the Mayans. The upper classes and the religious leaders had to be destroyed leaving the family system with no leadership or guidance to reformulate the social system. That is the story told in Bishop Landa's manuscript *Relacion de los cosas de Yucatan*.

THE MEETING OF THE ARYANS AND THE INDIANS (C. 2000 B.C.)

An earlier episode of the same character came about in c. 2000 B.C. when a group from the wheatlands of central Europe, undoubtedly from the Hungarian plain, moved eastward through Anatolia and Asia Minor (then the Hittite Empire) into Persia and on into the upper plains of the Ganges River and all Western sections of the present India. They first occupied a large part of the then grassy and well watered plain around New Delhi including the Punjab, Rajasthan and all the good land area as far east as Allahabad and certainly south into northern Deccan. In this case Europeans came into physical contact with a large body of dark skinned persons—natives with a more primitive economy. Aryans, as these invaders are called, became masters of these new lands and their peoples. These blacks had occupied the territory for a very long period. (How long that had been we have no exact knowledge because the documents of present India commence with the Aryan Vedic Hymns or Rig-Veda, a collection of 1,017 of the main religious songs. These Hymns tell the history of the invaders and describe their family system. From these documents as they evolved in India, the history and that of India after their arrival has been reconstructed by the Sanskritists, particularly A. B. Keith who summarizes it in the Cambridge *Ancient History of India*, last edition.⁴

The black-skinned people of early India undoubtedly had been protected in a considerable degree during the last ice age by the great Himalayan range or mountain barrier to the north. Their residence in the sub-continent or part of it possibly could have continued all during the Wisconsin Ice Age (c. 50,000-1200 B.C.). They also had a strong and well regulated family system as attested by the Vedic Hymns. These religious "documents" were pre-historic like all early similar works such as the *Illiad* and *Odyssey*, and organized for purposes of carrying oral tradition, religion and history from one generation to the next. As preserved now in India they concern also the rules for the relations between the Aryans and the Natives, but in so doing they tell the nature of both family systems.

⁴ The migration of the European peoples through Anatolia and thence to Iran (Persia) and India commenced somewhat earlier—about 2000 B.C. or even before that. It had to be after the agricultural settlement of the wheat plains of Europe and before the end of the Hittite Empire in Anatolia.

From this conquest the caste system evolved and became the common-law of race relations. By the 7th century (or much earlier) at the time of other documents called the *Sutras*, this caste system had reached its height. The dark color of the original Indians spread from them to the Aryans commencing of course as in all multiple racial societies, by the extra marital pregnancies of the lower class women and also the system of hypergamy.

Hypergamy is a type of provision that originally regulated marriages between the blacks and whites. A caste originally was a Varna—a color group. A woman could not marry down, or into an “inferior” caste—hence at that time a darker person. However men could make a second or later marriage with someone of a lower caste—more coloured. This custom carries on today and is reflected in the dowry system. Now after 2000 years the castes and colours are all mixed up with the exception that in any one region the upper castes tend to be more light and to have more Aryan or European features than the lower, particularly the very dark (untouchables) who are called “scheduled castes.”

This meeting of early European and the older natives of India, and their merger after 2000 B.C. was also most probably a *first* in history as far as can be ascertained (or has even been suspected) up to this time. Yet their family systems were very similar in the sense of what is considered right and wrong about marriage, child-birth, husband and wife, parent and child, and family members and kin, that the people, even though divided vastly by colour and culture, finally merged into one group. In the region between the Indus river to the West and the Brahmaputra on the East there are now at least three quarters of a billion persons united into a culture with approximately the same family system. And that, in all its essentials, is not materially different from the Western type. There are, of course, caste differences, but not in the relations between husbands and wives, parents and children, inner family and kin. In the creation of this one family system out of a merger of these strangely differing people, religious beliefs about the family have played the most important role. Secular family law in India, insofar as there is any, is mostly a product of the independent government since 1947.

CONVERGENCE OF FAMILY SYSTEMS: ITS POSSIBILITY

This convergence of family systems and the role religious doctrines have played in it, seem to me to have three fundamental explanations as to how it comes and did come along. One is the fact that the members of these cultures which have converged all consisted of human animals of the same species. In every family system of human beings there are certain biological or mammalian likenesses or prerequisites from the start. No matter how much human beings seem different on the surface, underneath there is a certain basic similarity. This similarity gives us that phenomenon known as the “nuclear family.” This unit is a biological aspect of primate h so-

ciety and is universal in human time and social space. Its nucleus is a unit of husband-wife and parents-children. Its regular form is often misarranged by death, desertion, divorce or lack of progeny but its modal type is most constant. It repairs itself in as many ways as it can such as by remarriage of spouses, adoption of children, having remaining parents play dual roles, getting surrogate parents from the kindred, or with social workers and public representatives standing in *loco-parentis* and various other devices. One of the many ways it used to fill in the voids in the past has been by the use of kindred. This is a constant factor in the joint family of India even today and also in the clan group responsibility generally used up to the most recent days in the West.⁵

This humanness and familiness of all human beings is a basic factor in repairing the disruptions in the domestic unit. Religions promote this. The family is in all respects the basic building block of all larger social systems. An individual is an abstraction. The person we see is really a member always of a family process. Hence we see in this biological similarity a force which makes the unification of society into larger units of similar types a *possibility*. That is, it is always possible for any society to create larger systems by the duplication of myriads of its basic local units. That is why it was always possible for India to unite the races and to become a civilization of Indians and for China to become a nation of some 800 million Chinese. The Indians developed a social system to encompass all colours (*varnas*). In the same sense it is always possible for a small group in any other culture to unite or to grow into a larger group. Latins became Romans, Romans became Italians; Italians united the Mediterranean world; and the people of this world became the Roman Empire.

RELIGION AND THE PROBABILITY OF MERGING

However that is only one aspect of the situation inherent in any group at any time. The second is the logical process of *probability*. When religion commences to sanction the union into larger groups it finds each small family system surrounded by what William Graham Sumner has called *mores* or very ancient, pre-historic, and sometimes irrational ideas of right and wrong. The mores concern many things but most of them, and the strongest, concern the family system and family behaviour. Some of the most pronounced and ubiquitous of these mores are those prohibiting sex outlets of a "non-family" type such as incest, adultery, masturbation, and cross-colour marriages such as between whites and blacks or even browns and blacks. (It is not the purpose of this study to defend any mores, but to report their universality and their significance upon the family systems). Religion is the selector and standardizer of the mores. It gives the important ones an aura of com-

⁵ On the early family system in the West see Zimmerman *Family and Civilization* or cit on the Nuclear Family *International Journal of the Sociology of the Family* September 1972 "The Future of the Nuclear Family" pp. 109-120

mandments of the Deity.

These mores explain why when communication between two groups becomes enhanced such as through wars of conquest or through increased social contact because of improved communication facilities, a new unified social system has high *probability* of emerging through creation of a united family system with religious sanction. These new family systems may be classified into two types—those in which minor differences melt into similar mores so that the two become in a few generations as one, and others, in which something like colour or other major visual characteristics do not disappear within a short space of several generations. The first case may be illustrated by different groups of Europeans moving to a new land such as America and melting together. The American Indians or browns, who previously ruled the continent were more or less excluded from the new system. The browns or blacks were there but not a part of it. Some got into it eventually by irregular matings in cases where the "Indianness" or even blackness was not particularly conspicuous. The blacks who came to America following 1615 were in the unfortunate situation of rather marked colour differences. Eventually an in-between group of mulattos was created. These in-between arose both in America and in India by the infiltration of common ancestry very much through irregular matings. Once started the new crosses tended to inbreed. Disregarding what "ought" to be done, these are the ways things have been done.

NECESSITY AS A CAUSAL FACTOR

In human events it is difficult to explain the relation between two occurrences. In the analysis used here the attempt is made to separate out what is possible, what is probable and what is necessary in the development of family systems and their associated religions. Above it has been shown that a systematization of family ideals over large units is always possible, and when human cultures come into close relation with one another it is very probable that this will come about. Now it is necessary to show that unification of a grand social system by familial convergence is *necessary* otherwise the culture remains a fragile unity with only forced mechanical bonds. Hence that human tendency for the amalgamation of small cultures into the larger ones—called "civilizations"—is thwarted. A common culture means a large number of persons with similar habits, beliefs, and ways of thinking and acting. This is merely a suggestion that any society is always tending towards what is called by a much over-used concept—an integrated social system. For it to become a workable social system—(A) has to understand (B) and vice versa, on through to (C) to (Z) and without very much reflection. The relation has to be accepted and habitual.

This is where religion, particularly "world" religion, comes more into play. The difference between the world religious code and the extremely local ones is that the world religion is a common denominator of many simi-

lar local faiths. When the Hittite Empire first began to form with its headquarters at Bogazköy, about 150 miles northeast of the present location of the city of Ankara in Turkey, the peoples who made up the central core of that new empire all had local Gods and similar religions. All these Gods or religious symbols were gathered together at the central place of the Empire when one ruling group began to dominate. Eventually one religion began to emerge overall in the sense that everyone could find in the Hittite empire the major aspects of his own beliefs. This seemed *necessary* because family practice and faith had to fit themselves to Empire or nation. The Hittite Empire spread over all Anatolia and surrounded itself by outposts in front of which was a Hittite warrior carved in stone as a symbol of nationhood. This same Hittite warrior was mounted also at the main gate in Bogazköy. This is what is called in sociology "a collective representation," after the use of this concept by Durkheim. In this case we have the unification of three great collective ideas—family, God and Country. This is a *necessitous* relation in which the religion stands behind the family system in the interest of the overall legal or governing unit. This explains a number of things about the family doctrine and family system at any particular time. The grand society has a grand religion. Military enterprise alone can hold a large aggregate together for awhile but, in the long run, it seemingly takes a common faith. And that faith is both a product of and a maker of a common family system. Civilization has been shown to need a common family system. In spite of the divergent groups forming the United States we now see these basic patterns of unification in which the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court play a prominent role.

FAMILY AND RELIGION IN PRIMITIVE AND PRE-URBAN SOCIETIES

Thus far the discussion has concerned itself with the family and the world religions of the advanced societies. The question must also be considered from the viewpoint of the earlier isolated or more primitive groups. These are the numerous "rabbits" as contrasted with the few "elephants" according to Toynbee's classification of societies. This phase of the problem has been studied by the census method as well as by the more theoretical explanatory analysis. Illustrating the census type we have such works as E. A. Westermarck's in his multi-volume *History of Human Marriage*, L. T. Hobhouse, G. C. Wheeler, and M. Ginsberg's *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of Simpler Peoples* and a large number all-embracing studies. These types enumerate primitive peoples and classify their family systems. In addition this whole problem was given a sound theoretical analysis by E. Durkheim in his famous work *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. From these we find that religion was, if anything, more concerned with the family in primitive conditions than it was or to be even in the more advanced

In primitive or isolated rural conditions the

family organization was about all a person had for his society. Consequently religion concerned itself more thoroughly there with family obligations.

The mundane aspect of religion is one of the things Durkheim calls a "collective representation." "Religion is something eminently social. Religious representations are collective representations which express collective realities. . . ." A collective reality is a *social fact* and that means it is something separate from any individual but at the same time constrains the individual to act in a given manner. A religion is like a code of law—not embodied in any single person but requiring all members to act in a certain way and restrain from acting in another way. If one Judge dies he is replaced by another. Religion is a part of what Durkheim calls the *conscience collective* or *group mind*. While all religions have a cosmology, or explanation of the world and the natural order, their main social impact on the family arises from their separation and classification of all things (and actions into two groups—*sacred and profane*. "Religious beliefs are the (collective representations) which express the nature of the **sacred things** and the relations which they sustain either with each other or with **profane things**." "Rites are the rules of conduct" which tell how a man should comport himself in relation to sacred things. In other words religious values make sacred those social actions which are deemed good or necessary for social welfare. Since the family is most essential to the welfare of the person, primitive religion is very concerned with that unit. Durkheim points out that all religions, either simple or advanced, tribal or world-wide, have "churches," which in their elements are propagating "institutions" which seek to unite the adherents of their religion into a unity with a common faith. He holds that these religious rituals are more close to the families in primitive as contrasted with more advanced societies.

His theory allows us to explain the high role which religion plays in the family life of simpler peoples. Hobhouse, Wheeler and Ginsberg give a table of the proportion of cases of what are now called "legal difficulties" which are settled among primitive peoples by the concerned families alone or by public institutions. These percentages are based upon all studies of primitives available to them. The primitive groups were divided into three classes, the simplest, the medium advanced and the most advanced based upon their agricultural practices. Some were merely appropriating peoples who moved to new areas where the wild plants were available at the time whereas others actually had some settled domiciles with gardens and domestic animals. Among the simplest peoples only 21% had a regular system of public justice as contrasted with 24% for the more advanced and 41% for the most advanced. On the other hand among the simplest peoples 48% settled *all* cases requiring redress by family aid alone. (This is of course the role of the Trustee Family). The more advanced peoples got farther and farther away from self redress and began to use extra family agencies to referee their claims to redress. In this religion helped. "*Vengeance is Mine* saith the Lord.

SUMMARY OF RELIGION AND PRIMITIVE FAMILY

The study of the relation between religion and the primitive family was made for all available known cases in which there was very little if any urban development. This is a midway situation between the study by Durkheim in his work on *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* and the above analysis of the less than a dozen World religions. The following were found about the relation of the religion to the family and vice versa.

1. The family was the most important religious agency. Generally the rites and the priest's functions were performed by the heads of the families.

2. The religious functions of an extra-familial type were generally performed by neighboring families meeting together which made the kindred the second most prominent religious group.

3. The "wise man"-sorcerer or priest was the only non-family religious agent but his functions were more encyclopedic rather than religious in a narrow sense.

4. Mores and customs played a dominant part in religious beliefs.

5. A place in the family dwelling was usually set aside for religious purposes. A building in the community might also be used for such but it was reserved for many other community functions.

6. No sharp separation existed between the religious functions and the domestic and other necessary community observances. In other words the religious and familial were tied in closely with all other community affairs. Hence family, religion and local government were closely intertwined.⁶

WHY RELIGION AND THE FAMILY ARE INTERRELATED

Thus an understanding of the universal relationship between religion and the family is one of the first steps in comprehending the working of any social system. One has to recognize that the family is the smallest unit of society. Any large body is a replication of that smallest unit which is recognizable as a part of the whole. That is a society is composed of families as water is composed of molecules of two units of hydrogen joined with one of oxygen. There were almost 200 millions of persons in the U.S.A. in 1970 and these were mostly dwelling in 50 millions of households, averaging about four persons per household. Those households were diverse but the mass of them consisted of a husband and wife (or their surrogates) and two parents and two children. Some had no children, some had one or more but they averaged two or three. One can take individuals of any designation whatsoever and replicate them over and over and never come out to a nation-society. Two hundred million men, or women or girls or boys do not make a society. Only the multiplication of families can, under given circum-

⁶ See P. A. Sorokin, C. Z. and C. J. Galpin, *Systematic Sourcebook in Rural Sociology* vol. II, Ch. X.

stances, make a society. The individual is an *element of but not a unit of society*.

A society has and must have physical immortality. This physical immortality is accompanied (and made possible) by social or psychological immortality. It is a living thing above and beyond the sum of its individuals. Hence the immortality of the social system is achieved through the family. It recognizes this by passing on membership through the family. At any moment members of the society are dying out at one end and new ones being born at the other. This process differentiates people societies from those of other animals—social membership, social sustenance and social responsibility. At birth within a family an individual achieves a bundle of potential future social rights and responsibilities. Some of them are protection, legal status, and citizenship along with obligations as a member, taxpayer and even being used as a human sacrifice by being drafted into the armed services. In other words *status* is ordinarily conferred by *birth*.

A religion, as noted above, is a classification of actions into sacred and profane. Sacred actions are to be preserved and kept as clear as possible from the profane, particularly those which contradict the sacred. It does not make any difference whether we take the most primitive religion (as did Durkheim) or the more advanced as in the fifty volumes of the *Sacred Books of the East*, the basic classification seems the same. Those actions and types of behavior which are thought to make a society immortal are the object of the major proportion of religious attention in all of them. Thus religion is directly concerned with the family because, as the major social institution for psychological immortality it must deal with physical immortality. Value immortality goes together with the physical. This idea, believe it or not, is in the preamble to what I think is the first code of comprehensive family law ever written—the *Novellae Code* to the *Corpus Juris Civilis* or the first total codification of Roman Law. This was published about the year 529 A.D. under the auspices of Justinian and Theodora, co-emperors of the Roman Empire. It was an attempt to stabilize the family system and hence the whole government and corporate body of the late Roman Empire.

This explains why, no matter where we turn, when we take up the family we come to religion, and the country. While it is quite obvious that much theological discussion as well as family sociology would seem to give the opposite impression, this is inevitably a false idea. A ritual must not be confused with a basic sociological function.

themselves more closely or singularly about the processes of birth, social status and death—three things with which the family is unavoidably connected. A part of this is due to the influence of the changed situation upon the mores themselves. These religions classify actions into two types, sacred or profane, and tend to promote the sacred and demote the profane except as the profane adds to or upholds the sacred.

Insofar as we have used the word family or "family system" it refers to the social unit most commonly associated with human reproduction and the rights, duties and after-effects ordinarily arising therefrom among people. In this situation reproductive biology, basic personality, and the fundamental egos of the members of the group become tied with rights and duties which are guided most carefully by what is considered sacred (or social), on the one hand, and profane (or individual), on the other. As the society becomes enlarged, and the functions of government are separated in considerable part from the family *per se*, the family rights and duties also take on civic rights and obligations. The "sacred" rules and regulations concerning the family and its members are supplemented, and sometimes partly even superseded, by legal rules and regulations.

Thus there is a universal relation between religion and the family. Even in the most secular societies the conceptions of what is sacred in regard to the family actions sometimes becomes confused, or challenged by a vociferous minority, but never disappears. Even the right to a legal abortion in the current United States is surrounded by merely a renewal of the very ancient argument as to when a fertilized human egg should be considered a legal person. This leads us to a point which is very mis-understood and neglected in most analyses in the field of family sociology—the *triple field nature of the family*.

Essentially and fundamentally the family unit is not a "simple group" or "another small group" as it has customarily been declared to be in modern sociology for the last half century. All simple groups—and that covers nearly all the voluntary aggregations of human beings—work largely in one field of reference. When that *raison d'être* is absent the group no longer exists. The family works in three frames of reference. These three—individual, religious, and governmental—are all basic, unavoidable, involve everyone, have all known methods of getting and enforcing behaviour, and are inter-related. At any one time the family is obligated to the fact that its components are mating animals and their progeny have all the "faults" and "virtues" of that inheritance. They are also domesticated animals which operate under religious beliefs which contravene, guide and limit this animal inheritance. The human female cannot ordinarily be abandoned by the male after she is pregnant. Thus the relationship between husband and wife, father and mother, parent and child, kindred and the nuclear family take on a religious sanction which divests and adds to some of the mammalian characteristics of the human animal. On top of that the social system uses the family for its governing. Any government from the simplest to the most

complex guarantees certain things to the family and takes others. It protects the family but requires from it unavoidable membership and its allegiance.

A deep acquaintance with this-triple-field nature of the family system seems to me to be the first step in understanding the family institution itself. There are periods in human affairs in which the students of the family get a one-sided view. In the medieval period in Western society the idea grew up that the family belonged entirely to religion. In recent years there have been short periods in which the family has been considered entirely the business of the political state. Now the idea is being expressed that the family is almost solely the business of the individuals concerned. From the standpoint of the triple-field nature of the institution, it is evident that these extremist philosophies are all aberrations. No family is workable which does not allow the satisfaction, in a major sense, of the human animal; neither can it belong entirely to the church or to the state. But we must go one step further: that family system which works best is one in which the three interests—all three—are well represented and none is excluded. But if there must be an extreme, that of strong religious family mores seems to have been the most satisfactory. Religious control of family life has lasted long periods but ages of extreme individualism or of unlimited state control of the family have been short and violent. One reason for the long lasting control of religion over the family is the willingness of most cults to make obeisances to the human animal which is in all of us.

This brings the analysis to a consideration of the influence of secularism and the present rise of what is called irreligiosity in the upper middle classes of Western society. Why is this so and what influence is it going to have upon the longtime stability and vitality of the Western social system? This is a very important question and one not generally discussed by recourse to rational scientific logic in which the family is considered.

Recently, everywhere, but particularly in Western society, a simultaneous decay has taken place in respect for religious beliefs, per se, and also the marital, parental and kindred systems of sacredness associated with these religious cosmologies and eschatologies. People now tend to have less faith in the doctrines of Genesis or Revelations and, at the same time, consider the marital, parental and kindred ties more casually. How then can (and perhaps must) the family system revive itself in the face of this scepticism? Will it do so without a revival of a system of "sacred" backing? Or will it find new reasons to consider family relations more sacred and less easily

loyalties and sacrifices of husbands and wives for each other, of parents and children for their opposites and of inner and outer members of the kin groups or the other members *can* and do, at times, vary greatly beyond these ordinary limits. This means that all family relations have the possibility not only of adaptation but also of moving from public virtues to anti-virtues and *vice versa*. Thus each social relation within the family group is subject to the possibility of wide variations overlapping into extremes—overuse and disregard.¹⁸ This is like that described in the Aristotelian analysis as developed in the main body of *Nichomachean Ethics*. Each human trait has a median, a minimum and a maximum position and each position has different meaning.

This capacity and tendency for human family systems to change in any one of its great number of traits (or interrelated social values) is associated with two factors which multiply the significance of the individual trait change. One of these is that "good" or "bad" traits of one type tend to be related or associated with similar good and bad traits of the others. A second is that families are organized into systems by various types of civilizations⁸. Hence a major disruption of a system permitting change tends to bring about a necessity for all to alter. When divorce becomes easy and popular and more and more persons find marriage unfulfilling they are less and less willing to sacrifice for any one partner or member. It must be said that not all divorces are casual in nature as many seem to be now. Perfection in mating has always been found impossible since the dawn of history. Before divorce laws made separations legal, mankind used repudiations, desertions and flight to settle domestic irreconcilabilities. The whole story is very complicated but similar from community to community. The probable reasons there are not even more divorces or spousal break-ups now is due to biological maturity, economic expense and lack of opportunity. Paul C. Glick of the U.S. Census Bureau took a national sample of 50,000 cases and found that although quite a number of the young persons were divorced once and then remarried only three per cent did it a second time and an infinitesimal smaller number had more than three experiences. This interrelation of social values explains how when one "bad" trait gains control it tends to be associated with a number of similar others and to reinforce a general breakdown. When this occurs many traits transform themselves to the so-called "bad extreme" and numerous other families suffer likewise. This means that periods of *general* family weakness and disruption *can* arise in civilizations. It was the knowledge of this possibility and probability that enabled the author, in the earlier parts of this century, to predict this current demoralization now prevalent in the latter part. Family problems in 1973 were evident in tendencies which Scott Fitzgerald and others noted by 1920 in those books on *The Beautiful and the Damned*. It is also true that what are called "good" traits tend to coalesce. However our study here is of the opposite types.

FAMILY SYSTEMS ARE PARTLY SELF REGULATING

One of the consequences of the interrelation of values in a family system is that it gives some ability for self-regulation in the family field, and insofar as the family field is related to the nature of the society generally, also some autonomy to the social system of which the family is a part. It may be an overuse of the word "system" but it ought to be emphasized that any such unit is operational and tries to replicate certain patterns like a machine. A machine follows the same pattern during its life existence. A social system is something similar in that its family not only follows the same general pattern as its predecessors but it also tends to adapt the pattern to changing circumstances. This is a mechanical analogy used solely to illustrate the replicating and changing patterns in a family system and their influence upon the larger society. "Cause" in society is a very complicated process.

There seem to be limits to one-way movements in most aspects of all human cultures. This is commonly discussed as the *Theory of Limits in Social Change*. When a family system changes drastically in all its parts it no longer functions as a family. One extreme may be illustrated by the Joint Family, as it is called, in India.²⁹ Here relatives live together within the same household under a semi-communal system so that it is often difficult for the individual child to understand clearly who is his mother, his father, his siblings and his uncles and aunts.^{28, 29} The joint family is different from the Zadruga type where each domestic unit has its own "firepot" and its own individuality in a large collectivity. This Zadruga type of family has been very common in rural Europe and is what the Le Play group called the Patriarchal Family. It is also found in much of Asia. But the Hindu Joint Family goes beyond the Patriarchal type in its almost tyranny over the members.

The opposite extreme which Le Play called the "ébranlée" (weak or broken) type may be illustrated by the current situation at least among a growing minority of current families.^{2, 19} Marriages and co-ensuing family relations are now increasingly poorly made, poorly guided and poorly kept. No facet of domestic relations is even considered very basic or essential by a large group of current family workers. This has already been documented.^{14, 16} The idea expressed here is that the extreme types of families make many ordinary social roles difficult of performance. The standard necessary characters in a social system are always persons trained in traditional roles such as husband, wife, parent, child, and mother, father. There are many hundreds of social roles, but the most important to a society are these few concerned with the family because the upkeep and ongoing of the whole social system starts with these. Other roles are important of course but these family roles are the most common, the most universal and of paramount influence to practically everyone. Husband, wife, parent, child—these are ordinarily just human animals with deeply integrated social

roles which seemingly are unavoidable because they originate in the very processes of birth, life and death, no matter when or where a person lives or what he does.

"Family systems" are backed by accepted customs common or written laws, mores and so on which define these roles. The role of a husband or wife is thus different in any given situation from that of a non-husband or non-wife. The larger systems of the society are adapted to these domestic roles as they are carried out in proper settings. In a shipwreck for instance the rule "women and children first in the lifeboats" is an illustrative case. This common law of the sea seeks to protect the next generation more at the expense of the older one. In any social situation one can enumerate a thousand forms of behaviour which are prescribed by customs, mores or the laws. These depend upon clearly defined roles of family members. When most men or women reach the later years of life each has played every basic social role either as main actor or as a foil.

Leo Tolstoi's declaration in *War and Peace* that "All happy families resemble one another (but) every unhappy family is unhappy in its own fashion" is illustrative of this analysis. In happy or "good" families the roles of the different members are regular and predictable whereas the other types have numerous possibilities of role breakage. Since "good" social behaviour supports and reinforces similar types, and the opposite also takes place, this adds to the amount of self-regulation within the family system. We see that today in the lowered birth rate in the cohorts of American families which took place since 1958. This change may be compared with the opposite movement which commenced among American females born between 1915 and 1920 in which the birthrates tended to increase. This self-regulation which is a tendency in all social institutions is a basic postulate used in explaining the changes in family institutions, particularly the reverse currents which seem to come about when the society is threatened. It is possibly best expressed in Durkheimian terminology as part of the significance of the *conscience collective*. However it is best to remember that the words are merely descriptive of what are thought to be the mechanisms whereby some unusual forms of behaviour are explained. (See also the study by Kingsley Davis in 34.)

WORLD RELIGIONS AND WORLD FAMILY SYSTEMS

The above discussion explains how the family system makes or defines and redefines the standard or everyday roles of all members of a civilization. Everyone is what he or she is as a person but also a standard human being. Thus the rise of a world civilization type—which is what we may call the long lasting world cultures which have appeared in the past ten or fifteen thousand years—depended upon the development and standardization of ideas making the newly needed roles of family members universal and iterated in the life cycles of every person. This is where the major world

religions laid the basis for the human scene.⁵ This short term since the retreat of the glacial sheet, has also been that of the development of "historical" time. In this period less than a dozen great widespread religious faiths have risen and these, along with the nations and civilizations which also developed, have been upholders of "Universalistic" family doctrines. Canon law, a term which is used for church rule, and civil law or secular rule have both been deeply concerned with family affairs. Of these two, canon law took the earliest and most primary steps in standardizing the human family unit and its relations between husband and wife, parents and children, and members versus outer kin and strangers. The main Eurasian religions of this historical period have been Confucianism, Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Islam and Christianity. Three others of significance were found upon the discovery of America after 1492—those of the Aztec, the Maya and the Inca. All these religions were or are familistic in their doctrines, which means that without exception, they concern the sanctity of family relations *more than any other mundane subject*. In other words the most sacred or divine aspect of society is considered to be the family system and being religious is tantamount to being a good husband, a good wife or a good parent, child or kinsman. An ordinary person eventually played all of these "roles" as he passed through life.

In this analysis religion is considered entirely in the worldly behaviour or mundane aspects in relation to the family system. This statement does not intend to imply there is nothing else in religion. In addition to these other things, each had a fundamental and fully stated code of the rights and duties of family members to each other, to the kindred, and to the outer world of strangers. Each main religion, or subsidiary branch thereof, no matter what else it made sacred always specified the major family rights, duties and obligations. The family, where possible, was the only way of life. Where the priesthood were excepted, in some affairs, the members had always to subordinate their lives to family norms. Each religion separated (then and now) what is called *sacred* behaviour from other which is either non-classified, or on the far extreme, which is considered *profane*. Each religion has a physical institution which is called *The Church* with an elaborate set of edifices, paraphernalia, and rituals. This Church seeks to perpetuate the doctrines of the sacred and the profane and to preserve the practices of sacred acts as opposed to profane. Durkheim, in his study of Primitive Religions, holds that all groups, even primitives, have "churches" and "rituals" for their religious affairs.

The sacred behaviour was always concerned mostly with "higher" social values as opposed to the secular or profane which dealt more with what is supposed to be "lower" or individual values. Societies inevitably think of themselves as having physical immortality. To achieve this the religions promote ideas among their disciples which, in their opinions, will add to or help create this physical immortality. In other words religious mandates

seek to promote what is called the "social good". Each religion also has its doctrines of cosmogony and eschatology or of the origin and the end of the world as illustrated by the stories in the first books of Genesis and the Revelations in the *New Testament*. These dogmas are justifications of the sacred-profane doctrines. Thus "social", "family", "religious" systems were always bound together in a more or less common shape because each was part of the other. And since the family system is an edifice erected upon the mammalian biological background of the human species there have been and are always three irrational interests in any given family system.^{20, 31, 32} (By "irrational interest" is meant a sublimated potential emotional force which if disturbed often causes unanticipated consequences). We have called these "the triple fields" of the family. They are mammalian, religious and political rights in the family. A marriage and its ensuing processes of sex, social, economic and reproductive sequences has to try to satisfy the sex animals, the mores and the political processes.²¹

This very important point needs great emphasis because it means that the nature of family systems makes them *neither fluid nor constant* entities but *both fluid and constant* at the same time. If a couple hold that their marriage or mating is their, and only their, business, that situation may, in times such as ours now, be completely unchallenged—at least for a while. In other words the mating arrangement "seems" fluid; and it may continue so unless problems of children, property, support, legitimation, citizenship, and others arise to stir up the mores and the legal authorities. For some few individuals the complications may never arise, particularly if they are wealthy or powerful socially or politically. But for most persons the constant factors intrude and then the original fluid aims are reversed. A cardinal example is what happens after the excesses of a communist revolution. The country cannot turn back to the "derided" old times so they create a new family system for "the good of the community". This new family system was in the cases of Russia and France; after their revolutions, the old ones, with a new name. However a country does not have to have a governmental revolution but instead can achieve the same swings by a revolution of the mores during a period of rapid social change.

THE FAMILY IS A COMPLEX (REAL) GROUP

Thus in a large sense the family is unlike any other human group. Probably the most non-intellectual doctrine in the entire history of modern sociology is the idea, taking shape in the early quarter of this twentieth century, that the family was a group like any other small unit of persons. Early pronouncements of this type received great popularity and led sociologists to believe and to teach ideas of the necessary fragility and easy breakableness of family relations. It was considered that human parenthood had no particular necessary function beyond procreation. Exponents of this theory claimed that the old family, the one existing up to the end,

ment of the 20th century, had carried on a number of functions (support, protection, feeding, education, religious training, sexual gratification, companionship, and so on). (Cf.⁷ pp. 64-118) According to the analysis all these functions of the family were normal duties and were passing away very rapidly. In each case some institution, such as social work, police (protection), restaurants (feeding), schools (education) and churches (religious indoctrination) were taking over given functions and doing better jobs than the old families had before. Hence the time was coming shortly when "companionship only" would be the main function left to the family so that the old familistic era was shortly to pass away.

This idea is introduced here to show that it is a great misinterpretation of the course of the modern family. It is true that now we have in modern society more social work (aid to dependent children), more police supervision, more public eating places, more school training, more Sunday schools, more mass religious movements, and even more forms and types of sexual gratification and companionship. But it is also true that our family product in the shape of inspired young persons seeking legitimate careers in life seems moving towards deep trouble. The deep underlying motivations, controls, and actions formed and passed onto the young by the families seemingly cannot be done well, if at all, otherwise.

In other words the family is a part of the main social structure in the sense that it is a cell of society. No other small group is such in any important sense. A foundation structure ranks in importance above all others. Hence these functions of the family cannot be avoided without eliminating the main working of the institution. The family functions can be supplemented by other social agencies but cannot very easily or successfully be nullified or superseded. This is recognized by the common Latin expression used in law—*in loco parentis* (in place of the parent). If there is no family for the child the state or some legal jurisdiction stands in place of the parent, not as a genuine substitute but as a temporary expedient until the arrangements can be made for foster parents or a foster home or the child matures.

The difference between the family and all other small groups is clearly demonstrated in such questions as citizenship, as status, as to rights or duties of inheritance, of military service and of tax paying. These and other areas of privilege and duty are transmitted through legitimate parenthood. A country protects its citizens and uses them. The question as to whom it protects and uses, is determined primarily through legitimate or legitimated birth—Unless there are strong and convincing reasons to the contrary the status of the father and mother is determining. This point could be discussed at some length but it should be evident that membership in a family is *unique* compared with the thousand and one other groups with which the ordinary person becomes involved during his or her lifetime. In other words the family is not a simple or nominal group because it is always, and also, a unit or referential section of the basic social structure. If one looks at it carefully he may see that there is no other group like the family and the

family is unlike all other groups

RELIGIONS MOULDED WORLD CIVILIZATION FAMILY TYPES

In spite of all of modern science and learning it must be confessed that we do not know how it could be possible that man arose and, after some millions of years of primitive existence, found himself in his present high status. Our only hope here is to try and explain the mechanisms—namely those connected with the family systems—whereby man eventually developed the basic social system which made the world types of civilizations possible. In world (or even primate) time these developed rather recently. The probability that the man animal would do so arose eventually out of the possibility, plus, that certain amount of *human creativity*, which must be granted, *pari passu*, to exist within the human species. We might possibly “try” to “explain” man as just another animal if he had continued to exist in the most primitive stages as some of the stone age aborigines have been pictured. But even there the creativity of man seems to have surpassed by many times that of the most intelligent animals known to us. Thus the dilemma of the advanced civilizations seems mostly unknown and very probably unknowable in terms of mundane logic. *Why* man created these cultural types is a question possibly beyond the realm of sensory investigation. The mechanism or methods used, very probably without much foresight, points to the family systems. Without the printed pages there can be no books and without the standardized family types there could be no society. And the credit for these standardized family types, as this study has been emphasizing all along, goes to the few world religions. The basic similarity of family types in different world religions is explained by the like human material which religions had to use for their family types.

This human material consists of a population in which about a half are males and the other half females. Mankind is a generic-disjunctive animal. (See⁷ pp. 33-35 *et passim*) to reproduce the species male and female collaborate, the male furnishing the sperm and the female the egg. The fertilized egg is nourished in the uterus or womb of the female for about nine months before it is separated from the mother by birth. During this period the woman is dependent because she cannot ordinarily be extremely active and laborious while pregnant. If she has other young children she must also stay with them while the male is away in the fields or the chase. This male-female difference in function and body cells is universal and important. The child has a long period of immaturity. What we are trying to say, without elaboration, is that a *distinct* biological basis exists for the human family. ^{30, 31, 32, 33} By that we do not mean that there is no possibility for variants or that everyone has to belong to one. Even among other animals the general patterns of relations between male and female and the old and the young are often completely broken. Man emerged from whatever prehuman type he was *gly* as he is with what is now called the *nuclear*

family. The basic elements of that existed in the higher primates. The world religions all accepted it as a fact and reinforced it as the basis for the larger human societies. As the society enlarged so did the conception of the universalized family type.

The religions performed two main tasks: (1) organizing family system; (2) fitting the society to the family patterns. They standardized the mores and made sacred the rules of the highest order concerning the relations between man and wife, parent and child and inner family and outer kin. This is evidenced in the first part of this study where the basic ten commandments of Christianity were broken down into parts: one concerning the primary of the Almighty Being and how to worship Him; a second concerning the rules for the relations of persons within the nuclear family, and a third concerning basic relations with strangers or non-family members. Examples are:

- I. Thou Shalt Have No Other Gods Before Me.
- II. Honour Thy Father and Thy Mother.
- III. Thou Shalt Not Covet Thy Neighbour's House, etc.

Every world religion has its own variety of these commandments about as evenly distributed as the one in the Old Testament. The Old Testament itself is the main book of Judaism and Christianity and formed the philosophic background of the Koran and hence of Islam. From these elementary rules it was possible to develop characters and personality types which would fit into and make possible world civilizations. These family types were the building blocks of those local types of social units which were built into the larger units called civilizations.

The second contribution to civilization building by the greater religions was to fit these standard familial characters and pattern into governing systems which included within each more than one recognizable kin group. *A religious person was a family one and vice versa.* The religion itself was modeled on the family as seen in the Christian conceptions of God as the Father and the "all men are brothers" ideas which recur in practically all major aspects of the religion. Even in the Confucian countries the idea of the family overlaps into the governing systems. The idea of filial piety stressed by Confucius was divided into grades from lowest (Don't let your Parents starve) to the highest (Do Nothing which will bring Dishonour upon your Parents). Their version of "Honour Thy Father and Mother" is very specific in promoting the well-working social system. The cardinal virtues of Confucianism are filial piety, benevolence, justice, propriety, intelligence and fidelity.¹ This, in elaboration, is merely our "love, honour and obey" which is the mutual agreement of the religious marriage ceremony in the west today. Much of the remainder of the story is given in histories of the types elaborated by men such as Arnold Toynbee and P. A. Sorokin. When one great civilization was created and got into trouble and fell, another replaced it. Civilized history has been the repetition of this pattern over and over again. When the edifices have fallen the building blocks have

been merged into other high civilizations. This is what is meant by the statement above that the family is not a simple group like other small human aggregations.

THE FAMILIAL ASPECT OF THE PRESENT IRRELIGIOSITY

This brings the analysis to a consideration of the influence of secularism and the present rise of what is called irreligiosity in the upper middle classes of Western society. What does it mean and what influence is it going to have upon the longtime stability and vitality of the Western social system? Needless to say these are very sophisticated questions which have to be discussed in entirely new light other than in the tiresome arguments about socialism, capitalism and communism which have dominated modern thought during the past century and a half.³⁴ The changed religious attitude seems connected, at least in part, with the rise of scientific criticisms of the ancient cosmology. A great many persons no longer accept the basic story of the origin of the universe as given in the opening chapters of the Old Testament. Undoubtedly many of them no longer accept the version of the "hereafter" also as presented in our Bible and other sacred books.

The Commission on Science Education of the American Association for the Advancement of Science adopted a rather long resolution in 1972 which is summarized as follows:

"...the statements about creation that are part of many religions have no place in the domain of science, and should not be regarded as reasonable alternatives to scientific explanations for the origin and evolution of life". (AAAS Bulletin, June 1973, v. 18, no. 3)

This way of looking at life was not adopted by the whole AAAS but undoubtedly it has many supporters in that prestigious group as well as more generally in the public. The accepted religious cosmologies of the past are now under considerable criticism. This in turn possibly has an influence upon the family because it is believed to influence the total faith. At the height of domination of Western society by the Christian Church, the medieval "golden age of Canon law", the family was held to be one of the "sacraments" between God and mankind. After the reformation many areas of the West changed the family bond from a sacrament to "one of the first acts of God". Now the tendency among many groups is to consider the marriage of man and woman as a private act. This has led, it is believed, to the rise of certain feelings of insecurity in the subconscious feelings of the children of those unions.

This seems like repetition of the same type of "irreligiosity" associated with the demoralization among the Romans prior to the rise of Christianity as the new accepted religion. This claim was made by the historian Zosimus. He probably wrote his *History* between the time of the sacking of Rome by the barbarians in 410 A.D. and the answer to his charges by St. Augustine in the first parts of *The City of God* (written between 412 and 415 A.D.)

Zosimus blamed the inability of the great empire to control its internal enemies to the rise of extreme irreligiosity and condemned the Christian movement for the debacle. His complaint about the Christians was that the new movement was very corrupt and led the people away from their primitive faiths and gods. This was also a time of gross violation of family relations and mores as attested by all Christian documents of the fifth and sixth centuries A.D. exemplified by Salvian's writings about 440 A.D. on conditions in Southwest Europe.

It is not our purpose to discuss this irreligiosity further. Suffice it to say that our present science does not explain the rise of man it merely defines another process by which he is thought to have arisen leaving the individual without any answers to the major questions of life. Since the forms of social relations involved in the family are still as important as ever, or even more so, there are no substantial reasons why other rationalizations for family stability cannot develop. Thus Russia returned to the "ethical" family system after its development of the "factual" or private agreement type, during the first two decades of the revolution (1917-1936). The new reason—for the good of the community—was simply a substitute rationalization for the former ethic. (As a matter of fact Durkheim might call the new rationalism "religious" since they are "for the collective good".) In a country such as the United States the return (if achieved) may (and can and probably will) find its own reasons. Our problem is to discuss the seemingly high probability of the return to much greater stability in family relations. In *Soviet Life*, for June 1973 a study of younger generation by Lisovsky of the University of Leningrad indicates that the leading influence there has been the educational system which is concerned with the same problems as ours—the development of talented leadership. This has been called elsewhere by me *The Rise of the Intelligentsia*²³. Most persons lead their lives on a declaratory level and all seem to handle most routine problems that way. Once a new regime gets established, and it meets with public favour, people carry on.

This analysis of the rise of science and agnosticism does not blame the present family decay entirely or even largely upon the supplementation of the older cosmology by the newer. It is but one aspect of a general grand change in social life. Various thinkers have characterized our period as an epoch of vast change. We have embarked upon a struggle for a new era. Whatever be their terminologies, it is clear that mankind has outrun the older systems and entered a period of probing for a new kind of civilization. It has to find a new modified family type for the future. In the meantime the older system, as a functioning entity, has become demoralized. It would take a whole volume to tell all the story of the new situation into which the family system now finds itself. Here it is possible only to enumerate a few main aspects relating to problems of population, economic developments, and rise of the third world.

THE BIG CRUNCH AND OUR FAMILY SYSTEM

It is clearly apparent now that the United States in particular, along with the rest of the responsible world, is involved at once in a combination of rapidly oncoming crises which in the absence of a better name might be called a *big crunch*. These crises will be evidenced shortly in the fields of overpopulation and food shortages; the rapid movement toward exhaustion of our economic resources through careless use and over-exploitation in the despoilation of our environment; and, so far at least, in the almost total failure of our efforts to persuade the "third world" of poverty stricken nations to help themselves, with some external guidance, rather than to continue leaning almost entirely upon the developed nations. Consequently, the coming half century, instead of being one of increasing ease and well-being is seemingly going to be one of greater challenge. To meet these repeated crises the country will need a much strengthened family system to furnish the educated and devoted leadership, and also to make up a corps of self-disciplined followership. These two will be needed to find and carry out the programmes found necessary. We cannot avoid the challenges. If we fail to meet them we will suffer in proportion as we do.

In almost every country prior to the 20th century, and in the undeveloped ones even now the older family was attuned to rural or semirural conditions in which hygienic and medical conditions were crude. Marriages were made usually early; everyone who had the opportunity married; birth rates were high to meet the high death rates; and the families had to take care of their aged. A large family, if attainable, was an advantage. Most of the food growing and processing was taken care of at each home. Even in America the homes, prior to 1920, had no electricity, no refrigeration, and, mostly, no central heating. If one did not live in a coal district cutting fuel was a daily chore. Theodore Roosevelt, President 1901-1908, used to "bucksaw" wood in the White House basement to advertise his "closeness" to the common people. Europe was about the same even much later depending upon climate, availability of coal, incomes and village types. Asia had very high birth and death rates and periodic decimating famines.

During the 19th century things have changed regarding population, food, relation of families to the soil, and a number of related circumstances. Although birth rates have declined, particularly in the industrial and developed nations, the death rates have stayed high or have not declined as much. Now there are close to four billions of people on the planet and the yearly increase is tending to outrun the food supply. By food supply we mean what is available now with present techniques in good years, with little or no allowance for the increasing numbers being born or for the periodic poor harvest years. During the middle sixties there were poor crop years in much of the great plains of Asia but these were supplemented by good grain crops in other places particularly the USA, Canada and Australia. Now in the seventies we are having poor crop years in Asia,

which includes the grain fields of Russia, India and China but in this period even more food is needed than earlier because the numbers of people have increased very greatly. A decade now makes a difference in many millions more mouths to feed. It would seem that the problems justify complete study and action now unless we drift too far. The Western industrial nations cannot solve the problems for themselves alone. Neither can the wealthy solve the problems within a country without at the same time solving them for the masses.

THE RETURN OF SENSIBLE FAMILISM

The nature of the necessary new family system to meet this big crunch may be described as "sensible." It will be sensible insofar as it put more responsibility back upon the parents and the family members and leaves less to the public. It will probably be associated with a new rural class of persons, those on small holdings who will supplement their money-making activities with some incomes in home products from these small holdings. The emphasis since 1930 upon bigness and commercial agriculture has practically destroyed the small farmer because he could not compete in large scale production. This has made the small farmer a chief source of urbanward migration. Millions have moved to the cities where they were not well equipped for urban life nor for industrial occupations. The 20th century migrations have resulted in massive social problems marked most pronouncedly by the rise of urban relief payments. Now our industrialized cities and states are practically bankrupt from welfare payments.³⁵ Our cities are unsafe. Politicians cannot do what they think is right because of their fears of the mob. However the pressure of circumstances is moving in upon us. Slowly but surely we will have to find new ways to promote the family actions more into the sacred and less into the profane. Seemingly character has to be created, if at all, out of faith in the inviolability of family relations. To meet our present problems we need more character in the run of the mill families than we are getting now. The methods can and perhaps will arise out of the needs.

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GLOSSARY

Agnate Family: One which traces lineage on husband's side.

Alieni Juris: Opposite of *Sui Juris*. These two terms are used to express individual independence and direct responsibility for acts before the law. A "minor" is *alieni juris* and an adult is generally considered *sui juris* or independent. These roles fluctuate according to social conditions. In the Roman Empire the first legislation provided that at 25 a son could become *sui juris*. Before that time he could only be freed from his ancestral family by actions taken by his father or guardian. Now in the West the age of 21 is automatically accepted as providing the *sui juris* status. This varies by country and by sex. *Sui juris* is a bundle of rights which may be granted automatically at different ages and for different purposes. Recently the United States seems to be reducing the age of attaining *sui juris* status to 18 years of age but so far only voting and compulsory military services are universally granted or required at that age. In the joint family of India *sui juris* status has to be granted and does not come automatically except to the oldest surviving head of the family.

Atomistic Family: One of three terms used by Zimmerman to classify families according to the strength of the direct control and responsibility of the group of kindred over the individual in contrast with the public law and political authorities. The other two are *Domestic* family, a middle type, and *Trustee* family, an extremely opposite form. The Trustee family is so named because kin group itself has most of the power over protection, discipline and control of the individual. The elders of the families are considered "trustee" of the property, titles and honors of the family groups. Public authorities under the trustee conditions ordinarily order the families to either discipline their members or free them from family protection. This practice is called *abandon noxal*. It comes from the practice of delivering over to the injured family the object which caused the damage to them whether it be an animal or person. If the damage to the injured is not recompensable in money the injured family may be given the right to punish the guilty person or kill the animal. Early and primitive periods in societies are characterised by *Trustee* families and later and more urban period by *Atomistic*. The *Domestic* type is a middle one between the extremes. See *Famille Souche*.

Basic Finite Causation: This applies to those extreme situations where the organisation of the family hampers the social system in a material fashion. Then the situation is such that unless the family situation is changed the social condition cannot recover or change. It happens at both extremes of the family situation, when the family is either too 1 over the individual or too weak to produce properly motivated children.

larly those established in Western Society by the Catholic Church.

Clandestine Marriage: In medieval times in the West (11-15th centuries) when divorces were very difficult to obtain from the canon law officials of the Catholic Church a legal fiction was often used. The appellant claimed that he previously made secret marriage to another woman, hence the marriage he sought to have annulled was really invalid. A married man could not take a second wife.

Cognate Family: Originally this refers to relatives on the mother's side. Since the recodification of Roman Family law in the *Novellae* of Corpus Juris Civilis (c. 535 A.D.) it has come to mean families which trace kindred on both father's and mother's sides.

Cyclical Family Behaviour: This represents a tendency for many family indices to fluctuate something like the bull and bear markets on the stock exchange although over longer cycles as two or three generations. Western birth rates are an example. About 1910, Theodore Roosevelt, a former President of the United States, referred to the low birth rates there as "race suicide". Between 1940 and 1960 demographers were frightened by the high birth rates and fears of overpopulation developed. These cyclical tendencies could not show themselves before, if they did exist, on account of the higher death rates and lack of demographic statistics.

Coloration of Family (or Stain): Ancient family practice in both East and West has recognised that good and worthy action by a family member raises its status and gives it prestige whereas bad and unworthy action does just the opposite. Many family vendettas took their origin in the feeling that actions by another dishonoured the family (stained it). One of the famous statements attributed to Confucius was that the "highest grade of filial piety was for a son to be sure every action done by him added to the lustre of his father."

Consent Age: At certain ages in some societies a female could consent to carnal intercourse without the act being considered a crime by the male partner. This applies to individual consent to marriage as well as sexual intercourse. See *alieni juris*. One intent was to prevent a woman from becoming pregnant before physical maturity. Another was to hold the family inviolate.

De Rerum Natura: A Latin expression meaning "in the nature of things". The primate or mammalian aspects of marriages may be considered *de rerum natura* or a part of nature in man.

Domestic Family: As a type see discussion in Atomistic Family.

Ethical Family: See Factual Family.

Extended Family: Includes a nucleus and a number of kindred. The dividing line between the nuclear and extended family is a matter of local opinion. In the West it is expected that close relatives of the husband and wife such as grandparents, husbands and wives of their children and even grandchildren in cases of need and if they have no other adequate support, will live with the nuclear family. H the nuclear family of bread-

winner and his wife who support the nuclear family are "bosses" of the group. In India this sort of extended family, which ordinarily includes relatives only on the agnate side, is classified as a "joint" family. On the whole, the Indian unit which is called a joint family, tends to include more of the husband's collaterals than do enlarged family in the West. The extended families in the West generally live in a number of closely related households, family groups. In India this is conventionally also called a joint family. (The Indian census uses the term "undivided"). In the West the extended family more or less is clan-like in that they co-operate in work, in social activities, and, in case of feuds with other families, join together for protection or vengeance (passive and active solidarity). See *Nuclear family*.

Exogamy: Means marriage outside one's own group. *Endogamy* means marriage inside one's own group. All family systems are both exogamous and endogamous in that rules, practices, mores, beliefs and or laws specify who can and who can't intermarry. Black-white marriages have been forbidden in the United States in many states until recently. Now they are allowed by law but are ordinarily prohibited by the mores. From that point of view white marriages with whites or blacks with blacks are considered endogamous and black-white marriages are considered exogamous. Exogamy and endogamy are attempts to control mating by prohibiting marriage outside the social, religious, and other classes, and requiring marriages inside each. The wider the class differences the more strict are the endogamous and exogamous rules.

Endogamy: See *Exogamy*.

East: Fundamentally Asiatic, particularly India and China.

Famille-Souche: Frederic Le Play, the founder of modern family sociology noted three types of families according to their modernisation. He called the most traditional type the "patriarchal family". By that he meant what is called by Zimmerman, *trustee* family. The extremely modern urban type was called by him *ebrales* which is essentially an individualised type somewhat similar to what was called by Zimmerman, *Atomistic*. In between he created a concept of *Famille-Souche*, which Zimmerman has called the Domestic type. The *souche* means technically stem family. The stem family could send representatives to the outer world to live elsewhere but replaced them at home like a grape-vine each year replaces the stem which is pruned away the previous fall.

Fredum Payment: See Transaction, Composition and amend.

Factual Family: The opposite of Ethical family. In the factual family, living together is considered marriage and living apart is considered a divorce. The *Ethical* position on the family is that man and woman living together may or may not be marriage and living apart is not a divorce but may be used in the courts as proof of desertion which may be claimed as a for divorce. Thus is legal terminology

Hypergamy A custom which allows a man to have more than one

wife at a time, but the second and later ones must come from lower castes. It does not apply to women having more than one husband at a time.

Intelligentsia: This term is used to signify the modern recruits to the upper classes who have risen through the use of educational ladders, in the sense of becoming thereby scientific and other types of leaders. Other social classes arise through use of economic, military, or family means. The intelligentsia are increasingly dominant in the modern West.

Incest: Prohibited marriages and sex relations based upon close biological kinship. This is universal and very ancient. In many societies it is believed incest causes leprosy and this is similar to the ancient belief that masturbation causes insanity. The basis of the prohibition of incest is believed to have been long experience with deleterious effects of close inbreeding although the adverse influences of several males in the same household having sexual access to the same females may have also been prominent. In Western countries the line is drawn at first cousins in that one can never marry a person nearer than this and first cousin marriages are permitted in only about half the legal codes. This fear of incest has been a constant influence against households composed of other than nuclear families. The age differences between grandparents and grandchildren would ordinarily prevent sexual intercourse between these two widely separated generations.

Joint Family: See *Extended Family*.

Jus Connubi: A Roman law term which defines the rights of intermarriages. In a pure caste society the *jus connubi* is limited to the caste members. *Jus connubi* is also defined by the mores in that some intermarriage is opposed by social distinctions. No human society has indiscriminate intermarriage but some have more latitude permitted than in others. In those with more latitude persons of achieved status rise more rapidly than in others where ascribed status is favoured.

Matrilineal: Tracing lineage through mother's family. Cognate in its early meaning.

Matrilocal: Family in which husband goes to live with wife's group.

Mammalian or Primate aspects of the family: See *Triple Field Theory* of the family. The mammalian or primate aspect of the family is its most private and individual interest and is reflected in the informal relations between husband and wife and parent and child. Ordinarily a woman, except to gain a divorce cannot testify against her husband and vice-versa.

Nuclear Family: This is used in two senses. All families tend to have a nucleus, which consists of a pair-bonded husband and wife and a generation bonded parent child relation. Nuclear family is a concept also used to denote the family type which is built closely around the nucleus and does not ordinarily include many more relatives or others. See *d*

realism, which holds that the family group is coterminous with the human species as are the natural groups among other animals.

Patrilineal: Another name for Agnate family.

Patrilocal: Family in which wife goes to live with her husband's group

Pre-Columbian family systems: Before 1492 strong national family systems were formed in America largely by the Inca, Mayan and Aztec Civilisations.

Polarisation: A term in social change which applies to the periods when an existing trend loses its utility and is being replaced by another. In those times a separation develops between the old and the new trend which carries on until the new gains precedence.

Polygyny, Polygamy and Polyandry: Technically polygyny means the right of a man to more than one wife at a time. Polyandry means the custom of one woman having more than one husband at a time. Polygamy is sometimes used for polygyny.

Realistic Conception of the Family: See *Nominalism*.

Repudiation: This is a form of unilateral divorce. Generally, the husband had the right to do this to his wife but with the advancement of civilisation the right has been limited to the conviction of the woman of certain faults in front of a group in which representatives of her own kin were present. In its modern form, many societies give the man and the woman both the right of repudiation. It is different from a divorce by litigation in which a marriage partner has to be convicted of a given fault before a jury of strangers. Barrenness was often an argument used in repudiation of a wife.

Sui Juris: The opposite of *alieni juris*.

Statutory Illegitimacy: This is a status acquired by many children in countries with two law codes, one customary among the lower classes and one written among the upper classes. The common people marry according to custom and then find they are technically not married so that no penalty can be given them if they desert their women and children. In central and South America illegitimacy rates are very high but this is largely fictitious because the marriages were not licensed by the state or high church. When the cultures start modernising they enforce school attendance or to receive social security payments, insurances, court awards to relatives of the injured or deceased etc. Some countries meet this situation by legalising all marriages of any kind; others by having mass marriages at public celebration after the fact; and finally some do nothing. Real statutory and illegitimacy are different acts although easily broken statutory illegitimacy often has very adverse effects upon the women and children who are later

Trustee Family: See Atomistic Family. In a sense the Indian Joint family has many trustee powers and practices.

Transferral Income: Until the last half century, family income came from wages, interest, rent and profits. During this century, public relief in Western countries has mounted to high proportions. The ancient conception that public relief was a gift like alms has changed to the expectancy of public relief as a "right" and is called by many economists Transferral Income.

Triple Field Family Theory: This is a concept developed by Zimmerman to show that the family is a basic part of the social structure in that it ties together the primate, the moral and the political interests of the society and relates them to the individual. An unbalanced theory of the family or institutional practice favours one field excessively to the detriment of one or both of the other two.

Transaction, Composition and Amend: Peaceful means used to settle interfamily disputes without resort to violence before the days of central governments with their courts and police powers. The elders of the two families met together, in case of trouble, agreed on a settlement of the dispute by a payment from the guilty to the innocent. This was the "composition payment". It was followed with eating together, a sort of "amend" ceremony. Charlemagne (800-840 A.D.) sought to recreate the Holy Roman Empire in the Dark Ages. He tried to make this peaceful means of settling family disputes compulsory and charged the local officials to keep a third of the composition payments for the royal purse. This was an attempt to recommence civil legislation to settle disputes after the decay of the Ancient Roman Empire with its court system and law codes. The part kept for the Royal purse was a sort of fine or court expense and was called a "*Fredum Payment*".


West: Fundamentally European. This includes the Colonies of Europe insofar as they are true to type. It started with Mediterranean Civilisation and in the end its family system was united under the universal acceptance of Roman family law.

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